*1 Query assigned to him as that the funds in payment Hunstein claims attorneys’ in criminal case. fees a federal of remedy extraordinary right mandamus, of to the To obtain sought legal right petitioner to the relief must show both a clear remedy. adequate has failed to Hunstein of another and the absence remedy showing. file a claim on his own His was to make either result, a action, he did not do. As in which behalf he the state forfeiture under the forfeiture statute owner or interest holder is not an legal right See 16- a to the seized funds. OCGA not have clear does (a). denial of mandamus. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s 13-49 Carley, Judgment Fletcher, J, Sears, Benham, J., P. C. affirmed. Judge Thompson, JJ, Hines, Hun- H. Arthur McLane concur. disqualified. stein, J., 3, 1977 February Decided 21, 1997. February denied
Reconsideration Ralph pro Hunstein, J. se. Attorney, McClain, McDade, H. Assistant District William
David Attorney, pro se. District INTERSTATE GUARANTYINSURANCE
S96G1100. HINTON v.
COMPANY. (480 SE2d Justice. Sears, granted Guaranty Co.1 certiorari Hinton v. Interstate We a farm tractor can be an uninsured motor consider whether when, in statute2 the course of the uninsured motorist nonagricultural pursuit, a it collides with another vehicle on question highway. in the answer this affirmative. We Lynn injuries personal car when her Plaintiff Hinton suffered Billy Ken- a farm tractor defendant Kendrick. collided with owned using a 14-foot wide mobile drick and others were the tractor tow county The tractor as motor home on a vehicle and it was not covered insured road.
by liability insurance. Hinton was (“IGIC”) Company Guaranty and her Insurance Interstate policy provided protection. against were Kendrick and the others who
Hinton filed suit copy assisting moving home, the mobile and served IGIC with 292) (1996). 2 OCGA 33-7-11. complaint denying any and summons. IGIC filed an answer denying
defendant was uninsured that Hinton was entitled to portion policy. under the uninsured motorist of her There- partial summary judgment, after, IGIC moved for and the trial court granted finding motion, its that “a farm tractor is not a motor vehicle appealed, uninsured motorist statute.” Hinton *2 majority Appeals and of the Court of affirmed.3 We reverse.
The uninsured motorist statute defines an “uninsured vehicle” as a no, motor vehicle as to which is there either or insuffi- bodily injury liability property damage liability cient, insurance and (1) (D). (b) § insurance. 33-7-11 statute, however, OCGA The does not define term “motor vehicle.” present Appeals case,
In the the trial court and Court of con- strued the term uninsured “motor vehicle” in the motorist statute to only include vehicle” in those motor vehicles that meet the of “motor definition (1), § type 33-34-2 OCGA which Code section sets forth the required mandatory liability of vehicles “Georgia to have insurance under the Reparations Motor Vehicle Accident Act.”4The definition of (1) § motor vehicle in is 33-34-2 as follows: (1) having “Motor vehicle” means a vehicle than more load-bearing three wheels of a kind to be relating under the laws of this state to motor vehicles designed primarily' operation upon for streets, highways by power roads, and and driven other than muscu- power. lar The term includes a trailer drawn or attached to such a vehicle.
