JAMES HILTON v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
(SC 21106)
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Argued March 6—officially released June 30, 2026
Mullins, C. J., аnd McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker, Dannehy and Bright, Js.
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The petitioner, who had been convicted of murder, among other crimes, in connection with the shooting death of the victim, filed a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel and first habeas counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate the opinion of K, the associate medical examiner who had performed the victim’s autopsy. At the petitioner’s criminal trial, a key issue was whether the fatal shot that caused the victim’s death had been discharged at close range or from a distance, and K opined during the criminal trial that the barrel of the gun that was used to shoot the victim had been touching the victim’s skin when the gun was fired. At the petitioner’s first habeas trial, his counsel presented the expert testimony of C, the chief medical examiner, and D, a forensic scientist, in support of the petitioner’s claim that trial counsel had failed to adequately cross-examine K and to present expert testimony on the petitioner’s behalf. The first habeas court rejected the petitioner’s claim and denied the first habeas petition. At his second habeas trial, the petitioner presented the testimony of W, an expert in forensic pathology, who disagreed with K’s conclusion that the victim’s fatal wound was a contact wound and testified that the victim had been shot from a distance. The second habeas сourt, after reviewing the prior testimony of K, C and D, and weighing W’s testimony, found that neither W nor his conclusion about the shot distance was credible and rendered judgment denying the second habeas petition. The petitioner, on the partial granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed in part the petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the second habeas court’s judgment. In so doing, the Appellate Court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the second habeas court had failed to apply the proper standard for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses, purportedly set forth in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction (316 Conn. 225). On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held:
The Appellate Court correctly determined that the second habeas court had applied the correct legal standard for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses, this court having concluded that Lapointe did not vary the standard, set forth in Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), that is applicable to ineffective assistance claims or alter how a habeas court is to assess the credibility of experts.
Lapointe did not prescribe a different legal standard for a habeas court’s assessment of the credibility of expert witnesses; rather, Lapointe involved an unusual circumstance in which the habeas court made clearly erroneous credibility findings that the record did not support, and the prejudicial effect of that error was evident in Lapointe because the evidence against the petitioner in that case was weak.
Accordingly, the second habeas court applied the proper legal standard when it concluded that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would not have been different if W had testified because W’s testimony would not have persuaded the criminal trial jury insofar as W failed to account for certain other features of the fatal wound about which C and D had testified, and W’s testimony would not have overcome the state’s overwhelming eyewitness and forensic testimony, as well as evidence of the petitioner’s motive.
Moreover, this court agreed with the Appellate Court that the evidence of the petitioner’s guilt in this case was not weak insofar as there were two eyewitnesses who gave statements identifying the petitioner as the shooter and no witnesses who corroborated the petitioner’s claim that other individuals were responsible for the shooting, аnd the Appellate Court had previously noted the overwhelming nature of the state’s case against the petitioner, both in the petitioner’s direct appeal and also in his appeal from the first habeas court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
Procedural History
Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Klatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of partial certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, Alvord, Moll and Clark, Js., which dismissed the appeal in part and affirmed the habeas court’s judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Alexander T. Taubes, for the appellant (petitioner).
Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state’s attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the aрpellee (respondent).
Robert J. Meredith, Desmond Ryan and M. Chris Fabricant, pro hac vice, filed a brief for the Innocence Project, Inc., et al. as amici curiae.
D’AURIA, J. In this certified appeal, we consider whether the Appellate Court correctly determined that the habeas court had applied the correct legal standard in denying the second petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, James Hilton. The petitioner claims that the habeas court failed to apply the standard for evaluating the credibility of expert witnesses that this court articulated in Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 112 A.3d 1 (2015). We disagree and affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.
The Appellate Court’s opinion aptly recites the facts and procedural history required to resolve this appeal; see Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 225 Conn. App. 309, 312–23, 315 A.3d 1135 (2024); whiсh we summarize along with other undisputed facts in the record. In July, 2000, the victim, William Rodriguez, was shot and killed on Truman Street in New Haven. The police found the victim’s body on the sidewalk, surrounded by a crowd of people. An autopsy later revealed that the victim died from a single gunshot at close range to the left side of his head.
