*1 question Since there is no that Merastar is not “the same in- surer” that issued policy the insurance under which Wheat was opportunity reject, writing, uninsured motorist 1988, I believe policy (covering the Merastar Wheat at the time the collided) subject by operation included uninsured motorist benefits (a) (1). Consequently, law. See OCGA 33-7-11 I would affirm the trial court’s Wheat’s motion for and de- nying Merastar’s summary judgment. motion for
Decided March 199 Goodman, McGuffey, Lindsey, Claxton, Aust & William P. James B. McClung, appellant. for
Coppedge, Leman, Jr., Goddard & Coppedge, Warren N. J. Al- Hammontree, Hurtt, len Hurtt, Finn & Michael D. appellees. Mullins,
Self, Marchetti, Robinson & Robinson, Miller P. Deron Hicks, R. amici curiae.
A95A1842. HINTON v. INTERSTATE GUARANTY INSURANCE
COMPANY.
Birdsong, Presiding Judge. Appellant Lynn Hinton, plaintiff personal case, injury this seeks coverage her carrier, uninsured motorist Guaranty Interstate Insurance Company, damages arising out of her collision with a farm being tractor used to haul a mobile home.
Defendants Kendrick et al. were using Billy Kendrick’s farm tractor to haul a mobile home after county sunset on a They road. had permit to haul a mobile home using specialized and were not a vehicle as by Department Transportation regulations. The trailer was feet wide. The tractor driver having was cited for wide, load too lights escort, no amber escort, on sign no wide load on dark, towing after improper and an towing vehicle. Kendrick’s tractor liability covered insurance. granted partial trial court summary judgment to the defend- ant Guaranty Interstate Company, Insurance that “a finding tractor is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist Appellant statute.” Hinton contends the trial in “holding court erred that a farm engaged non-agricultural activity is not a mo- tor vehicle for of the Uninsured Motorist Statute.” Held:
1. contended, found, insurer and the trial court purposes of the uninsured a motor vehicle was not farm tractor motorist provision requiring code the insurance law because being 33-34-2) designates vehicle” as a “motor load-bearing having kind re- wheels “of a three than more relating by Georgia registered” vehi- quired . . to motor “laws . streets, roads, cles and power.” power than muscular and driven *2 (1). § OCGA 33-34-2 to was not intended Statute Motorist Uninsured coverage
provide OCGA 33-7-11 of this state. to the citizens all-risk (a) (1) provides pertinently lia- or motor vehicle that an automobile bility policy, in therein, or delivered not be issued shall as identified provisions undertak- or state, it contains an endorsement “unless legally ing pay to be entitled he shall insured all sums which to the operator damages motor of an uninsured owner or as recover vehicle.” This statute that the covered legislature reveals the intent of the on its face arising damages from inci- risk be limited to those operator involving motor vehicle. of an uninsured owner or dents the (b) (1) statutory those definition of OCGA 33-7-11 However, no def- to “uninsured.” which are deemed motor vehicles provided “motor vehicle” it- the statute of the term inition is pari accordingly, in materia to de- statutes we must examine self and any, statutory vehicle,” if of a “motor definition termine which Compare applies &c. State Farm motorist statute. to the uninsured (417 419) (physical prece- App. 711, Guest, SE2d Co. v. Ga. 712 203 construing provisions only) where, in the of OCGA dent (6) (2), then-existing pari statutes, §§ OCGA 33-34-2 in materia the doing (33) applied. provisions and their and 40-1-1 so, bly were examined that a tire assem- Guest held it could not be concluded court meaning of the uninsured was a motor vehicle within the statute. Id. primarily designed relating for
The “laws . . . to motor vehicles upon public highways” operation streets, are roads and (33) Georgia. § 40-1-1 defines Title 40 of the Official Code of “motor vehicle” as OCGA “every self-propelled.” However, is vehicle which inquiry defining code “motor vehicle” the insurance the crucial (1)) particular self-propelled vehicle is whether registered relating to mo- under the “laws of this state upon designed primarily operation streets, tor vehicles for by power roads, power.” muscular than and driven (a), promulgated chapter registration licensing pertaining vehicles, re- of motor (b), quires except provided registration excepts “tractors,” in 40-2-20 agricul- registration “used which tural from tractor (b) (2). purposes.” § 40-2-20
701 correctly The trial court ruled that this farm not a mo- coverage. Although tor vehicle for the of uninsured motorist provisions coverage pur- for uninsured motorist are remedial pose broadly accomplish legis- therefore must be construed (Smith lative Commercial Union Assurance (268 50, 632); Rhoden, Maryland 51 SE2d Cas. Co. v.
