108 P. 689 | Utah | 1910
The foregoing eight cases were tried together in the district court, are presented to this court in one record, and, as the decision in each one of them substantially depends upon the same state of facts and must be based upon the same legal and equitable principles, we shall, for the purposes of this opinion, treat them all as one ease.
The principal errors assigned are: (1) That the court erred in its finding that the respondent and said Dr., Park were in fact married, and that they sustained the relation of husband and wife at his death; and (2) that, conceding that the respondent and said Dr. Park were in fact married, the court nevertheless erred in its conclusion of law that respondent was not estopped from successfully asserting her right to dower in the lands in question by reason of her conduct. The facts upon which this estoppel is claimed we shall refer to more fully hereinafter.
So far as the error relating to the finding of the marriage is concerned, we remark that the same grounds against such a finding are now urged that were insisted on in the cases
Respondent asserts that this question has been settled by this court in the case of Norton v. Tufts, 19 Utah, 470, 57 Pac. 409, and in Hilton v. Roylance, supra. In the latter case respondent herein was appellant, and the question, she now insists, was there determined in ’
Neither can it be said that the question was necessarily involved, and hence decided, although not discussed, by the court. This contention might be sound if the parties to the actions, as well as the court, had not specifically stated what the character of the estoppel was that was claimed on the one hand and defended on the other and finally decided by the court. When a specific ground for an estoppel is alleged and the court passes upon such ground only, it cannot with any show of reason be said that such ground includes all other grounds of estoppel, and, because the court considered and passed upon that ground, therefore every possible ground which may be urged in a subsequent case has been included in the formed decision, and has thus become stare decisis. We do not understand this to be the law.
The question, therefore, is: Do the conceded facts constitute an estoppel m pais in favor of appellants, who are all grantees or purchasers from the grantees of Dr. Park, the former husband of respondent ? The material facts upon the issue of estoppel, as either agreed to or not disputed, in substance, are: That on the 5th day of December, 1812, at Salt
. Appellants contend that the foregoing- facts, including the inferences that may be deduced therefrom, together with the circumstances disclosed, constitute an equitable estoppel in their favor as against the dower claim of respondent. Upon the other hand, respondent, in effect, insists that whatever might be the rule as applied to other claims, as to the claims for dower, the facts are entirely insufficient to constitute equitable estoppel. Without here repeating what she claims in this regard, and without formulating a statement of the necessary elements constituting estoppel, it must suffice to
Respondent contends, also, that the claim of an equitable estoppel must fail if for no other reason than that there is no evidence, either direct or inferential, that she intended to deceive any one by her conduct and that the inference is strong, if not conclusive, that she was ignorant of her own rights, was ignorant of the legal effect of the church divorce,
“All that is essential is that there should be such conduct on the part of the person against ■whom the estoppel is alleged as would make it a fraud for him to gainsay what he had expressly admitted by his words or tacitly confessed by his silence, but there need not be in the precedent acts actual fraud or evil design. All that is méant in the expression that an estoppel must possess an element of fraud is that the case must be one in which the circumstances and conduct would render*374 it a fraud for tlie party to deny what he had previously induced or suffered another to believe and take action upon. The door is shut against asserting a right then (when) that would result in doing an injury by the party asserting it to some other person, or when in good conscience and honest dealing he ought not to he permitted to gainsay his previous conduct.”
The right to assert an estoppel by appellants against respondent, in view of the facts and circumstances of the cases at bar, rests upon purely equitable grounds. An estoppel in pais is entirely a creature of courts of equity, and the equities of the particular case must control the result of that case. The reasons why such estoppels were called into existence, and when and to what extent they should be enforced, are well stated by the author in section 739 of 2 Herman on Estoppel and Hes Judicata, in the following language:
“This doctrine is properly and peculiarly a doctrine of equity, originally introduced there to prevent a party from taking a dishonest and unconscientious advantage of his strict legal rights, though, like many other equitable doctrines, constantly administered at 5 law. The ancient practice differed from the modern, and in actions at law, the courts, being unable of giving effect to this equity, were often enjoined where the party insisted on his rights at law contrary to the equitable doctrine. The office of equitable estoppels at law is therefore like that of injunctions in equity, to preclude rights that cannot he asserted consistently with good faith and practice, to prevent wrongs for which there might be no adequate remedy. And they should consequently, when the circumstances will permit, he so construed and mould-ed as not to deviate from their object; and those eases where estoppels are said to be odious or not favored should be only where the technicality of the estoppel cannot be subservient to its equity.”