A drug turf war in the Truman Street area between the petitioner and the victim’s associates had been ongoing, including two altercations in the days leading up to the shooting. The victim had recently moved into an apartment on Truman Street. One eyewitness to the shooting, Sherice Mills, saw the petitioner approach the victim as the victim was making a drug sale to someone in a car. Mills testified that shе had heard the petitioner state that he was “about to kill [the victim]” and observed the petitioner shoot the victim in the head. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 313. According to Mills, the petitioner fell to the ground with the victim, and the petitioner “kept holding [the victim’s] head, saying he didn’t mean to do it and [telling] somebody to call the police.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Mills later identified the petitioner as the shooter from an array of photographs. A second eyewitness, Simone Williams,
The petitioner voluntarily went to the police station and informed detectives that he had been sitting on his porch when he heard a commotion and went to see what was happening. He said that a third man had drawn a gun, that the petitioner had grappled for the gun, and “it went bashing across [the victim’s] head.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 315. At trial, the petitioner described how several seconds after he had fought with the third man, a fourth mаn shot the victim and ran away. The petitioner testified that, immediately after the gunshot, he applied pressure to the victim’s wound to stop the bleeding and then left to make sure someone had called an ambulance. He explained that he left the scene after people in the crowd began to tell the police that he was the shooter. Although the petitioner had his bloodied clothes washed, the state discovered a drop of blood on his boxer shorts that matched the victim’s blood type and DNA.
The state charged the petitioner with murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. One of the key issues at the petitioner’s сriminal trial was the distance the fatal gunshot had traveled. The state contended that the petitioner had shot the victim at close range; the petitioner maintained that someone else had fired the gunshot from a distance. The state presented the testimony of Arkady Katsnelson, an associate medical examiner in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, who performed the victim’s autopsy. Katsnelson testified that, because “there was
A jury found the petitioner guilty of murder, criminal possession of a pistol or revolver and carrying a pistol or revolver without a permit. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-five years of imprisonment. The Appellate Court rejected the petitioner’s prosecutorial impropriety claim and affirmed the petitioner’s conviction on direct appeal. See State v. Hilton, 79 Conn. App. 155, 170, 829 A.2d 890 (2003).
The petitioner commenced his first habeas action, in which he alleged that his criminal trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately cross-examine Katsnelson regаrding the nature of the victim’s fatal wound and failing to present his own expert testimony regarding the wound. At the first habeas trial, the petitioner’s counsel sought to undercut Katsnelson’s autopsy report and conclusions by presenting the expert testimony of Harold Wayne Carver II, the state’s chief
Carver testified that there was a sufficient basis from the autopsy photographs and report to conclude that the wound had resulted from a contact shot based on the large size and abnormal shape of the wound. He noted that one phenomenon that is a “very, very strong criteri[on]” of a contact wound is a blowback laceration that occurs when the force is great enough to make the skin explode toward the muzzle. He explained that blowback lacerations can have serrated edges, also referred to as “stellate” because they are starlike, which can extend symmetrically in all directions around the wound. Carver also opined that, in addition to the large size and irregular shape of the wound, there was one stellate arm present at the irregular perforation, indicating a blowback laceration caused by a contact wound.
DeForest testified that the wound was “ambiguous,” and he could not conclude with certainty whether the wound resulted from a contact shot or from a shot from a distance. DeForest noted that the oval shape of the wound could have been caused by a destabilized bullet that struck the skin sideways. “Nevertheless, [DeForest] acknowledged that a bullet striking the skin at an angle can cause an oval wound. . . . In [DeForest’s] assessment, this was either a contact wound or a distance wound where the bullet had become destabilized.” (Citation omitted.)
The habeas court denied the petitioner’s first habeas petition. The court determined that defense counsel had not rendered deficient performance because the scope of the cross-examination of Katsnelson reflected a reasonable trial strategy. The habeas court also concluded that the petitioner had failed to prove prejudice because DeForest’s opinion that the wound was ambiguous did not contradict Katsnelson’s testimony that it was a contact wound. The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment; Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, 161 Conn. App. 58, 85, 127 A.3d 1011 (2015); and we denied
The petitioner then filed his second habeas petition, which is at issue in this appeal. He alleged that his first habeas counsel and criminal trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate Katsnelson’s opinion. He further alleged that, although his first habeas counsel had presented two experts (DeForest and Carver), both counsel failed to present expert testimony from a forеnsic pathologist to undercut Katsnelson’s opinion. Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 320–21. In support of this claim, the petitioner presented the testimony and report of his new forensic pathology expert, Cyril H. Wecht.
