50 So. 564 | Miss. | 1909
Lead Opinion
delivered the (first) opinion of the court; the one afterwards set aside; it was as follows:—
The stenographer’s notes in this case were not signed by the judge. Nor is there any agreement, in writing or otherwise, between the counsel for the respective parties that they were correct. At the time of the institution of this suit the declaration
On the trial in the court below, both these separate firms were present and participated in the trial; that is to say, the firm of Flowers & Whitfield, and the other independent firm of May & Saunders. It is conceded, very frankly, by learned counsel for appellant, that no notice of any kind whatever was given to Mr. George May of the filing of stenographer’s notes, as the statute imperatively requires should be done. The language of the statute is express, and has been over and over again declared by this court to be imperative and mandatory. See section 797, Code of 1906. That section reads as follows on this point: “As soon as the stenographer’s notes, transcribed, shall be first received by the clerk of the circuit court, he shall notify each attorney, or firm, interested in such case, by mail or in person, that said notes were received and are on file.” As stated, there is no pretense whatever that this provision in this statute was complied with in any manner whatever. Mr. May never had any notice of any kind. The circuit clerk testifies, in the second affidavit, that the name signed to the declaration in the case was May, Flowers & Whitfield; but this is no sort of excuse for failure to notify Mr. May, who was not, at the time of the trial in the court below even, much less at the time of the filing of the notes after the trial, a member of the firm of May,
The provision in the statute that each attorney or firm interested shall be notified is one of the highest wisdom. Suppose a case in which three separate attorneys represent the plaintiff on the trial in the court below, and the clerk gives notice to one of them, but not to the other two of the attorneys; these attorneys residing at points distant from each other in the state. Is it possible that the two- attorneys not notified as required by the statute can be bound by reason of notice given to the other attorney, in the face of the express declaration in the statute that each attorney should be notified ? Manifestly, not. Suppose, again, in such case, one of these attorneys is the leading counsel in the case, and the other two, being mere assistants should .be notified, and the leading counsel not notified. Is it possible that the leading counsel can be bound by notice given to the other two? Just as manifestly not. And, of course, what is true of separate attorneys is true of separate firms. It is impossible to fail to see the wisdom, therefore, of the statute, when it imperatively and mandatorily requires the circuit clerk to give notice of the filing of the stenographer’s notes to each attorney, and also to each firm intei’ested in the cause. It is not for us to judicially legislate. The statute is so written, and wisely so written; and it is the duty, the imperative and mandatory duty, of the clerk to give the notice in the manner required by the statute.'
We may also mention that in the very admirable substituto for section Y97, Code of 1906, prepared by Judge Fletcher, and adopted by the Bar Association, for recommendation for pas
Therefore the motion is sustained, and the stenographer’s notes hereby stricken from the record.
Dissenting Opinion
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
There is no doubt in my mind but that the motion to strike out the stenographer’s notes should be denied. The motion is utterly without merit, either as a question of fact or law, and to sustain this motion on the facts here presented is to do a great wrong to the appealing parties. Of course, if the motion is sustained, all good that could possibly be accomplished by the appeal is destroyed, and a judgment for damages in the sum of $3,000, recovered against appellants in the court below, is made absolute, and they are denied the right to have their case reviewed by this court, a result which this court should avoid unless the facts of the case make it an unavoidable necessity. Do the facts of this case make such holding necessary ? Let us examine the record and see. The facts on which it is sought to have these notes stricken from the record are as follows, viz.:
During the year 1908, George W. May, J. N. Flowers, and Albert H. Whitfield, J'r., were associated together in the practice of law in the city of Jackson, as partners, under the firm name of May, Flowers & Whitfield. While so associated, and in June or July of 1908, the firm was employed by one J. M. Shumaker to institute a damage suit against W. W. Hines and the Lamar Life Insurance Company for the sum of $50,000: It is unnecessary for the purpose of this motion’to specify the basis of this suit. The declaration was filed some time in
In January, 1909, the firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield dissolved and two new and independent firms were formed. Flowers & Whitfield associated themselves in a law firm under the above name, and Mr. May formed an association as partner with Mr. Saunders under the firm name of May & Saunders. When the dissolution and reorganization of the firms took place, publication of this fact Was made in the daily papers of Jackson, and each firm had separate and disconnected offices, and had in large type on the door the firm name. While all this was done, no request was made on the clerk to enter the firm of May & Saunders as attorneys of record in the
At the conclusion of the case, V. Otis Eobertson, of counsel for appellant, being anxious to take a trip East urged the stenographer to transcribe the notes at the earliest possible date, to the end that Eobertson might see that the appeal was perfected before he went away; and Eobertson also requested the stenographer to make a carbon copy of the notes, together with the original, the carbon copy to be for the private use of Eobertson, and the original to be filed with the circuit clerk as the record in the case. Accordingly, dn the 6th day of May, following the adjournment of the court on the 17th day of April, and less than twenty days thereafter, the undisputed testimony shows that the stenographer transcribed the notes, and on that day, to wit, the 6th day of May, filed the original in the office of the circuit clerk, and they.were so marked filed on that date. After these notes were filed, and at the request of the clerk, the stenographer carried the filed notes to the attorneys for the purpose of getting them to agree as tu the correctness of the notes. He went first to the office of Mr. Eobertson, delivering the carbon copy to him, and asking that he approve the original. Mr. Eobertson immediately indorsed his approval of the notes, and the stenographer immediately carried the original notes, that had been filed with the clerk of the circuit court and marked filed by him on that day on the last page, and delivered same to J. N. Flowers, of the firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield, with request that
