1 Iowa 36 | Iowa | 1855
It appears that these parties were married on the 2d of November, 1846, in the state of Massachusetts. They continued to live together, with the exception of a short separation in the year 1848, until in September, 1850.r At that time, from some cause, perhaps not very clearly developed, they .separated. The complainant remained with some friends in Boston until the next spring, when she came to Lockport in Illinois, to reside with her uncle, one Edward B. Talcott. The respondent remained in Boston. Since that time, complainant has been in Boston once, if not offcener, but their separation has been complete since the autumn of 1850. In March, 1854, she came to Keokuk in this state. In December, 1854, her uncle removed from Lockport, Illinois, to Hannibal, Missouri. Up to the time of filing the petition, she had remained in Keokuk, except perhaps two visits to her uncle, while he was at Lockport.
This case has been most fully and ably argued by counsel, showing the deep solicitude of themselves, as well as their clients, in the result. The parties, from all the testimony, appear to be very intelligent, to have enjoyed the society of the best circles in the city of Bostón, and to have had the esteem and confidence of the learned and worthy wherever known. Their position and influence have natu
It is claimed by tbe respondent that no divorce can be granted in tbis case: First, because complainant was not a resident of tbis state for six months next preceding tbe filing of her petition, witbin tbe meaning of tbe law; and second, if sbe was, then tbe testimony does not make it “ clearly apparent to tbe court that tbe parties cannot live in peace and happiness, and that their welfare requires their separation,” ór that tbe equity of tbe case is with tbe respondent, and not tbe complainant.
Tbe first question is jurisdictional in its character, and will be first examined. Tbe provisions of our Code, on tbe subject of residence in these cases, are as follows : Sections 1480 and 1488 provide that “ Tbe District Court in tbe county where tbe plaintiff resides, has jurisdiction of all cases of divorce and alimony and of guardianship connected therewith.” “ Tbe petition for divorce, in addition to the facts on account of which tbe plaintiff claims tbe relief sought, must state that be (or sbe) has been for tbe last six months a resident of tbe state. It must also be sworn to by plaintiff.”'
On tbe part of tbe complainant it is claimed that the words “resident” and “reside,” as used in tbe law, do not bave tbe same meaning as tbe word domicil; that tbe question of intention cannot be considered in determining such residence, whether with reference to tbe coming into tbe state or that of remaining. It is urged with much ability that tbe legislature, by making tbe remaining witbin tbe state a required, definite time, to wit, six months, designed to make such time tbe evidence of intention, without reference to tbe motive of tbe inhabitancy, or tbe future design of tbe party. And it is further claimed that even if tbis is
"We cannot concur entirely in the first part of this proposition. The residence contemplated by our law, in these cases, cannot, in our opinion, be that of the sojourner — the visitor — that of one here on business, or for the accomplishing of a particular purpose — with no intention of remaining. The animus manendi must exist, in order to constitute a residence. Not that, in the language of Yattel, “ it shall be a habitation fixed, with the intention of always remaining,” but rather that there shall be a.fixed habitation or residence, without any present intention of removing therefrom.
Our law provides that “ words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language; but technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in Jaw, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.” Code, section 26, clause 2.
In giving a construction in this instance, but little aid can be obtained from the language used in the context. So far as the object and purposes of the law are concerned, however, as developed in this chapter, some assistance is given. The residence in the county gives jurisdiction, not only as to the divorce, but also as to alimony; and not only as to alimony, but also of “guardianship connected therewith.”Was it the design of the law that a sojourner- — -a temporary -dweller for the space of six months, averring an intention to leave as soon as he obtained his divorce — was to be entitled to the aid of the law, not only to be divorced, but also to have the question of alimony, and the guardianship of children, settled at the same time? We do not believe so. There is more reason in saying that it was designed to operate upon residents permanent, and such as that their character, property and condition in life, had become known and understood, and who, from actual inhabitancy, were entitled to the aid of our laws.