Wecht testified that he had reviewed, among other things, Katsnelson’s autopsy report and photographs, Katsnelson’s testimony from the criminal trial, a police report, the petitioner’s posttrial brief from his first habeas trial, and a field report from a private investigation service. Wecht acknowledged that he had not reviewed the transcripts from the first habeas trial, including the testimony of Carver that the wound had blowback stellate. Wecht disagreed with Katsnelson’s opinion and offered his own opinion that the victim’s gunshot wоund was not a contact wound but, instead, resulted from a bullet fired from a gun held at least twenty-four inches from the victim. He explained that he arrived at his conclusion because there was no gunpowder residue or stippling, which is the term used to describe skin abrasions resulting from burning gunpowder particles. Wecht agreed that the wound was oval and not round, indicated that he did not see any stellate tears on the wound, and could rule out a “loose” contact gunshot wound in which gunpowder residue goes into the wound or onto bone, but also onto skin.
The habeas court denied the petitioner’s second habeas petition. The court reviewed in detail the prior testimony
The habeas court concluded that the petitioner’s trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to adequately cross-examine Katsnelson and that first habeas counsel did not perform deficiently by calling Carver, a forensic pathologist, “whose experience and credentials are on par with, if not superior, to [Wecht].” The habeas court further found that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice because the court was not persuaded that Wecht’s testimony would have made a difference in the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial because Wecht was not credible, and the state had abundant and overwhelming evidence of identification and motive, which supported the forensic testimony at the petitioner’s criminal trial.
The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal with the habeas court. Two of the grounds he advanced
The Appellate Court affirmed the habeas court’s judgment. See Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 225 Conn. App. 341. In particular, it rejected the petitioner’s claim that the habeas court had applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing witness credibility by failing to follow the prescriptions of Lapointe. See id., 333. It held that the habeas court had applied the
“A defendant seeking habeas relief for ineffective representation must prove two elements. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires [a] showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maia v. Commissioner of Correction, 347 Conn. 449, 460, 298 A.3d 588 (2023). To prevail on a second habeas petition, a petitioner is faced with the task of establishing that (1) his first habeas counsel was ineffective, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. See, e.g., Kaddah v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 548, 562, 153 A.3d 1233 (2017).
In determining whether a petitioner has met his burden of establishing prejudice, “[t]he principal question . . . is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the [fact finder] would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. . . . A reasonable probability
In assessing whether a petitioner has met his burden, a habeas court, as the finder of fact, must assess whether to believe all, none, or some of the testimony presented. See, e.g., Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, 343 Conn. 347, 367, 273 A.3d 680 (2022). The habeas court “is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Echeverria v. Commissioner of Correction, 193 Conn. App. 1, 15 n.6, 218 A.3d 1116, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 947, 219 A.3d 376 (2019); see also Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, 333 Conn. 502, 523, 217 A.3d 609 (2019).
An appellate court “does not retry the case or evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. . . . Rather, [the reviewing court] must defer to the [habeas court’s] assessment of the credibility of the witnesses based on its firsthand observation of their conduct, demeanor and attitude.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, 324 Conn. 631, 643, 153 A.3d 1264 (2017); accord Sanchez v. Commissioner of Correction, 314 Conn. 585, 604, 103 A.3d 954 (2014). A habeas court’s pure credibility determination is unassailable, and we will not disturb it on appeal. See Breton v. Commissioner of Correction, 325 Conn. 640, 694, 159 A.3d 1112 (2017); Orcutt v. Commissioner of Correction, 284 Conn. 724, 741, 937 A.2d 656 (2007). “Because it is the [habeas] court’s function to weigh the evidence and determine credibility, we give great deference to its findings. . . . In reviewing factual findings, [w]e do not examine the record to determine whether the [court] could have reached a conclusion other than the one reached. . . . Instead, we make every reasonable presumption . . . in favor of the [habeas] court’s ruling.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Barlow v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 343 Conn. 357–58. Thus, the habeas judge’s credibility determinations and findings are entitled to deference from this court and cannot be disregarded unless they are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Small v. Commissioner of Correction, 286 Conn. 707, 716, 946 A.2d 1203, cert. denied sub nom. Small v. Lantz, 555 U.S. 975, 129 S. Ct. 481, 172 L. Ed. 2d 336 (2008).
