Hines & Hobbs v. Rawson, 40 Ga. 356

Hines & Hobbs v. Rawson

40 Ga. 356 | Ga. | 1869

Lead Opinion

McCay, J.

1. That there is error in the judgment of the Court, as it stands, is very clear. It was no violation of the injunction to commence proceedings for foreclosure as to the property which had passed into the hands of purchasers from Rawsora *359before his death. It is true, that even as to this property the administratrix is, perhaps, a neccessary party to a bill for foreclosure, but she is only a nominal .party. None of the objects of the bill are thwarted by such a proceeding, and we think the defendants in this motion have a right to proceed against the property referred to, and if the rules of the United States Court require it, to make her a party'to that proceeding. But so far as the proceedings in the Federal Court are intended to foreclose the mortgage on property, which is in the hands of the administratrix, we think such proceedings are a violation of the injunction.

1. The mortgagees are citizens of the State of New York, and under the Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the controversy. It is equally true that the mortgagee may, if he chooses, sue in the State Court. The jurisdiction is concurrent. Now, in all such cases, as well by repeated decisions as by the necessities of the case, the Court first acquiring the jurisdiction in fact has it to the exclusion of the other: 9 Wheat., 532; 20 How., 583; 10 How., 56; 14 How., 368; 23 How., 90. Interminable confusion would result from any other rule, while harmony and justice flow naturally from the rule as established.

2. When these parties filed their bill in Dougherty Superior Court, and, in the regular course of judicial proceeding there, they were enjoined from reducing their claims to judgment until the matters set up in the petition of Mrs. Rawson for the injunction were' disposed of, it is a direct violation of the order of the-Court, in which, by their own motion, they are suitors, to seek another tribunal for the attaining of the very thing they are restrained from..

.3. We recognize fully the doctrine, that neither a State nor a Federal Court will restrain the^ other, even indirectly, by acting on the party, and admit that this rule, so well understood as to foreign jurisdictions, does not apply between the Federal and State Courts. But it will be found, on looking into these cases, that they are all cases in which .the party sought to be enjoined was free to act-when he sought the tri*360bunal in which it was attempted to restrain him from proceeding: 2 Paige Chan. Rep., 404; 2 Story’s Equity, sec. 900. But in this case the defendant was not free to act. Of his own motion he had come into the State Court in the regular course of proceedings there, this injunction had been put upon' him by a Court where he was a suitor, and when he sought the Federal tribunal, he disobeyed the order of the State Court. No tribunal can permit such an indignity. If its orders are improvident, it is to be presumed it will, on motion, vacate them, and if it fail so to do, there is a writ of 4error to this tribunal, or if the party take the proper steps, the law authorizes a removal of the controversy to the Federal Court. But a contemptuous disregard of the order of the Court by one who is a suitor in it, authorizes the Court to punish the offender, and we think, under the circumstances of this c.ase, the Court was authorized to do so.

We think, however, the shape of this judgment is obnoxious to objection. It requires the defendant to dismiss his proceeding in the Federal Court. Perhaps it may seem mere quibbling to find fault with the order for this reason, but it is best to keep up the proper distinctions, especially on so delicate a question as an apparent conflict of jurisdiction between Courts equally supreme, and we think the Court erred in requiring the defendant to dismiss his proceedings in the Circuit Court.

The State Court, as we have said, has the right to punish for disobedience to its order. If the defendant sees fit to take the consequences, let him do so. Each Court has its sphere, and should keep within it, and we doubt not the Chancellor below can find a mode of attaining his end, to-wit: obedience to his injunction, other than an order directing the defendant to dismiss his proceedings in the Federal Court. We reverse the judgment on the ground that the Chancellor had no right to order the proceedings in the Circuit Court to be dismissed. But we have no doubt of his power to punish the defendant for violating his injunction, and to continue that punishment until he shows, by his conduct, that he is in fact obeying the process of the Court. •

Concurrence Opinion

Brown, C. J.,

concurred, laying down the following rules, which are, in his opinion, applicable to the case:

1. The State Courts are exempt from all interference by the Federal tribunals, and the Federal Courts are exempt from all interference by the State tribunals, and each is destitute of all power to restrain either the process o^' proceedings in the other. . Circuit Courts of the United States and State Courts act separately and independently of each other, and, in their respective spheres of action, the process issued by the one is as far beyond the reach of the other as if the line of division between them “ was traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye.” Appellate relations exist in a class of cases between the State Courts and the Supreme Court of the United States, but there are no such relations between the State Courts and the Circuit Courts.

