*1 HILTON v. SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC RAILWAYS
COMMISSION 8, 1991 Nо. Argued 16, 1991 90-848. October December Decided *2 Court, Kennedy, Rehnquist, in which J., opinion delivered the J., J., White, Stevens, Souter, JJ., joined. Blackmun, con- and C. and O’ConnoR, J., dissenting opinion, in which judgment. in the filed curred J., Scalia, J., joined, Thomas, part 207. took no in the consider- post, p. ation or decision of case. argued briefs for J. Beckham the cause filed
Robert petitioner.
Keating argued L. Simons III the cause and filed a brief respondent.* opinion delivered the of the Court. Kennedy Justice In this Employ case we must decide whether the Federal Liability (FELA), ers’ Act 53 Stat. 1404,45 U. §§51-60, S. C. against creates a cause of action a state-owned railroad, en forceable in state reaffirming We hold court. that it does, part Railway decision Parden v. Terminal Ala Dept., bama Docks U. S.
HH employee Petitioner Kenneth Hilton was an of the South *3 Railways Carolina Public The commission, Commission. employees, which engaged has some 300 is a common carrier by agency interstate commerce railroad and is an of the having State of by South Carolina, been created statute alleges injured scope 1969. Hilton he was in the and course employment of negligence his and that the of the commission was the cause of the accident. In the case now before us respondent. the commission is the injuries, petitioner To recover for his first filed a FELA pend action in United States District That Court. case was ing Dept. when we announced our decision in Welchv. Texas Highways Transportation, and Public S. (1987), which held that the Jones Act, 33, 1007, Stat. § App. abrogate U. S. C. does not the States’ Eleventh immunity. incorporates The Jones Act the re understanding medial scheme of FELA; and, based on his that Eleventh Amendment from Jones Act suits apply petitioner would as well to FELA, dismissed his Weinberg, Kamiat, * Robert M. Walter and Laurence Gold filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Organi of Industrial zations as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Richard Ruda a brief for filed the National Governors’ Association et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. FELA suit in a He refiled his South
federal-court action.
this
now before
court,
state
is the case
us.
Carolina
complaint
trial court dismissed Hilton’s
on
The state
money
ground
an action for
that FELA does
authorize
agency
damages against
State,
if
is main
of the
even suit
acknowledging
Though
in a
that
Par
tained
state forum.
Deрt. supra,
Railway
Terminal
Alabama Docks
den v.
interpreted
permit
actions, the trial court
FELA to
those
we
by
severely
subsequent
“has
limited
said that Parden
been
Supreme
App. Pet. for
22.
of the
Cert.
decisions
Court.”
longer good
id., at
law,”
held
Parden “is no
The court
whereupon
ap
Hilton
dismissed,
ordered the action
23, and
Supreme
pealed
Court.
to the South Carolina
appeal
pending,
was
the South
Su-
While his
Carolina
preme
Public
Court decided Freeman
South Carolina
Railways
E.
Commission, 302 C.
393 S.
2d
S.
by
Addressing
ease,
this
Freeman held
the same issue raised
liability
subject
does not
in state-court
that FELA
Supreme
ac-
As
trial
Court
court,
did the
State
suits.
knowledged
holding
concluded that
effect
our Parden
but
subsequent
course of decisions.
it had been overruled
we held
FELA authorizes suits
dam-
In Parden
against
entering
ages
railroads,
state-owned
and that
operating
a railroad a State waives its Eleventh
business
*4
from suit in federal court.
latter
Amendment
holding
with
more re-
was overruled in
to accord
jurisprudence,
S.,
at
cent Eleventh
U.
478;
483
explicit
declining
in
to decide
but the Welch
was
Court
(or
FELA) Congress
in the
Act
in
intended
whether
Jones
against
Id.,
the States.
at
create a cаuse of action
to
opinion);
(plurality
id.,
J.,
concur-
see also
at
n.
495
(White,
6
ring).
In
the
decision did
disturb
words,
other
Welch
holding
statutory-construction
of Parden.
the
addressing
issue,
latter
the South Carolina court
In
Michigan Dept.
“dispositive” our
in
v.
found
decision Will
brought
was
suit
Police,
When case reached petitioner’s the South Carolina Su- Court, it affirmed dismissal of the action in a one- preme per сuriam Freeman. sentence opinion, citing We granted certiorari, 498 U. (1991), S. 1081 and now reverse.
