71 Wis. 74 | Wis. | 1888
This record develops at least three material errors, any one of which is necessarily fatal to the judgment. These will be stated and considered in their order.
1. At the commencement of the trial the defendant objected to the admission of any evidence under the complaint, for the reason that it does not state facts sufficient
It is quite true that the testimony (received under objection) shows a substantial compliance with the requirements of sec. 204. But, without an amendment of the complaint, the testimony should not have been received. No offer to
Before leaving this branch of the case, it should be observed that the case of Plum v. Fond du Lac, 51 Wis. 393, arose before the enactment of the charter of 1879, and it was there held that the notice required by sec. 1339, R. S., should have been averred. At that time the charter of Fond du Lae contained no provision corresponding with sec. 204 of the present charter, so far as we are advised.
2. The next error is the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust her legal remedies against the owner of lots 93 and 94 before bringing this action. The charter provision on that subject is found in sec. 206 of the charter of 1879. The section reads as follows: “ In case of injury or damage by reason of insufficient, defective, or dangerous condition of streets, sidewalks, drains, sewers, gutters, ditches, or bridges, produced or caused by the wrong, neglect of duty, default, or negligence of any person or corporation, such person or corporation shall be primarily liable for all damages for such injury, in suit for the recovery thereof by the person sustaining such damages, and the city shall not be liable therefor until all legal remedies shall have been exhausted to collect such damages from such person or corporation.”
It was held in Amos v. Fond du Lac, 46 Wis. 695, that under the city charter of 1868 (P. & L. Laws of 1868, ch. 59, subch. 13, sec. 11) the obligation of the owner or occupant of the adjoining lot to repair a sidewalk did not arise until he had notice from the city authorities to do so. But the charter of 1879 makes such obligation absolute and not dependent upon any action of the city or the city authorities. Sec. 207 is as follows: “ The duty of always keeping the sidewalks, gutters, drains, and ditches on or adjacent
On the trial, the plaintiff proved that lots 93 and 94 belonged to one Drury, and that the sidewalk was rebuilt under the direction of Drury’s agent on the day the plaintiff was injured, and was left by him in the condition it was when she was injured.
It was held in Amos v. Fond du Lac, that under the charter of 1868 the failure to exhaust legal remedies against the owner was matter of defense. Such failure was so pleaded in this action. But after the plaintiff had proved the facts which showed the primary liability of the owner of the lots, it was incumbent upon her to go further, and prove that she had exhausted her legal remedies against such owner; failing in this, she failed to prove a cause of action. '
One of the grounds upon which the motion for a non-suit was predicated was that, under the complaint and proof, the plaintiff had not made a case entitling her to recover. The motion should have been granted or a new trial awarded for that reason. The rule of pleading established in Amos v. Fond du Lac was based upon the provisions of the charter of 1868, under which no duty was imposed upon the lot-owner to repair or build the sidewalk on his lot until after due notice. There was no presumption that he had received such notice; hence the necessity of stating the fact as a defense in order to show his duty in the premises and consequent liability for injuries caused by the defective walk, But the charter of 1879 makes such duty
3. The third and most vital error is that the case was tried and the verdict and judgment rendered upon the hypothesis that the defective condition of the sidewalk for the four weeks or more before Mrs. Cuff was injured was the direct and proximate cause of her injury. Nothing could be further from the real fact. The broken and defective sidewalk, during all that time, was practically impassable; at least, the plaintiff never attempted to pass over it. It was inconvenient, no doubt, to travelers who otherwise would have used it, but was perfectly harmless so far as exposing any one to peril is concerned. It was the same as though there had been no sidewalk there. The proximate cause of the injury complained of was the loose plank, the end of which did not rest upon the stringer. That, and that alone, was the defect in the walk which was the direct ■cause of the injury. That defect had existed but a few •hours before Mrs. Cuff was hurt, and there is no claim or pretense that any city?- official had anything to do with leaving the plank in that condition, or had the slightest knowledge of the existence of the defect. As a matter of course, there is nothing in the case to charge those officials with constructive notice of the defect. Hence the finding that the injury was caused by the negligence of the city is entirely unsupported by evidence. For these reasons the nonsuit should have been granted. That being denied, a new trial should have been ordered.
4. At the common law the cause of action would not have survived the death of the plaintiff, and a reversal of the
5. The printed case contains about 200 pages of printed testimonj7. The reporter’s minutes of the testimony is signed as the bill of exceptions, and nearly the whole of it is inserted in the printed case. A very large proportion of it is entirely useless for the purposes of this appeal. It is mere chaff, and confuses, rather than aids, the investigation of the case. This is a gross violation of the rules of this court in that behalf. [In the original opinion a statement as to who is responsible for this violation of the rule was here inserted, but having been found erroneous it is omitted by direction of Mr. Justice LyoN.] The testimony could
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.