2. The Circuit Courts of the United States and the State Courts, in certain controversies between citizens of different States, are Courts of concurrent and co-ordinate jurisdiction, and the general rule is, that as between Courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court that first obtains possession of the controversy, or of the property in dispute, must be allowed to dispose of it without interference or interruption from the co-ordinate Court. Such questions usually arise in respect to property attached on mesne process, or property seized upon execution, and the general rule is, that where there are two or more tribunals competent to issue process to bind the goods of a party, the goods shall be considered as effectually bound by the authority of the process under which they were first attached or seized : 20 How., 583; 24 How., 454; 3 Wallace, 334; 6 Wallace, 195-6.

3. In this case the plaintiffs, in error having gone voluntarily into the State Court, and an injunction.having issued against them by that Court, restraining further action till the assets of the estate could be marshalled, it was a contempt of the authority of the State Court, into which the parties had voluntarily come, and which had obtained possession of the controversy, for the plaintiffs to commence proceedings in the *362United States Courts upon the same matter of controversy, till the dissolution of the injunction in the State Court, and the State Court had the power to maintain its dignity and enforce its authority by punishing the attorneys of the complainants for violating its injunction, by bringing a suit in the United States Court, or otherwise disobeying its process, till it had finally disposed of the matter in dispute.

But the State Court cannot order the case dismissed in the Circuit Court. It can only punish those subject to its order who disobey its injunction, and it must leave the other party to the litigation to move in the Circuit Court to stay proceedings in the action there brought in violation of the injunction of the State Court, till the final disposition of the case in that Court: 10 How., 71.

Concurrence Opinion

Warner, J.,

concurring.

It appears from the record that Trowbridge, Dwight & Company are citizens of the State of New York, and that they have instituted a' suit in the Fifth Circuit Court of the United States, against Annie E. Rawson, as administratrix of C. W. Rawson, deceased, a citizen of this State, to foreclose a mortgage. The Court below passed an order “ re-. quiring Hines & Hobbs, attorneys-at-law for Trowbridge, Dwight & Company to “ dismiss the said suit or proceeding in the said Fifth Circuit Court of the United States for the foreclosure of said mortgage, and in default thereof, that they be considered in contempt of this Court.” Whilst I do not question the power and authority of the Court below to punish the defendants for a violation of its process of injunction, (if indeed.it has been violated by them,) I do deny the power and authority of the State Court to order and require Hines & Hobbs, the attorneys-at-law of Messrs. Trowbridge, Dwight & Company, to dismiss their suit pending in the Fifth Circuit Court of the United States, or in default thereof, to be considered in contempt. If the State Court has the power and authority to compel the attorneys of the non-resident creditor to dismiss his suit pending in the Circuit Court of the United States, it has the power and authority, for all *363practical purposes, to repeal and render nugatory that provision of the Federal Constitution and the Acts of Congress, ■which secure to the non-resident creditor the right to sue it citizen of Georgia in the Circuit Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the United States enacted' in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land, and no department of the íátate Government has 'the power, either directly or indirectly, to violate or defeat that supreme law of the land. In my judgment, the Court below had no legal power or authority to order the attorneys of Trowbridge, Dwight & Company to dismiss their suit pending in the Fifth Circuit Court of the United States, against a citizen of this State, in accordance with the Constitution and laws thereof, to say nothing about the impropriety of interfering with the jurisdiction and business of that Court by an order of the State Court for that purpose. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the Court below should be reversed.