I I
Our
analysis
ultimate determination in this case are
of stare
controlled and informed
the central
by
importance
decisis
in this
Court’s
asks us
jurisprudence.
Respondent
to overrule a 28-year-old
first enunciated in
interpretation,
Farden,
that when
enacted FELA
and used the
common carrier
phrase “[ejvery
railroad,”
U. S. C.
describe
class of
employers subject
terms,
its
it
intended to include state-owned
S.,
railroads.
U.
187-
Authority
in Port
Trans-Hudson
188.1 Just two Terms
ago,
Feeney,
Corp.
“Every common carrier railroad engaging while in commerce . . . damages shall be liable in any person suffering injury while he is em ployed by such carrier in such commerce ... *5 may have had. it
Eleventh longstanding this reexamine we should here is whether issue strong statutory considera- Because of construction. circum- favoring in these decisis to stare adherence tions question Time and be no. must to that stances, the answer recognized “the doctrine again, has this Court time importance of law.” to the rule is of fundamental stare decisis supra, v. McLean Credit also Patterson 494; see (1989); & v. Coronado Oil Burnet Union, 164, U. 491 S. (1932) (Brandéis, dissenting). J., Co., 393, Gas S. stability, predictability, promotes precedent Adherence Hillery, authority. Vasquez respect judicial for and (1986). reasons, we will For all of these 266-266 U. S. some depart of stare decisis without the doctrine Rumsey, justification. compelling Arizona v. following policies stare in favor
In the before us the case departure. suggesting outweigh “Consid- decisis far those special area of stat- force in the have erations of stare decisis interpretation, utory in the context of consti- here, unlike for power implicated, legislative interpretation, is tutional what we have done.” free alter and remains supra, had almost 30 has Patterson, at 172-173. years in Parden corrected decision it could have which disagreed it, has not chosen to do so. We it with and if acceptance weight of our ear- this continued should accord legisla- holding. has force when the Stare decisis added lier private public sphere, realm, citizеns, in the ture, in the and previous decision, for in this in- acted in reliance on have dislodge rights overruling settled stance the decision would legislative expectations require re- or extensive sponse. This so in the case before us. many specifically compensation laws in
Workers’ coverage of the workers from their because exclude railroad provides adequate protection assumption that FELA g., (Supp. e. Stat. 8-41-201 See, those workers. Colo. Rev.
203
§36-301(9)(D)
§22-
1990);
(1981);
D. C. Code Ann.
Ind. Code
(West
79(d)
§23:1037
1991);
(Supp.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
3—
§48-106(1) (1988).
1985);
re-
Neb.
Counsel for
Rev. Stat.
spondent
during
argument
oral
that
this ease conceded
petitioner
seeking
may
precluded
be
from
an alternative
injuries,
remedy
for his
because of a like
under state law
exclusion in
law. S. C. Code Ann. 42-1-350
South Carolina
(1976).
require
overruling Parden would
these States
Our
putting
to reexamine
meanwhile
at risk all
statutes,
their
employees
employers
acting
who have been
on the as-
and
sumption
they
protected
injuries
in the event of
that
are
by
employer’s negligence. Overruling Parden
caused
previous
would
decisions from this
also throw into doubt
holding
the entire federal scheme of rail-
Court, cases
that
regulation applies to state-owned railroads. United
road
(1936) (Safety Appliance
States v.
U. S.
California,
(1957)
Act);
(Railway
Taylor,
v.