Thus it will be seen that the court adjourned on the 17th day of April, and the statute allowed sixty days for the filing of the stenographer’s notes, which made the last day at which same could have been filed June 17th. In less than twenty days from the adjournment of court, to wit, on the 6th day of May, the notes had been transcribed marked filed by the clerk, and placed, so marked, in the hands of Mr. Flowers. Mr. Flowers retained them, for inspection, until about the 1st day of June, seventeen days before the time expired for filing, and then returned them to the clerk, by his stenographer, and himself in this way filed the notes seventeen days before the time limit expired. Now, this-mysterious statute, so bunglingly drawn and so often appealed to successfully to defeat justice, has no doubtful attitude when its provisions are applied to an attorney who knows or has notice that the stenographer’s notes are on file in the office of the clerk. It provides in such cases that if an attorney or firm interested in the case has this notice ten days.before the expiration of the time allowed for filing, and shall not, within that time, file in writing with the clerk a statement of his ob
In face of the facts of this case, showing that the notes themselves had been delivered to Mr. Flowers, bearing the subscription of the clerk on the last page that they had been filed, kept by him for more than three weeks for the purpose of examination, having on the initial page the style of the case, delivered' to him with no'object but that of notification, and returned by him and filed in the proper office, will the court ever hold that the law was not complied with because the statute says the clerk must notify “each attorney, or firm, interested in such case, by mail or in person,” where the record so conclusively shows that, though the clerk failed to carry out the literal provisions of the statute, he adopted a surer, better method, namely, he placed the filed notes in the hands of the attorney himself and left them there for more than three weeks? Such literalness would be farcical, when the beneficent purpose of the statute is kept in view, and it would be a trifling with the sacred property rights intrusted to the protection of this court.
For some time nothing was heard about the notes in this case, the attorneys for appellant feeling certain that they had perfected their appeal; but about the latter part of July or the 1st of August it was discovered by counsel for appellant that opposing counsel had not indorsed their approval on the notes. The time for filing the notes allowed by law had then long expired; it having been out about June lJth. When counsel for appellant discovered the condition of affairs, he called up Flowers, of the former firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield, and requested Mr. Flowers to approve the notes or waive the matter. Mr. Flowers replied that he would not, of his own motion, take advantage of the technicality; but, if his client insisted, he would reserve the right so to do. During this conversation, showing that Mr. Flowers had examined the notes, he stated that after reading the transcript no errors were discovered, except typographical. Mr. May, of the former firm of May, Flowers &
Neither Flowers nor Whitfield file affiadvits in the case, but Mr. May does; the purport of the affidavit made by Mr. May being to the effect that the firm of May & Saunders participated in the trial of the case in the court below, though the record does not anywhere disclose this fact, and he further states that the dissolution of the firm and reorganization took place as formerly, stated in this opinion, and that no notice was ever given, either to him or his firm, that the notes were on file in the clerk’s office. He further states that he did not know the notes were on file, and never had an opportunity to examine them; but let it not be forgotten that the undisputed testimony in this record fails to show that there were any attorneys of record, other than the firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield, that were “interested in such case,” other than the attorneys for appellants, and that no request was made by any person to- have any other name or firm entered as attorneys of record, and no notice ever given to the clerk of any change of interest in any way in connection with this suit. Mr. May does not appear as counsel in the motion to strike out, though his name appears in the brief. This is emphasized, for the purpose of showing that the real attorneys interested in the cause were notified, if it could aver be held under these facts, for the purpose of this suit, in reference to the service of this notice, that Mr. May was not as much a member of the firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield at the
The opinion of the majority sustains the motion on these facts, and strikes out the stenographer’s notes, thus destroying, the appeal. When I read the opinion, I am a little uncertain as to just what ground this action of the court is based on, as it would seem to indicate that the motion is sustained both upon the ground that the clerk did not notify the attorneys “by mail or in person,” and because the direct notice was not given to George W. May. I dismiss, as unbelievable, any idea that the majority holds, or would ever hold, that so* far as any one connected with this case would be bound with the notice, if the clerk had literally followed the statute and served notice on Mr. Flowers “by mail or in person,” that vsuch person would not also be now bound with notice by the action of Mr. Flowers in dealing with these notes as he did. It is a conceded fact in the' case that all the dealing had with the stenographer’s notes by any one was with Mr. Flowers, and that neither Mr. May or Mr. Whitfield, so far as anything contrary appears in this case, had notice of any kind, unless notice to Mr. Flowers was notice to them. Now, was it ? To hold otherwise is at variance with all other authority which I have been able to find, and dangerous to the safety of litigation. Shall the clerk be required to serve notice on an attorney not of record, even if he happened to have an interest in the litigation? When attorneys of record appear in a case, and subsequently become connected with other attorneys not appearing of record, shall this statute' be so construed as to require the clerk to take official notice of the changes in firms, where the attorneys themselves do not take any action to make'those changes appear of record, and make his failure to do this fatal to the right of appeal vested in litigants ? If that is the law, haste should be made to wipe off the statute a law that deals so dangerously and equivocally with life, liberty, and property; for, if that is the statute, it applies as well in criminal as in civil cases.
