108 P. 698 | Utah | 1910
Tbis is an action to recover dower. Tbe case may be said! to be a companion to tbe ease of Hilton v. Sloan, 37 Utab, 359, 108 Pac. 689, and tbe seven other cases tried with that case, all of which have just been decided by tbis court. Tbe controlling issues presented for trial to tbe district court, affirmatively stated, are: (1) Tbe marriage of appellant to Dr. Part; and (2) that appellant was estopped from claiming her dower interest in tbe land in question as against respondent. Tbe parties to tbe action at tbe trial stipulated with regard to all the issues except that of marriage, which was left to be established by such competent evidence as appellant might produce. Tbe only evidence that she produced in support of her claim that she was married to Dr. Park, and that she was bis legal wife, and hence bis widow, were tbe pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgments in tbe eases of Hilton v. Roylance, 25 Utah, 129, 69 Pac. 660, 58 L. R. A. 723, 95 Am. St. Rep. 821, and Hilton v. Stewart, 25 Utah, 161, 69 Pac. 671.
It is deemed material to state tbe issues that were involved in those two cases. Hilton v. Roylance was an action by tbe appellant here to recover dower in land conveyed by Dr. P'ark during bis lifetime, and during tbe time it is alleged appellant was bis wife. In that case Mrs. Roylanee denied that appellant and Dr. Park ever bad been married. Tbe trial court found that issue in favor of Mrs. Roylanee and entered judgment accordingly, but tbis court, on appeal, reversed tbe judgment, and ordered findings and judgment in favor of appellant here, who was also appellant in that
Prom the foregoing it will thus be seen that in two actions of proceedings in which appellant was plaintiff it had been adjudicated by this court that she at a certain time and place was legally married to Dr. Park, and that at the time of his death was his lawful widow, and as such was entitled to a widow’s share in his estate. At the trial of the case at bar in the district court that court pro forma admitted the findings and judgments aforesaid in evidence over respondent’s objection, with the understanding, however, that their effect as evidence would be determined later. Upon further consideration, the court ruled that the findings and judgment in neither of the cases mentioned were admissible as evidence of the marriage in the case at bar. Appellant having produced no other or further evidence of her marriage with D!r. Park, the court found that issue in
As we understand appellant’s contention, it is in effect, this: That proceedings to establish a status, such as marriage, divorce, pedigree, citizenship', inquisitions of lunacy, etc., are in their nature proceedings in rem, and hence the judgment by which the status of any individual is adjudged is competent evidence as against all the world to prove the status as it is declared to be by such a judgment. (2 Black on Judgments, secs. 802-806, inclusive.) Appellant therefore insists that in both cases referred to her status, namely, that she was the legal wife of Dr. Park, was solemnly adjudicated, and that hence tbe judgments in those cases were at least evidence of her marriage with Dr. Park. It may be conceded that, where there is some law by which a proceeding to establish a status of any individual may be instituted upon such notice as may be prescribed by law, that in such a proceeding the judgment declaring the status of the individual in whose interest or against whom the proceeding is had may ordinarily be used as evidence against all the world for the purpose of proving that the status is what it is declared to be in the judgment. Generally it may be conceded that in nearly all, if not all, jurisdictions special proceedings are provided for by which the status of certain individuals may be determined and established when for special reasons it becomes necessary to do so. Those most generally provided for are inquisitions of lunacy, naturalization proceedings by which certain individuals are adjudged citizens, and matters of that character. We know of no special law or procedure in this state, however, whereby every possible status may be established as is done in some countries, notably in England, (Shores v. Hooper, 153
Did the court err in excluding the judgment in the case of Hilton v. Stewart, which we have assumed in effect was a proceeding against Dr. Park’s estate ? We think not. Assuming, but not deciding, that all those who claimed any interest in Dr. Park’s estate were in legal effect parties to the proceeding instituted by appellant to obtain a dower interest therein, it does not follow that all those who simply claim as grantees of Dr. Park, and who claim no interest in his estate as such, were also parties to the proceeding. While any person who claimed a direct interest in Dr. Park’s estate could no doubt have resisted appellant’s claim for dower, and if she was successful might have prosecuted an appeal from any judgment so obtained, such clearly was not the case with respondents. They had no interest in Dr. Park’s estate as such, and claimed none, and hence could not have tested appellant’s right to dower in it. They had to postpone their defense, if any they had, to her claim for dowers, until she sought to enforce it against property in which they were interested. Respondents, therefore, were in no sense parties to or interested in the action or proceed--ing of Hilton v. Stewart, and hence cannot be affected by any judgment that was rendered therein, or be concluded by any fact or facts that may have been judicially determined and established in that proceeding. The end in view in instituting those proceedings was not merely to establish the status of appellant, but it was to have her rights in Dr. Park’s estate as his widow determined and adjudicated. Her status, in so far as strangers to the estate were concerned, was thus again determined and declared for the purpose of a par
“The only relation which the former proceeding in the probate court had to the present suit is that the demandant, in order to succeed there was obliged, as against other parties, to prove, as she is here, that she is the daughter of Dr. Ellis. If that had been, as this is, a writ of entry against another party for a piece of land, it certainly cannot be maintained that a recovery of a judgment there by a decision in her favor would enable her, so far as this proof is concerned, to recover a judgment against the tenant for a different piece of land, even if the title to both pieces had descended to her from the same ancestor. In the proceeding in the probate court, as a preliminary fact to be decided before the administrator could be held liable, it was found that the defendant was the daughter of Dr. Ellis. Even if the subsequent determination of the responsibility of the administrator and settlement of his accounts would bo conclusive under our statutes, proper notice having been given, and to that extent would possess many of the characteristics of a judgment in rem, the finding which preceded should have no effect in other proceedings against another party, a stranger, not affected by any notice thereof, nor entitled to be then heard therein, if he had actually appeared.”
The only difference between that case and the case at bar is that, in order to entitle the claimant in that case to recover, she had to judicially establish the fact that she was a child of the deceased, while in this case appellant is required to establish the fact that she is the wife
Erom what has been said it follows that the court committed no error in excluding the judgments. It also follows that, if this ruling is correct, then the court had no alternative save to find the issue of marriage against appellant, for the reason that the burden of establishing the marriage was upon her? and, as she adduced no evidence in support of the issue, the court was bound