the Jones jurisdiction coverage, of state This the States. Eleventh a suit free from entertain courts to explanation plausible for the absence constraints, is practical effects of any adverse of the discussion Welch only pertained portion overruling which Parden juris- state-court continued Amendment, since the Eleventh *7 those effects minimal. diction made holding determi- of Welchas cannot treat the Further, we presented we our decision. As for of the issue now native explained supra, Eleventh Amendment 471, at may abrogate “Congress the hold cases do indeed that constitutionally suit in fed- secured States’ unmistakably making only by clear its intention eral court Hospital language of the statute.” Atascadero State in the added). (1985) (emphasis Scanlon, 234, 473 U. S. 242 v. abrogate Congressional Amendment im- Eleventh intent to expressed munity the statute; of the be the text must making legislative history in its in- will not look to Court (1989). quiry. These Muth, 223, S. Dellmuth v. 491 U. on the Elev- a law based establish rule of constitutional cases developed after the Par- Amendment. That rule was enth undercut the decision, have den and was found Welch require reasoning Eleventh and to Parden’s of Parden holding as we have stated to be overruled. But reserved Welch was not the specific statutory The construction issue today, language of prеcise issue before the Court but rather whether (“Any injury in the personal seaman who course the Jones Act shall suffer 688) correctly interpreted by App. U. C. was employment,” of his S. Comm’n, Petty Bridge 275, Tennessee-Missouri v. 359 U. S. the Court in (1959), remedy against a the States. Justice White’s 282-283 to afford Dept. Highways Transporta Public concurrence, Welch Texas v. of tion, S., question, stating “Congress 483 U. focused on this that construction, Court, it, has I not disturbed this and the as understand however, purport parties, agree does not now do so.” The and FELA. resolution of this issue should be same the Jones Act purposes We thus for the оf this assume so decision. many
on occasions, “the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in citing state Will, S., courts.” at 63-64, (1980); Thiboutot, Maine 1, 9, Hall, n. Nevada v. 440 S. 420-421 U. pure question statutory becomes, issue a then, con- compel-
struction, where the doctrine of stare decisis is most ling. Respondent argues, and the state courts in this case statutory-construction holding said, of Parden is no longer good opinion law supra. because of our later in Will, Respondent solely would make the result in Will a function jurisprudence, reading of our Eleventh Amendment the case adopt per prohibiting interpretation gen- a se rule liability language eral to include the States, absent clear by Congress statement to the effect that intends subject Respondent the States to the cause of action. argues light Will, that in the same considerations which partial overruling led gov- us to a of Parden in Welchshould *8 ern here. argument think
We the misconstrues the Will decision. import entirety did not Will the of our Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence statutory into the area of construction. It treated the Eleventh Amendment as a relevant consider- ation. 491 at S., 66-67; Melo, U. 21, 502 U. S. Hafer primary The focus was, of Will as it should have language history on the been, and S., of 1983. 491 U. supra, 64, 68-70; cf. Muth, Dellmuth v. at 229-230. If Will adopted per by respond- had a se rule of the sort advocated unnecessary. ent, that entire discussion would have been The in issue Will in and this case is different from the in issue our Eleventh Amendment cases in a fundamental respect: application The latter cases involve the of a rule of apply “ordinary law, constitutional while the former cases an statutory supra, rule of Will, construction.” at 65. This Wyo in EEOC v. our discussions is evident conclusion (1983), Gregory in v. Ash ming, and n. 18 226, 244, S. 460 U. (1991), cases de Term. Both last croft, statutory rule of plain аs “a rule statement scribe the ambigu statutory is applied intent where to be construction law; and a constitutional than as rule of ibid., rather ous,” implicated The dis Amendment. the Eleventh neither case supported by in decision the Court’s also we draw is tinction explicit particular that Welch in the fact in and statutory resolve issue we construction terms reserved today. S., at n. 6. statutory construc to be resolved one the issue
When liability monetary impose congressional on intent to tion, requirement a statement of clear States, the ought liability impose be of a rule that creates such drafting and and the courts assistance interpreting legislation. requirement also serves liability: inquiries separate parallel into state two make statutory inter and canons Amendment doctrine Eleventh Gregory pretation. v. Ash cases, as Will In most symmetry, resulting be followed. The the rule can croft, may immunity, liability making be, or as the case a State’s has much to com courts, federal and state the same both It the federalism-related concerns mend it. also avoids courts uses the state arise when the National Government congres permit recоvery forum to under as exclusive argument. inconsequential not an sional statute. This is predict Symmetry than esthetics. It is law is more ability symmetry imperative and order. But is not *9 just expectations upon must which themselves rest override predictability and order stare decisis. inquiry In the case us the clear statement need not before we need be made and not decide whether FELA satisfies any prevail standard, the rule event does not over applied longstanding of stare as doctrine decisis statutory implicating important construction reliance inter- inapplicablе ests. And when the rule is either overcome or impose liability upon so that a federal statute does States, Supremacy Clause makes statute the law every State, fully enforceable in state court. Howlett v. Rose, (1990). 367-368
IV stated, judgment For the reasons we have of the South Supreme reversed, Carolina Court and the case is re- proceedings manded for further not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered. part Justice Thomas took no in the consideration or decision of this case. judgment.
Justice Blackmun concurs in the O'Connor, joins, Justice with whom Justice Scalia dissеnting. example
The Court's decision in this case is an of the tru- ism that hard cases make bad law. The Court's understand- petitioner remedy able reluctance to leave without a leads it to contort and confuse the clear statement doctrine we have opinions. reason, respect- articulated in recent For this I fully dissent.
