44 A.2d 241 | Pa. | 1945
This case turns on the interpretation to be given to two clauses — one in a lease and one in a deed. Plaintiff would have the lease construed from a practical rather than a literal standpoint; defendants and additional defendant, while opposing this, seek that same kind of *35
construction in the case of the deed. We think it is the method which should be adopted as to both instruments, for, where there is any doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of the covenants in a contract or the terms of a grant, they should "receive a reasonable construction, and one that will accord with the intention of the parties; and, in order to ascertain their intention, the court must look at the circumstances under which the grant was made.": Connery v. Brooke,
Plaintiff, S. S. Hindman, was the owner of a tract of land of approximately 50 acres underlaid with coal, and, on June 6, 1935, by an instrument in writing, he leased to defendants all the coal lying in and under the tract, together with all rights and privileges "necessary for the removal of said coal by mining, stripping, or any other method, including the right to mine and remove, through, over and under the demised premises, coal from other lands now or hereafter owned, leased, or otherwise controlled" *36 by defendants; also with the right to erect tipples and other buildings necessary for the operation of the mine. "As royalties for coal mined and removed from the premises" defendants agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of ten cents per ton of "coal mined and sold from the demised premises and the further sum of three (3¢) cents per ton for all coal moved through said premises from other lands." In case of any failure of defendants to comply with the covenants of the lease plaintiff was to have the right to re-enter and take possession of the premises.
Defendants engaged only in deep mining and for the coal which they hauled underground through the demised premises from other lands they paid the three cents per ton stipulated in the lease; they never hauled any coal across the surface. On April 14, 1940, they leased to Tri-County Coal Sales, a partnership, all coal in and under the tract, together with the tipple and other fixtures then on top of the ground, and also all leases of coal or coal lands which defendants then owned or might thereafter acquire within a radius of two miles of the tipple. Tri-County Coal Sales agreed to pay all moneys due to the respective landowners under the various leases thereby assigned and sublet, and to do all things necessary to prevent default or forfeiture thereof.
On June 7, 1940, plaintiff executed a deed of the 50 acre tract to W. H. Dunn, one of the partners of Tri-County Coal Sales, for the consideration of $400; the deed contained a clause that it was "made and accepted by grantee subject to the lease of said premises for coal . . . dated June 6, 1935 . . . and all rights and privileges of lessor under said lease are hereby reserved for said S. S. Hindman, his heirs and assigns." In 1941 Tri-County Coal Sales became incorporated as Tri-County Fuel Company, which took over by assignment all the assets of the partnership and received from Dunn a conveyance of the title to the tract. It continued the mining operations theretofore conducted by defendants *37 but also strip-mined coal from adjoining lands and hauled it across the surface of the tract to and from the tipple.
Plaintiff instituted the present action to recover from defendants the three cents a ton which he claimed to be due for the coal carried across the surface. Defendants brought Tri-County Fuel Company on the record as additional defendant. There being no controversy as to the facts, the court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against the defendants and the additional defendant, both of whom now appeal.
The first question arises in regard to the lease of June 6, 1935, because, while it gave defendants the right to remove coal from other lands "through, over and under the demised premises", defendants were to pay, in addition to royalties for coal mined and removed from the premises, the sum of three cents per ton "for all coal moved through said premises from other lands". It is therefore contended by defendants that their obligation in this regard was limited to the prescribed payment for coal hauled through but not over the demised premises, in other words, for coal carried through the underground workings but not over the surface. Applying the principles of interpretation proclaimed in the authorities hereinbefore cited, we are of opinion that the clause in question is not to be given any such narrow and literal construction. The phrase "through said premises" may, by its context, refer only to the demised premises, that is, to the stratum of underlying coal, or it may refer to the tract as a whole; if the latter, the word "through" would include passage overground, for we speak, for example, of passing "through" a country, when we mean, of course, traveling over its surface; (see Provident Life Trust Co. v. Mercer County,
The second instrument the interpretation of which is in question is the deed of June 7, 1940, by which plaintiff, for valuable consideration, conveyed title to the 50 acre tract, and in which he reserved all his "rights and privileges" under the lease to defendants. Was it the understanding and intention of the parties that such "rights and privileges" were to include the three cents per ton for coal hauled from other lands across the surface of the tract? In Robinson v. Stover,
Judgment reversed and here entered for defendants and additional defendant. *39