But why provide for six months, or any time, if there
But further, in considering the context,, let us look at the eighth cause for a divorce under the Code, and the one relied upon in this case. It must be “ fully apparent to the court that the parties cannot live in peace and happiness,” &c. The court, as we apprehend,, is not to be satisfied that in years and months past the parties could not live together in peace and happiness. The whole past may have been condoned and buried. It has reference to their ability to so live at the time of making the application, in determining which much aid might be gathered, it is true, from their previous conduct and happiness. But if the husband can leave the wife, or the wife the husband, and come to our state, board at hotels, and visit any and everywhere within and without the state, and no reliable means are afforded for showing the true character of the applicant, as you could in the case of the bona fide resident, how could it ever be said that the parties could not, at the time, live in peace and happiness together. Difficulty, it is true, might exist in making the proof, and ascertaining the reliable facts, in cases where the applicant had his residence bona fide and actual for only six months. But, we apprehend, not so much so as in the case supposed. The Iona fide resident designs and expects to continue his home where he brings
But, not to further enlarge here, let us next ascertain ■what “the approved usage of the language ” would dictate in giving this construction. And here we may remark, that such is the character of our language that nearly, and' indeed most of the words in general use, will be found to vary in meaning, according to the context or connection in which they are used. This might be illustrated by a very large reference. Take the words “settlement,” “sentiment,” “right,” “apparent,” “reasonable,” “loud,” “levity,” and “restraint,” as an illustration. Many of these words we have selected at random from the chapter regulating divorce and alimony; and the curious, by giving these words their frequent conceded meaning, without reference to the connection, will readily see the change or jargon that would be made in this chapter. So it is with the word reside or resident, in speaking of its construction from the approved usage of the language. "Webster’s definition is, “to dwell permanently, or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time. When the word is applied to the natives of a state, or others who reside in it as permanent citizens, we use it only with reference to the part of a city or country in which a man dwells. One who resides or dwells in a place for some time. A man lodges, stays, remains, abides, for a day or a very short time, but reside implies a longer time, though not definite. To set, to settle.” It will be observed that the learned lexicographer uses the word “ dwell ” in this definition. The definition of that is, “to abide as a permanent resident,” “ or tp inhabit for a time;” “to five in a place.” Dwell may signify a residence for life. And in this definition he uses the words “ inhabit ” and “ live.” To inhabit is to occupy as a place of settled residence; to live is “to abide, to dwell, to have a settled residence in any place.” So that, while no definite time is necessarily implied from the word resident or residei
Let us now see whether these words .have, or have not, a peculiar and appropriate meaning in' law. This, we must determine by reference to the text books, the construction given to them by -courts, and the connection in which they aré generally used.
Bouvier defines the word resident, as follows: “ A person coming into a place, with an intention to establish his dom-icil or permanent residence, and who in consequence actually remains there. Time is not so essential as the intent.” 2' Law Diet. 468; Domat. Lib. 2,485. “Art. 4. The principal domicil of every one is that which he makes the seat and centre of his affairs, and which he does not leave but on Some particular occasion, from whence, when absent, he is said to be from home, or when he returns to, he is said to have come home.” “ Art. 5. Since the domicil is the place of one’s residence, it is, all one as to the domicil of a person, whether he reside or dwell in his own house, or in that of another, which he leases, or possesses by some other title.
It will be found by Kent, 76, that the learned author uses the words domicil and residence, in the same connection, not perhaps entirely in the same sense, but speaks of the animus manendi, as essential to the establishment of a/ resident, national character.
In the case of Crawford v. Wilson, 4 Barbour, 520, Paige, J., refers to the fact that in Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend. 11, a distinction had been recognized between domicil and residence. He also refers to Vattel’s definition of domicil. It is also stated that, “ the residence of a foreign minister at the court to which he is accredited, is only a temporary residence. He is not then animus manendi. The same may be said of the officers, soldiers and seamen in the army and navy. They may be said to have their domicil in one place, and their residence in another. But, generally, residence and domicil, mean the same thing. The place where a man carries on his established business, and has his permanent residence, is his domicil. Inhabitance and residence are generally used as synonymous terms. Inhabitancy and residence do not mean precisely the same thing as domicil, when the latter term is applied to successions to personal estate, but they mean a fixed and permanent abode or dwelling place for the time being, as contradistinguished from a more temporary locality of existence.” Matter of Wrigley, 8 Wend. 140.