I
The Court
invokes
stare decisis while at
the same time
running
headlong
away
my view,
from it.
In
this case is
cleanly
by applying
precedents,
resolved
two recent
Will v.
Michigan Dept.
Police,
(1989),
of State
The result this fortiori already reasoning Wе have decided Will and Welch. may necessary re- be statement before a State a clear against damages quired own itself its to entertain suits language already that FELA’s and we have decided courts, Congress’ intent to to a clear statement does not amount abrogate sovereign immunity. dictates state Stare decisis down in Will and that we follow rules we have laid substantially case not that we revive a discredited every litigants reason think and lower courts had defunct.
II wedge Court tries to drive a between Will Welch by characterizing statutory interpretation the former as a case and the latter as a constitutional case. state- The clear *11 says, required ment the Court was because rule, Welch implicated. byWill, the con- Eleventh Amendment was In trast, use of the clear was discre- statement rule somewhat tionary, question because the in that ease was a of issue statutory interpretation in which the Constitution was not implicated. ante, See at Because case in- 205-207. this immunity sovereign volves state in state federal court, not by the court, and Eleventh Amendment does not its terms apply, the the Court holds that clear statеment rule in this trumped by can “nonconstitutional” context be stare decisis. The Court’s distinction untenable. clear statement statutory interpretation. rule is a mere of not canon In pro it stead, derives from the Constitution itself. The rule power tects the balance of between the States the Fed and Although eral Government the struck Constitution. the spells aspect Eleventh Amendment out one of that balance power, principle underlying of the of federalism the Amend pervades ment the constitutional structure: The Constitution gives Congress only govern power to limited Nаtion; the power govern locally. the States retain See Dellmuth v. (1989) (“ [Abrogation sovereign Muth, 491 U. S. 227 223, of upsets ‘the fundamental constitutional balance be placing tween the Federal Government and States,’ the . .. ‘[t]he principles a considerable strain on of federalism Amendment’”) (quoting inform Eleventh Atascadero State Hospital supra, Scanlon, v. at and 238, Pennhurst State (1984)). Hospital School Halderman, 89, 100 v. 465 U. S. Recognizing governmental this basic truth about our struc wary extending ture under the Constitution, we have been congressional effect enactments into tradition areas ally governed by Congress the States, unless has directed us unmistakably to do so clear Indeed, statement. employed cases in which we have the clear statement rule recog context, we have the Eleventh Amendment outside Gregory v. Ash the rule’s constitutional dimensions. nized (1991)(“This plain statement rule is U. S. croft, acknowledgment nothing re than an more sovereign powers under our constitutional substantial tain readily powers inter does scheme, with which (“[I]f fere”); to alter intends Will, S., at the States and the balance between ‘usual constitutional do intention to so it must make its Government,’ Federаl ”) (quot ‘unmistakably language the statute’ clear 242); supra, Hospital ing Scanlon, v. Atascadero State (1971) (clear state Bass, United States *12 federalism”). concepts of rule “rooted in .. . American ment required employ position that we are not the Court’s Thus, ignores the constitu clear statement rule in this context the of the rule. tional source spells instance, out but Eleventh one not
The respect only is due from in which and forbearance one, the governments, respect a that ce- state national The clear state- ments our federation in Constitution. Congress respect by will show that ment rule assumes that sovereignty lightly abridging powers or retained standpoint, it little sense to From this makes the States. congressional apply enactments the clear statement rule damages suits in that make the States liable to federal congres- apply the clear statement rule to courts, but not damages that make the liable to sional enactments immunity, Sovereign crucial suits in their own a at- courts. governments, infringed separate in both tribute cases. suggested dichotomy even sense if we The makes less con- anomaly the remarkable that these two canons of statu- sider statutory tory construction scheme in which create: state obtaining recovery are the avenue for courts exclusive under & statute. federal
I I I gives guidance The Court no to lower courts as to when it apply will the clear statement rule and when it will not. obscurity point The Court’s on this does little to further the goals stability predictability assertedly drive its analysis. says only The prevail Court that stare decisis will Congress over the clear statement rule when has manifested acquiescence statutory its interpretation by in this Court’s its silence, and when citizens have “acted in reliance on a previous previously Ante, decision.” at 202. Yet we have applied despite presence the clear statement rule of both of these considerations. years ago, Congress
Just four
we held that
did not mani
fest its consent
damages