In Lapointe, this court recognized an “exceptional factual and procedural scеnario” in which we held that the habeas court’s credibility assessment of expert witnesses was clearly erroneous. Lapointe v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 316 Conn. 272–73.3 In that case, the petitioner was convicted of capital felony and other offenses for the rape and murder of an elderly woman and the arson of her apartment to destroy the evidence. Id., 229. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and first
This court in Lapointe did not substitute its own credibility determination for that of the habeas court but, instead, concluded that the underlying factual findings on which the habeas court relied to discredit the petitioner’s experts were clearly erroneous because they were unsupported by the record. See id., 273. This court held that it was “not bound” by the habeas court’s “appraisal of the scientific underpinnings of the parties’ expert testimony“; id., 261; because the habeas court’s “critique” of the petitioner’s experts was “comprised of factually unfounded assertions.” Id., 277. For instance, we reasoned that the habeas court had erroneously (1) characterized the testimony of the petitioner’s experts as a “high energy fire” when they in fact did not state that and had opined that it was a “low energy fire“; id., 278; (2) stated that the respondent’s expert provided a lower peak temperature when his testimony was the opposite; id.; (3) considered the petitioner’s experts’ maximum fire temperature as “‘wildly exaggerated’” when the
In the present case, the question the petitioner raised in his petitions for certification to the habeas court and this court, and the question as to which we granted certification, is whether the habeas court had erred by failing to apply Lapointe in assessing Wecht’s credibility. The parties do not dispute that the habeas court did not cite, apply, or use a standard articulated by Lapointe. We conclude, however, that the habeas court did not err in not applying Lapointe because our decision in that case did not alter a habeas court’s analysis of a claim brought pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), or how it is to make credibility assessments of experts. Lapointe represented an unusual circumstance in which this court concluded that the habeas court made erroneous credibility findings that the record did not support in a case in which the prejudicial effect of that error was evident because the evidence against the petitioner was weak. What made Lapointe “extraordinary” was the searching nature of the appellate review we found necessary to review for clear error a habeas court’s credibility determination of an expert witness; our analysis did not change the legal standard the trial court must apply in making credibility determinations in the first instance. Because Lapointe in fact did not prescribe a different legal standard to be applied by the habeas court, the habeas court
Our well established standard—both before and after Lapointe—required the habeas court to make the predictive judgment as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the petitioner would have prevailed if the petitioner’s first habeas counsel had called Wecht to testify. See, e.g., Grant v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 354 Conn. 50. In making that predictive assessment, the habeas court was required to assess Wecht’s expert opinion based on his methodology and its firsthand observation of the persuasiveness of his tеstimony. See, e.g., Bowens v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 333 Conn. 523; Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 324 Conn. 643–44. The habeas court properly applied this legal standard as it quoted the apt legal principles and expressly concluded that the outcome of the petitioner’s criminal trial would not have been different if Wecht had testified for two principal reasons. First, the court found that Wecht’s testimony would not have persuaded the jury because he failed to account for the shape and stellate tear around the wound, as well as the time that had elapsed between the shooting and autopsy. Second, the habeas court determined that Wecht’s testimony would not have overcome the state’s overwhelming eyewitness and forensic testimony, as well as evidence of the petitioner’s motive, that bolstered its case.
The petitioner further asks this court to apply Lapointe on appeal to reverse the habeas court’s determination that Wecht was not credible. This argument is outside the question on which the petitioner requested and we granted certification, and would necessitate our application of Lapointe instead of the habeas court’s standard. See State v. Armadore, 338 Conn. 407, 438 n.15, 258 A.3d 601 (2021). We will not undertake the task at this point. Doing so would not benefit the petitioner in any event, because it is evident from the foregoing analysis that the petitioner in the present case, unlike in Lapointe, cannot demonstrate that the reasons the habeas court
We also agree with the Appellate Court that, unlike in Lapointe, the state’s evidence of guilt in the present case was not weak. The habeas court aptly found that the state’s case against the petitioner was “overwhelming” because “[t]here were multiple witnesses to the argument and ongoing feud between him and the victim. Identification was not an issue as all parties knew each other. There were two eyewitnesses who remained on the scene and gave statements to [the] police identifying [the petitioner] as the shooter and plаcing him standing right next to the victim when he was shot. There were no witnesses to [the petitioner’s claimed] third and fourth individuals. . . . [T]he sole witness who testified in support of [the petitioner’s] claim that someone else shot the victim was wrong about the time and location of the shooting and did not observe a fourth witness.” The Appellate Court has twice taken note of the strong and overwhelming nature of the state’s case against the petitioner, once in his direct appeal and a second time in his appeal following his first habeas trial, and we have no reason to disagree with those assessments of the evidence. See Hilton v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 161 Conn. App. 76; State v. Hilton, supra, 79 Conn. App. 168.4
Although Lapointe did not alter a habeas court’s function as the arbiter of credibility, it provides an important
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.