704, 175)), square SE2d the construction of a statute must City Brunswick, Tuten v. reasoning. common sense and (7) (a) (i) (418 399, 367). Ga. subject To a farm which is not operate everyday driving en- public roadways vironment designed primarily ag- but is purposes, statutory ricultural categorization to a of “uninsured motor vehicle,” prudent does not follow a rule of reason. It was not without major public policy legislature considerations elected to ex- empt farm tractors from registration requirements. It is very sometimes but a separating legitimate statutory fine line con- struction and judicial legislation (Oglethorpe unauthorized Power Corp. Sheriff, 14)); it would cross this line to hold that a farm tractor is an uninsured motorist Additionally, vehicle. it is most reasonable to conclude that provide lature desired to persons uninsured motorist in- jured by motor designed primarily vehicles upon the *3 streets, roads, (OCGA public (1)), and 33-34-2 is it § those uninsured motor daily pose vehicles which greatest risk and danger public. Conversely, to the poses a farm tractor a far lesser de- gree of danger public streets, to those on roads highways, and public policy provides no overriding require reason to such vehicles to treated the same manner as designed primarily op- vehicles public streets, roads, eration highways.
State Farm Guest, &c. Co. v. supra, factually distinguishable controlling and not disposition as to the of this case. That case did “self-propelled” not involve a assembly vehicle but involved a tire which fell off a truck.
2. We note that vehicle used to tow a re- mobile home is quired by law to maintain liability insurance. Department See Transportation Rule (g), pursuant 672-2-.03 enacted to OCGA 32-6- 28, which permits authorizes issuance of for vehicles ex- and loads ceeding legal weights certain and dimensions. grant The trial court’s partial summary judgment did not foreclose in es- this issue but sence determined that this tractor was not a re- motor vehicle quired registered under the Motor Vehicles Act 40-2- 20) and hence was required not have under (1).
If the definition of farm changed tractor is to be order for it vehicle,” become an “uninsured motor change leg- then the is for the used make a islature, Court. To not this of one de- because motor vehicle uninsured an purposes, agricultural intent of the not the is, my opinion, use primary from its parture legislature. Andrews, Ruffin, J., Blackburn and Pope, P.
Judgment affirmed. J., C. concurs in Beasley, specially. JJ., and concur concur JJ., Smith, J., dissent. McMurray, P. Johnson only. concurring specially. Judge, Blackburn, separately to add write opinion but majority with the concur partial motion Interstate’s following. not a motor tractor is that a farm concluded the trial court judgment, That is the statute. motorist the uninsured the Court. only issue before that court’s conclusion the trial opinion affirms majority under OCGA “motor vehicle” on the definition
case turns 33-7-11, contains (UMA), OCGA (1). Act Uninsured Motorist (1) (D), simply “motor vehicle.” definition of uninsured, an uninsured not what motor vehicle provides when a ap- relate to thereunder all five subdivisions vehicle is. The motor existence, coverage to the motorist plicability of uninsured motorist cov- liability coverage. Uninsured amount, collectibility of or liabil- exceed available its limits play into unless erage does not come ity coverage. part coverage is a
Uninsured motorist reject law, insured does where the liability policies under automo- (a) (1) part: “No coverage. OCGA such be issued liability policy shall liability policy or motor bile . . . dam- undertaking pay . provisions . . . . . unless it contains ... at the vehicle, limits motor ... uninsured ages from (Emphasis supplied.) insured.” option of the protection motorist providing for uninsured “[T]he it protection the same public generally with to afford the the same had carried if the uninsured have had would in his liability policy issued coverage under amount of Farm &c. Wages v. State supplied.) (Emphasis name.” Ga. *4 part of the actual provisions are a
As uninsured motorist 33-34-3, that the appear it would governed policy which is lia- related to motor that the definitions legislature intended unin- to the apply in OCGA 33-34-2 would bility policies contained to the indication specific thereof absent provisions sured motorist (UMA). Otherwise, “Motor the term contrary under policy. same meanings two different Vehicle” would have (463 SE2d App. Boston v. Allstate Both 155) (1995) Grange Mut. Co. Brinkley, Cas. 767) (1987) were decided on the issue of coverage based
upon provision policies a “resident relative” of the and did not deal motorcycles with the issue of or the definition of “motor I vehicle.” Georgia appellate can find no motorcycle case which holds that a is a “motor vehicle” for of uninsured as said issue has previously been raised. might ques- While it be fair to why previously tion such issue Court, has not been raised before this pure conclusion speculation would be and cannot form a basis for determination in this case. Traffic,
Title Motor Vehicles and contains the traffic laws of Georgia, including road, State of the rules of the and the broad definition of “motor vehicle” contained at OCGA 40-1-1 clearly needed to possibility reduce the avoiding traffic violators conviction based a narrow definition of “motor vehicle” which might prosecution. exclude registra- for the tion of motor vehicles present and is not at issue in the case. It would appear that legislature intention of the in including the term “tractor” in require those vehicles registration which under OCGA provide was to for those tractors which are used in tandem with trailers for purpose hauling freight, i.e. tractor- trailers. appear It would primary likewise that purpose for the exclusion from registration of tractors used agricultural pur- poses under OCGA 40-2-20 distinguish was to farm tractors from those tractors used in hauling freight. any event, registra- tion of motor vehicles is not present involved case and would not control the resolution thereof. public may
While the change well served in the law which would result in uninsured motorist coverage under the facts herein involved, where the intent of legislature clear, as I feel it is here, any change in may the law only by be made the legislature. “Re- gardless of the desirability arriving particular at law, state of the this court has legislate.” Bieling Battle, authority
I am authorized to state Presiding Judge Pope, An- Judge drews Judge Ruffin join special in this concurrence.