In the case of Whittle v. Renner, 55 Cal. 395, a statute required that a notice of appeal be served on the adverse party or his attorneys, and the court held that the attorney meant by the statute was an attorney of record. The same thing is held in the case of Wilson v. San Francisco Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 588, 18 S. W. 286, 32 Am. St. Rep. 624. If there are any cases holding to the contrary, my own industry, coupled with that of the counsel in the case and the other members of this tribunal, has failed to bring that case to light. I am justified in saying that there is no such case, for I have given this subject the most careful and painstaking examination, and such holding is so' illogical and dangerous that I feel confident that, if any court ever made such a decision, it would long since have been receded from. I have carefully examined all the cases cited by counsel in favor of this motion, and here state, without recapitu
After the delivery of the foregoing opinions, the counsel who opposed the motion filed a suggestion of error, and the court set aside its judgment, and remanded the motion to the docket. •Whereupon Whitfield, C. J., recused himself, and K. E» Wilbourn, Esq., a member of the supreme court bar was appointed and presided in his place.
The facts, so far as they relate to the motion to strike out the stenographer’s notes, are as follows:
The declaration in the cause was filed on the 18th of July,. 1908, on behalf of appellee against appellants, in the circuit court of Hinds county, state of Mississippi, by Messrs. May, Elowers & Whitfield, a firm of lawyers composed of Messrs. G. W. May, J. N. Elowers, and A. H. Whitfield, Jr. The-name of said firm was signed to the declaration. No other attorney or firm of attorneys ever formally became attorneys of record in the cause for the appellee in the court below; and, while it appears from the affidavits in the case that the firm of May, Elowers & Whitfield was dissolved on January 1, 1909,. and that two new firms, to wit, the firm of Elowers & Whitfield,, composed of the said J. N. Elowers and A. H. Whitfield Jr., and the firm of May & Saunders, composed of the said G. W. May and J. S. Saunders, then came into existence, which facts were extensively advertised and generally known, it does not' appear that the firm of May & Saunders ever became attorneys-of record in the cause. The clerk of the court makes affidavit
The March term, 1909, of the Hinds county circuit court adjourned April 17, 1909. The stenographer’s transcribed notes
It is insisted that the notice of the filing of the notes, required by section 797 of the Code of 1906, must be given by the clerk, by mail or in person, and that the notice given under the direction of the clerk, by the official stenographer,. who volunteered his services to the clerk for that purpose, is not sufficient,
But, conceding that the notice required by the statute was not given, we are further of the opinion that the question of notice, or no notice, was rendered immaterial by the fact that after the transcribed notes were filed by the stenographer, and examined and approved by appellants the leading counsel for appellee retained the said notes for the purpose of examination for more than five days, did examine them, returned them to the clerk, and filed no written suggestions of correction of said notes. Clearly the object of the notice required by the statute is to afford the parties to the litigation an opportunity to inspect the notes and suggest corrections within the time allowed them, and .to put them in default in the event they do not exercise the right to the use of the notes, for the purpose of inspection and correction, for the period prescribed by the statute, If the appellee exercised, himself or through counsel, the right to use and inspect the notes for the period allowed by the appellee under the statute, and omits to file written suggestions of corrections, the question of notice becomes just as immaterial as is the question as to whether or not process was issued
The motion is therefore overruled.