This appeal primarily raises the question whether appellant, being tried for carrying *248 a pistol without a license. (D.C.Code 1973, § 22-3204), was entitled to a jury instruction as to the defense of momentary or innocent possession when the evidence revealed that his admitted purpose in carrying an allegedly newfound pistol had been to show it to a friend. A second contention, which we shall address later, is that the trial court erred in ruling that appellant was not within the statutory exception permitting possession of a gun on land “possessed by him”. (Section 22-3204, supra.) We hold that he was not entitled to the instruction and that he did not bring himself within the statutory exception. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Appellant’s version of the facts was that he found a pistol in an alley near his apartment building when he went outside to throw away trash and inspect his parked car. Carrying the weapon on his upraised palm, he decided to return to his apartment and show the newfound pistol to his girl friend. When he reached his front porch, however, his girl friend panicked and grabbed the gun. In the ensuing struggle the gun fired twice, injuring appellant and his girl friend. A nearby hospital security guard heard the shots, came to the front porch, and seized the weapon. According to the security guard, appellant tried to conceal the gun in his (appellant’s) pocket as he protested that no gun was involved. (Tr. 7, 19-20.)
We note at the outset that we are not confronted with a claim that a pistol was picked up out of an altruistic. motive either to protect the finder or others from harm, to turn it over to the police, or to otherwise secure it. Rather, we deal with a situation in which the asserted reason for possession was to show the gun to a girl friend. Appellant stated at trial: “Well, I had to take it to somebody. You don’t find things like that and not show it.” (Tr. 90, 91.) We deem this claimed purpose not properly cognizable as an excuse under the policy of section 22-3204 aimed at strict handgun control referred to in Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App.,
In order to assert the defense of innocent or momentary possession, an accused must show not only an absence of criminal purpose but also that his possession was excused and justified as stemming from an affirmative effort to aid and enhance social policy underlying law enforcement. This requirement is entirely consistent with the well-established principle that the showing of a legally valid excuse or justification will negate liability for the doing of an act normally held criminal.
1
For example, the otherwise unlawful possession of a pistol is excused if done for the purpose of self-defense. Wilson v. United States,
The concept of innocent possession was acknowledged in Mitchell v. United States,
supra
Although appellant asserts that he picked up the gun with the ultimate intention of delivering it to the police, it is significant that he still proceeded to move to *249 ward the hostile group and contributed to the ensuing disorder. . . . [Id.)
Furthermore, we agree with what Judge Leventhal stated in United States v. Freeman,
[W]e question authorities like Wallace v. State,82 Tex.Cr.R. 658 ,200 S.W. 836 (1918), that an “unlawful carrying of the pistol” was not established when a friend handed defendant a pistol, as they crossed the railroad track, to hold while he went into a nearby social gathering. Whatever the conditions in rural Texas fifty years ago, in today’s society the offense of carrying a dangerous weapon “is a serious matter in a troubled metropolitan area.” Epperson v. United States,125 U.S.App.D.C. 303 , 305,371 F.2d 956 , 958 (1967).
Appellant has cited several cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have carved exceptions for “nonwrongful” possession of dangerous weapons based on either momentary possession or possession with a civic-minded purpose. We agree with People v. LaPella,
Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erroneously ruled that appellant was not within the exception in section 22-3204 for a person who carries a weapon “in his dwelling house ... or on other land possessed by him”. Appellant has the burden of bringing himself within the statutory exception. White v. United States, D.C.App.,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Mitchell v. United States, supra; W. Burdick, Law of Crime §§ 427, 746 (1946).
. United States v. Pritchett,
. W. LaFave and A. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law 389 (1972 ed.).
. Franklin v. State,