We have thus shown the general principles that govern courts in applying the doctrine of estoppels in pais. Some courts have mooted, while others have asserted, the proposition that an equitable estoppel cannot be invoked in an action to recover dower, unless the claim for dower is made in a proceeding in equity, for the reason that the right of dower is purely legal and is enforceable in
“From all the investigation that I have given to the ease it is of first impression, so far as the question presented is concerned. Now, the record shows that since 1849, a period of 20 years, Mr. Hill and Mrs. Barclay hpre not only lived separate and apart, hut they have ceased to intermeddle with the affairs of each other. With mutual concurrence they have both changed their situation in life. Each has married and brought up children, built up separate and distinct property, and transacted their business without regard to any previous connection between them. It may be reasonably inferred that there is not any very amicable feeling of relationship existing between them. Under such circumstances does the law demand or require the absurdity of Mrs. Barclay, when she wishes to dispose of her private property, going to Mr. Hill and asking him to join in the conveyance, when at the same time he professes to be the husband of another woman? The length of time that has elapsed, the manner in which each party has regarded and treated the other ought to operate as an effectual estoppel, and preclude either party from an attempt to intermeddle in the affairs of the other. For upward of twenty years Mr. Hill, as far as his relationship toward Mrs. Barclay extends, has treated her as a feme sole; and upon no principle of justice has he any interest in, or can he interfere or exert any control over, her property. Mr. Hill is not here claiming any right, bnt it is set up in defense that the deed is not valid unless he°joins and concurs. But I am of this opinion: I think that as Mr. Hill has voluntarily renounces his marital rights, and, by a course of policy persisted in for more than twenty years, has led Mrs. Barclay and the whole world to believe that all control or interest on his part had ceased and been surrendered, he can no longer be a party, nor need he be consulted in any disposition she may see proper to make of her property. Any other conclusion would be promotive of injustice and lead to the greatest hardship.”
But we need not go to tb© extent in applying tbe estoppel in the cases at bar that the Supreme Court of Hissouri went in Richeson v. Simmons. True, in that case the husband’s rights to the wife’s property were involved, while here it is the wife’s rights. In the Bicheson case it was held, however, that by reason of the conduct of the husband and wife, who separated and lived apart from each other, and, in the belief that they were legally divorced, each in good faith intermarried with another, and continued this relation until the action was commenced in which the question was raised,
The appellants’ rights are not based upon the naked' claims of innocent purchasers. While, in order to prevail, they, or their grantors, must have purchased the property from Dr. Park without notice of respondent’s right, yet this without the elements of an estoppel would not be sufficient to protect them. When, however, such a purchaser obtains property under the facts and circumstances of these cases, he is protected upon broader grounds than the mere claim of innocent purchaser. In these cases, if appellants are not protected against the claims of respondent, it will result in permitting her to contradict and gainsay, to appellants’ detriment, all that she by her solemn acts and daily conduct during a long period of years avowed as true, and will further permit her to now assert that she did not authorize Dr. Park to deal with all the world as a single man. This, in justice and good conscience, she ought not be permitted to do. It is still true, and as applicable as ever, that “in a moral sense that is called equity which is found ‘ex aequo el bono’ in natural justice, in honesty, and in right.” Moreover, if we permit respondent to assert her claims against these ap
In saying what we have we are not unmindful of the fact that dower is merely an inchoate right which may or may not ripen into a vested interest, and that a wife is not required to stand guard over her husband, and
Counsel for respondent, however, most earnestly insist that all of the foregoing facts may be true, and yet there is nothing which will prevent respondent from enforcing her dower right. In this connection it is again asserted that the authorities are to the effect that while a widow may, by her .declarations, acts, and conduct, under certain circumstances, estop herself from successfully claiming her right of dower, yet this’ is not the case with a wife before the death of the husband. It is therefore contended by counsel that a wife cannot be barred from claiming her dower, except by a formal relinquishment of it as provided by the statute. The case of Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala. 86, is cited in support of this contention, and much reliance is apparently placed upon what is said in that case. It must suffice to say with respect to that case that the proceeding there was a direct one by the widow to recover dower in her alleged husband’s estate. What was said by the court, therefore, in that case with respect to an estoppel, was intended to apply to the peculiar
In view of all the circumstances, upon what reasonable
In what we have said we disclaim any intention to in any way reflect upon the motives or the intentions of respondent. She, to a certain extent was the dupe of circumstances, and, we have no doubt, acted in good faith. By reason of her relations with Mr. Hilton, we do not wish to be understood as imputing to her any impure motives, any moral wrong nor that she consciously (except in the manner we have stated) desired to deceive any one. If we permitted her to prevail in these actions, however, she would perpetrate a wrong upon innocent persons. Our system of jurisprudence would fall far short of accomplishing what is claimed for it if it were impotent to afford relief under circumstances like those in the cases at bar, and a court of conscience that would fail to protect the purchasers in their rights as against the claims of respondent would, in onr judgment, entirely ignore the fundamental principles upon which that system of jurisprudence is founded.
In conclusion we remark that it is claimed that the judgment against Elizabeth Goeghegan should be affirmed if for no other reason than that she purchased the property claimed by her after being made cognizant of respondent’s claim of dower. It is, however, conceded that Mrs. Goeghegan pur-
The judgment in each case is therefore reversed, with directions to the district court to set aside its conclusions of law that respondent is not estopped from claiming a dower interest in the several parcels of land described in her complaint in each case, and to substitute a conclusion of law that, by reason of the conceded and undisputed facts as they are made to appear from the stipulation of the parties and otherwise, respondent is so estopped; and to enter judgment or decree in each ease quieting the title to the real estate described in the several complaints to the several appellants in accordance with the prayers contained in their answers. It is further ordered that the several parties to the foregoing actions pay his own costs on appeal.