It was held in the Matter of Fitzgerald, 2 Gaines, 318, that a resident within the state, was one who had a residence of
H The constitution of Kentucky in 1833, required residence in the state, and actual residence in the county, for a certain' time, as qualifications for' electors. In the celebrated contested election case of Letcher v. Moore, in Congress, it was held that the terms there used meant the same as that given to the word “home” in the vernacular tongue, and the term domicil by the writers on the civil law. But let us look further into the use of these words and their connection in. the* constitutions and statutes of different states. In Maine,
. It is true, that the question of intention may at times be obscure and difficult of ascertainment. And the same may be said with reference to the word domicil, in the settling of which, it is conceded in the argument here, we must look to the intention. The same difficulty arises with regard to many things depending on intention under the law; and yet, that intention has to be ascertained from the best lights
It is doubtless true, that authorities will be found not concurring in detail with those above cited. Indeed, what is and is not a residence, for various purposes, has been a subject of much controversy. We are not aware, however, of any authority that holds that a mere transient, temporary sojourn, with no intention to remain permanently, can constitute a legal residence.
As not maintaining the positions above stated, we are referred by complainant’s couusel to Story’s Conflict of Laws, section 44: “ Two things,” says the author, “ must concur to constitute domicil; first, a residence; and secondly, the intention of making it the home of the party. There must be the fact and the intent.”- We are' not able to see that the same author gives any definition to the term resident or residence. The word domicil, we may also suggest, is that used by the old law writers, and even modern text books, as conveying, according to law language, more fully the whole meaning arrived at. And yet, as here used and defined, it does not seem to us, that the author can be understood as saying that residence, or the term resident, means a dwelling, an abiding without reference to intention or permanence. True it is, there must be the fact of the intent. Now, what fact? We answer, the act of abiding; the fact of a dwelling ; a habitation; and having this residence- — -having an abode — this abode, this dwelling, then, if the intent exists, the domicil is perfect. In other words, the mere intent, without the fact of residence or abiding, cannot constitute the domicil.. Neither can the intent, without having the abode, the home, the place to dwell, constitute the residence.
The case of House v. House, 9 Iredell, 99, asserts the same doctrine, as above quoted from Judge Story, and indeed so much of it as relates to this question, will be found to be copied from that work. The judge, however, in that case, says that “ domicil, in its ordinary and familiar use, means the place where a person lives or has his homewhile, in a large sense, it is where he has his true, fixed-and permanent home, to which, when absent from it, he intends to return, and from which he has no present purpose to remove.” In other words, he recognizes an ordinary and familiar use of the word domicil, and also its use in an enlarged sense; and lays it down, that the fact of residence must exist, and also an intention. It would be as hard to conceive a residence without a place or locality to abide, dwell, or live, as it would to conceive of a domicil without the same. And that, in our opinion, is what is meant; and that it is not intended that a man may have a residence, in legal acceptation, without reference to intention, any more than he can have a domicil.
We are also referred by counsel for complainant, to art. 2, sections 1 and 4; art. 3, section 4, of our state constitution, and section 259 of the Code. These sections define the qualifications of voters, and eligibility of members of either house of the General Assembly. We have carefully examined those sections, and are unable to see in what way they can assist in the construction claimed by complainant. It is said that in these sections the word “ citizen,” as well as the word “resident,” is used, and that the design was to qualify thereby the character of the residence. "We do not conceive that such was the design in using the word citizen. The term citizen has reference to a person, native or
It will be observed that the same words are used in those sections as will be found in the constitution and laws of many of the states on this subject, and the same as in our Code regulating divorce. And yet, would any person claim that a mere transient sojourner within our state, with no intention of remaining, was a resident within the meaning of these provisions, and entitled to the elective franchise ? Or, is it true that a citizen of the United States is to vote, if he happens to have his person within our state for six months, but with no intention of being a resident; and the actual bona fide resident is to be deprived of such right, if he is gone, for one, two or three years, with an intention to return, and who does return, on the very day of an election ? We cannot believe that in any section where the words residence or resident is used, it was designed to so utterly ignore the question of intention.