Johnson, Judge, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because believe the erred trial court focusing single statutory on a definition of a motor in this case and did not consider the use to which the being put motor vehicle was at the time of the collision. “The of uninsured motorist require lation is to provision some first-party coverage to facilitate injuries person indemnification for to a legally who is entitled to re- cover damages motorist, from an thereby protect uninsured
704 Unin- irresponsible drivers. negligence from the
innocent victims broadly be in and must nature are remedial statutes motorist sured (Citations purpose.” legislative accomplish the construed 264, (3), 266 omitted.) Doe, 189 Ga. Smith punctuation improperly shifts view majority’s I the (375 believe SE2d injured party compensating away goal focus the class of vehicles by single injured only those victims compensating in Code. the of motor meet one definition which (1), Code the in OCGA 33-34-2 motor vehicle The definition of those vehi- only to delineate by majority, serves relied on section liability insurance cov- legislature has mandated cles as which pro- in other contexts of motor vehicle Applying that definition erage. appellants, by out example, pointed as results. For illogical duces in of motor vehicle satisfy the definition motorcycles would not person involved that a 33-34-2, Georgia court has held yet no OCGA § motorcycle protection seek cannot an uninsured in an accident with or her own automobile coverage of his motorist through the uninsured Co., Ins. Boston v. Allstate policy. generally See Brinkley, Co. v. (463 155) (1995); Grange Mut. Cas. SE2d App. 726 767) (1987). App. 273 of a motor satisfy the definition in case does not The tractor designed (1), clearly not as the tractor was in 33-34-2 vehicle OCGA § does, however, satisfy It upon public roads. primarily operation provisions of the in numerous other motor vehicle the definition of a “every (33) simply ve- defines motor Code. OCGA § (a), defines mo- which self-propelled.” hicle which expressly in- registered, in to be tor vehicles terms of those purposes. solely agricultural being tractors unless used cludes (b) (2). case the instant It is clear that the OCGA 40-2-20 activity This can used, a mobile home. being illegally, to tow was I purpose. believe that way agricultural said to be an ag- purposes other than clearly farm tractors used for lature intended Finally, a registration requirements. riculture to be included motor vehicle under criteria for an uninsured tractor meets the broad (b) (1) (D). was not meant “The term ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ a different defi- purposes Code one definition for [one section] section; split parts the Code such appearing nition when Regal Hall interpretation would be absurd.” engine 511, A with an home, operating on a 14- mobile was capable towing a 52-foot merely highway was not presence tractor’s on public highway. The That the mobile agricultural purpose. legitimate to some incidental rather than another being was towed a tractor home (1) did squarely more which would have fit plaintiff not in this case. injuries diminish sustained We presented policyholder paid premiums are with a who for uninsured injured coverage. public highway She was an accident on a vehicle, which, may a motorized while it have been public roads, performing on same I designed. function as a motor vehicle which is so believe the trial company. court erred in to the insurance Presiding McMurray am Judge authorized to state that join in Judge Smith this dissent. 199
Decided March *6 Spiva, Davis, Howard E. C. appellant. Cecil Chambers, Brooks, Mabry, Clyde III, McClelland & E. Rickard appellee. THE
A95A1851. STATE v. CRISANTI.
Beasley, Chief Judge.
Edward Crisanti possession methamphet- was indicted for of amine with intent to distribute violation of the Georgia Controlled (b). Act. Substances appeals State trial court’s order suppress. Crisanti’s to motion appellate
“When an court reviews a trial court’s concerning order evidence, a suppress motion appellate to guided court should be principles regard three interpretation to the trial First, court’s of the facts. suppress when motion to heard judge, judge the trial sits as the trier of facts. trial judge evidence, ‘hears findings upon conflicting and his based evi- analogous dence are to verdict of jury and should not be dis- turbed reviewing if support court there is evidence to it.’ [Cit.]
“Second, the trial regard ‘questions court’s decision with fact credibility . . . must accepted clearly unless erroneous.’ Third, . . . reviewing court must [Cit.] construe evidence favorably most upholding findings judg- the trial court’s omitted.) (Emphasis ment. State, Tate v. [Cit.]” in light Viewed foregoing principles, the evidence at the suppression hearing day leading showed that on the events arrest, his companions, Rivera, Crisanti pur- and two Dubnoff and flight Brunswick, chased airline Georgia, tickets for a from to San