to allow States to be sued for FELA
despite congressional
in federal court,
silence in the face of
long-established holding
in Farden. Welch v. Texas
Dept. Highways
Transportation,
and Public
212 regulation. congressional longstanding See 483
on, sufficient). (constructive to suit not consent 473 S.,U. at exception rule thus clear statement to the “reliance” sovereign theory im- waiver of constructive reinstates munity rejected. repeatedly ibid.; See cases have that our Hospital 241, at 246- Scanlon, S., v. State Atascadero Corp. Feeney, Authority Trans-Hudson v. Port 247; (1990). 299, newly exception to the clear created sum,
In the Court’s except altogether, it to eliminate rule threatens statement sovereign Eleventh Amendment when the States’ abrogated difficult, if not im- It will be in federal court. they apply possible, when should for courts to know lower interpreting upset the traditional in statutes the rule outside and Federal Governments balance between State immunity. the context of Eleventh 1—Í > prеcedents application of our fears that strict The Court regula- congressional require for all a clear statement will is not Ante, at 203. That fear well tion of state railroads. recently doctrine articulated The clear statement founded. requires Gregory a clear statement Con- and Will gress it intends to alter the usual before we assume that “traditionally regu- power constitutional balance of areas Gregory, S., U. lated 460. States States.” traditionally regulated liability damages suits; their have they traditionally regulated
have not interstate railroads. Wabash, Illinois, L. P. R. Co. v. 118 S. See St. & U. (1886); Long Transportation Co., v. R. Union Island U. The clear statement rule this con- S. provides applies it text to FELA because a cause of ac- damages; apply congressional tion for it does not to other regulation of state railroads. application of
Nor would the clear statement rule here Authority Corp. Feeney, overrule Port Trans-Hudson
213 supra. Feeney, In held that a could its sov we State waive immunity ereign damages from suit and consent to a action Feeney' underlying assumption, s course, under FELA. Congress was that had intended to include state-owned appropriate railroads in the FELA If class of defendants. contemplated category States are not defend within the they ants, suit, then States could not consent to because can entity against “create cause of action . . . whom Congress liability.” subjected Rose, has not to Howlett v. U. S. by
Welch did not hold that owned railroads States were category “[ejvery outside FELA’s common carrier rail road,” fact, however. 45 C. 51. In clari U. S. Welchnever fied what would count the context of FELA a “clear as congressional statement” of intent that States submit to damages aspect sovereignty suits. Because the of state at immunity damages stake here is suits, the clear state required Greg ment should tailored be to concern. See (1991)(when ory application of fed Ashcroft, U. S. change respect eral statute would state law with tenure to judges, question of state clear statement rule tailored to apply whether intended the to to state statute judges, apply not whether intended statute generally). to A “clear context, statement” this “Congress then, should be a statement that to ab intended rogate the Statеs’ from suit.” Muth, Dellmuth v. atS.,U. 231.
Congress clearly “[e]very wanted common rail- carrier subject road” to be to suit under FELA. owners, Railroad clearly contemplated category then, are within the of defend- Congress, clearly say however, ants. did not whether it in- happen tended force States that also to be railroad owners quite submit suit their without consent. Indeed, it is Congress thought power doubtful that it had the to create against causes of action the States in 1908when FELA was supra, concurring enacted. See 496 (Scalia, J., *15 concurring judgment). enacting part Since, in and clearly it wishes FELA, hаs not stated that abrogate has said that suit, a State’s but damages remedy employees provide it wishes to a proper “[ejvery railroad,” carrier is a common State capac- FELA in its defendant it consents to be sued under if ity agrees as a railroad But unless a State to be owner. sovereign, may treated as a railroad owner instead of a it not be sued without its consent. As South Carolina has not agreed sovereign immunity, may throw off its mantle of it not be sued under FELA. I would therefore affirm the judgment Supreme of the South Carolina Court. Railways
The concern that South Carolina Public Commis- employees remedy sion’s will be without a should not deter- mine the result in this If we clarified our doctrine, case. obfuscating compensa- it, instead of could allow other to fill tion schemes the void left FELA. should not We quickly callously ignore so assume that will South Carolina Certainly, its the fate of own workers. South Carolina has seeing employees compensated more of a stake in are its than does or this Court. avoiding implications previous
Instead of of our deci- holding, sions, I would adhere to them. The Court’s while premised par- on is unfair fairness, States, courts, parse applying ties that must our doctrine the clear state- respectfully ment Therefore, rule. I dissent.