Before going to the other branch of the case, we would notice a further point made by complainant’s counsel. And that is, suppose complainant should remain in Iowa until her death, and a question should arise, as to when residence commenced, would it be from March, 1854, or when ? This is an argument, to our minds, ingenious rather than sound, or applicable to the question at bar. It is not sufficient to say, perhaps, in the language of Judge Story, that “ an intention of permanent residence may often be en-grafted upon an inhabitancy, originally taken for a special or fugitive purpose.” The question has also been asked, where is this complainant’s residence, if not here ? It is, perhaps, sufficient to say, that if it is not here, then it is
But let us now examine the testimony bearing on the question of residence, so as to see whether the complainant is a resident within the meaning of the law as above construed. The complainant’s testimony is as follows: Sarah H. Stover states, in February, 1855, that complainant came to Keokuk, in March or April, 1854, and that she has resided there since; that she was absent about three weeks, visiting her aunt in Lockport, Illinois, being detained by reason of her aunt’s sickness, and also twice to Missouri, being gone some two or three weeks each time; that she boarded, while in Keokuk, one week at the Laclede Hotel ; then at the St. Charles; then at Mr. Tucker’s; then at Mr, Davis’s; then at Mr. William’s; and then at Mr. Brown-ell’s ; and that she had no knowledge of complainant’s having relations in Keokuk or Iowa, and yet she might have, Eliza Williamson testifies to about the same as to residence ; but does not speak of complainant’s 'absence or anything as to relations. It is also shown by a written agreement on file, that about the time complainant left her boarding at Tucker’s and Davis’s, those persons changed their residences, one moving to Illinois, and the other into a different part of the city of Keokuk. Edw. B. Talcot¿, of Hannibal, Missouri, in February, 1855, states, that complainant left his house, where she had been residing since the spring of 1851, on the 20th of March, 1854; that he then lived in Lockport, Illinois; that she went to Keokuk, Iowa; that he moved to Hannibal, Mo., December 1st, 1854; that plaintiff at that time came to Hannibal on a
The respondent proves -as follows: M. B. Poole testifies, that complainant visited Boston in the winter of 1858 and 1854, and she then told her, she was living with her uncle Talcott, at Lockport, -Ill., and that he had promised her a -home as long as she lived; that she should not return to Boston again until she was free-; and that her uncle was •going to try to get her a divorce'; that she left Boston, 1st ■January, 1854, to reside with her uncle Talcott Mrs. But■ton states, that in January, 1854, complainant told her that she was living with her uncle Talcott; that he was kind to her, and that she traveled with him for company, as her aunt was in delicate health, and could not go. Dr. Cleveland states, that in January, 1854, complainant told him in Boston she was going back with her uncle (who was then 'with her) to Lockport; that soon after ariving home, she expected to go to Iowa, to spend some six months or more, ■as her uncle said it was necessary in order to obtain a divorce ; that she intended to reside with her uncle; that -her home was there, and that he was very kind to hen Also, that the uncle told him at the same time, that he had taken some steps towards procuring a divoree for complainant ; that she was going to Iowa to spend a certain time dhere, as the law of that state required for that purpose.; and that in Iowa much less was required to obtain a divorce -than in other states; that he had taken care of her and would •continue to do so. B. P. Ward testifies, that he is cousin t© -complainant; that she left Boston in the spring of 1851, to reside with her uncle Talcott.; that she and her uncle had
This is the substance of the testimony on this point, as we have collected it from over two hundred pages of depositions. This testimony does not satisfy us that complainant had been a resident six months next before the filing of the bill, as contemplated by the law. The residence is directly put in issue by the pleadings, and unless the testimony does so satisfy us, we regard it as our duty to dismiss the bill. All proper consideration has been given to the fact, that the court below ruled otherwise: but in these causes, where the whole case comes up and is heard de novo, the' presumption that obtains, where the hearing is on error, does not continue. Our reasons for the conclusion at which we have arrived, are briefly these :
1st. The complainant’s testimony, to give it the strongest weight, shows that she had been in Keokuk (without reference to the time she was at Lockport, Illinois) only a little over six months, engaged in no particular avocation, not visiting or living with relations, and no reason shown why she had. left her uncle, and come to Iowa among strangers.
2d. The testimony of Cleveland, Ward and others, shows
3d. Sbe and ber uncle stated, that sbe was coming to Iowa to obtain a divorce, for that purpose alone, and that sbe was then to return to her borne witb ber uncle.
4th. In June, 1854, after sbe bad come to Keokuk, and when it is said sbe was on a visit at Lockport, sbe writes her cousin, of ber uncle’s intended removal, of ber intention to go witb him, and of ber anxiety to get into a warmer and milder climate.
5th. Instead of showing an intention to remain, or no present intention to remove, it shows affirmatively, that sbe does not regard this as ber borne, and never has at any time, but, on tbe contrary, considers and treats ber uncle’s residence as ber home and ber residence.
This view renders an examination of tbe other part of tbe case unnecessary. Satisfied as we are, that complainant bad not a legal residence, as contemplated by tbe law, at tbe time this suit was commenced, without expressing any opinion as to tbe merits of this unhappy difficulty, we concur in tbe opinion, that tbe decree rendered in tbe court below must be reversed, and bill dismissed without prejudice.