Judge agree majority Johnson, however, did with the Appeals, concluding purposes Court of his dissent of the restrictive, uninsured motorist this definition is too in that it purpose defeats the remedial of the uninsured motorist statute and agree position. leads to absurd results.5 We with that purpose legislation of uninsured motorist is to provision first-party some “to facili- injuries person legally tate indemnification to a who is damages motorist, entitled to recover from an uninsured thereby protect negligence innocent from the victims irresponsible 935, 7 drivers.” AmJur2d Automobile 3 Guaranty Co., v. Hinton Interstate Ins. App. supra. Ga. 220 §§ OCGA 33-34-1 to 33-34-8. dissenting). Guaranty Co., v. (Johnson, Hinton Interstate App. J., Ins. Ga. 703-705 § remedial motorist statutes are
Insurance, 293. Uninsured accomplish construed to must be in nature and Wages legislative purpose. Farm Mutual See v. State Id. 1) (1974); see also Co., Auto. Ins. 205 Va. v. Farm Mutual Auto. McDaniel State 806) (1965).6 (139 SE2d Limiting unin- of the the definition of motor (1) § forth in 33-34-2 statute to the definition set motorist sured example, unjust that limited defini- and absurd results. lead to scope motorcycles § 33-7-11, as a from the tion motorcycle exclude would load-bearing Given that three wheels. does not have many motorcycles highways driven to be given daily present motorists, and risk to other required by motorcycles cov- OCGA 40-6-11 be are themselves under for “motor vehicles” ered the same insurance seq., term to construe the et it would be absurd OCGA 33-34-1 so motorist statute as exclude vehicle” in the uninsured motorcycles. importantly, of the
Further, more the remedial “motor vehicle” be statute mandate that term *3 broadly provide protection to motor- innocent to financial construed injured by irresponsible purpose, it this are drivers.7 Given ists who is clear that vehicle,” of the uninsured
the
term
least
classes of motor vehicles:
must include at
two
motorist
(1)
primarily
public
designed
use
the
that are
on
Motor vehicles
liability
by
required
insurance;
and are
law to be covered
roads
(2)
primarily
designed
the
for use on
vehicles that are not
and motor
liability
required
public
insurance, but
to have
roads
are not
being
operated on the
of an accident are
which
the time
designed primarily
purpose.8 former
like a vehicle
roads
of
a motor
because, when an owner
such
must be included
signifi-
liability
poses
purchase
insurance, the motor
to
fails
innocent,
be
to
motorists. The latter must
cant financial
threat
regard,
a motor vehicle
the
reason. In this
when
included for
same
by liability
required
not
to
insurance and is
that is not
be covered
designed
driven
designed
for use on the
roads is nevertheless
as a vehicle that is
on
roads
the same manner
the
the
use, the
of that vehicle circumvents
for that
insurance
driver
just
surely
vehi-
as motorist who drives a motor
laws
as
(1980).
Co.,
Smith v. Commercial Union Assurance
receive
conduct of motorists
financially irresponsible.
who are uninsured and
v.
Moore
(1967).
Insurance
N.C.
Further, in Chase v.
Co.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. the Arizona
Supreme
golf
Court faced the issue of whether a
cart that designed
public highways
for use off
could be excluded
from unin
policy
violating
sured motorist
in an without
Georgia
uninsured motorist statute. Like the
uninsured motorist
statute, the Arizona statute did not define the term “motor vehicle.”
Reasoning
pro
that the uninsured motorist statute was
*4
public highway,
Supreme
tect motorists on the
the Arizona
Court
adopted
concluding
analysis
Appeals Autry,
the
of the North
Carolina Court of
pro
that the Arizona uninsured motorist statute should
“
tect motorists from ‘motor vehicles which should
. . .
be insured
but
subject
though
compulsory
not,
which,
are
and motor vehicles
not
(N.C.
1978).
in OCGA 33-7-11 includes the designed operate off motor vehicles while highways highways, operating public the on the Accordingly, motor the tractor in this case was a time of an accident. purposes of uninsured motorist statute. We therefore the Appeals. judgment of the Court of reverse except Thompson, Judgment J, concur, reversed. All the Justices who dissents. dissenting. Justice, Thompson,
Although
statute16 does not define
the uninsured motorist
one
vehicle,” it
“uninsured motor vehicle” as
term “motor
defines an
liability
no,
insufficient,
is
or
insurance.
as which there
either
determining
inquiry
is
unin-
Thus,
true
whether a vehicle
an
purposes,
is whether
vehicle for uninsured motorist
sured motor
generally Smith v.
Union
must be insured. See
Commercial
(268
632) (1980). my view, this
In
Assurance
Decided Spiva, appellant. Davis, E. Howard Cecil C. Mabry, Clyde
Chambers, III, Brooks, & McClelland E. Rickard appellee.
S96A1486. BARBER v. THE STATE. Justice. Sears, appellant, Jacorey juvenile, The Barber, was convicted of mal- possession during murder, ice aof firearm the commission of a fel- ony, receiving property.1 appeal, and theft stolen On Barber con- 21, September 20, The crime occurred on 1994. Barber was indicted on October 1994. 26, guilty April Barber was on day. found and the trial court sentenced him that prison years trial court sentenced Barber to life for murder and terms of and ten five prison, respectively, possession offenses, for the of a firearm theft both terms to run con secutively 15, 1995, May to the life sentence. Barber filed a trial motion new on and the reporter transcript court certified on November The trial court denied the May 5, 1996, May appeal motion for new trial on and Barber filed a notice of 29. The