Hilterbrand v. CarterHilterbrand v. Carter
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Plaintiffs brought this action to determine their interest in real property. The trial court held that plaintiffs’ action was timely, that the grantor had conveyed her land to herself and plaintiffs as joint tenants with the right of survi-vorship, and that the grantor could not later unilaterally revoke the contingent remainder that she had given plaintiffs. Defendаnts appeal. We affirm.
This case arises out of a dispute over a parcel of real property that Irene Stanfield (mother) owned and operated as a mobile home park. In 1976, two of mother’s children, Beverly Holbrook and Durene Cantrell, and their spouses (plaintiffs) moved onto the park to helр mother operate it. In 1978, mother executed a deed in which she conveyed her interest in the property to herself and plaintiffs as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. The deed, which was properly recorded with the county clerk’s office, provided that mother would own the property
“in joint tenancy with Tommy J. & Beverly G. Holbrook and C. Kenneth & Durene A. Cantrell * * * not as tenants in сommon but with the right of survivorship * * *.
«H« * * * *
“* * * [T]he grantees herein do not take title in common but with the right of survivorship, that is, that the fee shall vest absolutely in the survivor of the grantees.”
In 1983, mother recorded a document entitled “Correction Deed,” which purported to “correct that certain Deed executed between the parties оn April 12,1978, * * * clarifying the interest that each of the parties is to receive herein.” It provided:
“[Mother], hereinafter called grantor, for the consideration hereinafter stated, does hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey [the property] unto Tommy J. Holbrook, Beverly G. Holbrook, H&W, [undivided 1/4 interest as tenants by the entirety and C. Kenneth Cantrell, and Durene A. Cantrell, H&W, [u]ndivided 1/4 interest as tenants by the entirety.”
Although the correction deed provided that the couples would hold their quarter shares of the property as tenants by the entirety, it did not expressly say whether all of the grantees would hold the whole property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship or as tenants in common. 1 Plaintiffs did not sign the 1983 deеd but were aware that mother had executed it.
Mother died in 1995, and a dispute over her interest in the property ensued. 2 Because the 1978 deed plainly established a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, plaintiffs maintained that mother’s interest in the property passed directly to them on her death. Other beneficiaries (defendants) claimed that the 1983 deed created tenancies by the entireties as to the two married couples but created a tenancy in common among all of the grantees. Under defendants’ theory, mother’s share of the property would not pass to plaintiffs pursuant to their right of survivorship under the 1978 deed but would pass to defendants either as beneficiaries of her estate or as beneficiaries of the 1994 trust.
In 1996, plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title and for a declaration of their ownership interest in the property. They argued that, once the 1978 deed was executed and delivered, mother could not unilaterally divest the grantees of the interests that the deed conveyed, including the right of survivorship. At the close of plaintiffs’ case, defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing, among other things, that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by laches. More specifically, they asserted that, because the 1983 deed did not expressly mention a type of tenаncy or the right of survivor-ship, it created a tenancy in common by default.
See
The trial court denied defendants’ motion and, after considering the parties’ evidence, entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In a letter opinion, the trial court reasoned that the 1978 deed established mother’s intent to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship. Once that deed was delivered, mother could not unilaterally revoke it or defeat plaintiffs’ survivorship interest. Defendants appealed, raising four assignments of error. We write to address only the issues raised by defendants’ first and third assignments— whether mother could unilaterally correct the 1978 deed and whether рlaintiffs’ action is barred by laches. We affirm without discussion the other rulings that defendants assign as error.
We begin with the question whether mother could unilaterally revoke the contingent remainders created by the 1978 deed.
3
As noted above, the 1978 deed conveyed
Defendants advance two arguments to explain why the 1983 deed nonetheless supersedes the 1978 deed. First, defendants argue that
Myers v. Weems,
Although defendants do not argue, in so many words, that mother did not intend that the 1978 deed would presently convey an interest in the property to the grantees, they suggest as much by citing
Myers
and by referring to the 1983 deed as an expression of mother’s true intent.
5
We disagree. When a deed is recorded, there is a presumption that the grantor intended the deed to take effect and to pass title to the grantees.
See Lancaster v. May, as Administrator,
Defendants advance a second argument. They appear to argue that, even if the 1978 deed made the grantees joint tenants with rights of survivorship,
Jones v. Bramwell et al.,
Jones
does not say that a grantor may unilaterally correct an earlier mistake in a deed, as defendants argue. Rather, the only issue, as the court framed it in
Jones,
was whether the original deeds should be reformed because of a mutual mistake. Not only does the decision in
Jones
not yield the proposition that defendants draw from it, but its reasoning dоes not advance defendants’ argument here. Defendants
do not argue that there was any basis for reformation; that is, they never explain how the survivorship clause was a mutual mistake.
See Jones,
The remaining question is whether laches barred plaintiffs from bringing this action in 1996 to determine the effect of the 1983 deed. Laches will bar a party from asserting an equitable claim when three elements are present. The first two are “full knowledge of all the facts concurring with delay for an unreasonable time.”
Kelly v. Tracy,
“[Ljaches will not begin to run until the plaintiff has actual knowledge, Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co.,52 Or 70 ,96 P 528 (1908), or is chargeable with knowledge [the plaintiff] might have obtained upon inquiry if [the plaintiff] had knowledge of facts which would have put a duty to inquire on a person of ordinary intelligence. In re Webster’s Estate,74 Or 489 ,145 P 1063 (1915).”
See also Loomis v. Rosenthal,
In this case, defendants argue that laches began running in 1983 when mother executed the second deed and that, because plaintiffs delayed longer than the analogous statute of limitations in initiating this action, “plaintiff[s] ha[ve] the burden of explaining the prolonged delay.”
See Oregon State Bar v. Wright,
In this case, defendants failed to establish that any delay prejudiced them to the extent that it would be inequitable to permit plaintiffs’ action to proceed.
Hanns v. Hanns,
While the loss of a witness will often be prejudicial, that is not always so.
See Woodriff v. Ashcraft,
Affirmed.
Notes
In 1990, Tommy Holbrook executed a deed that conveyed his interest in the property to Beverly, who became known as Beverly Hilterbrand some time before this case commenced.
Although the record is not fully developed on this issue, both parties refer to two trusts created by mother between 1989 and 1994. According to defendants, in the 1989 trust agreement, mother purported to convey “an undivided one-half interest” in the mobile home park (along with other property) to the trust, part of which would pass to defendants upon mother’s death.
Both plaintiffs and defendants agree that we review de novo.
One of the incidents of the cоmmon-law joint tenancy was the power of each of the cotenants to sever the estate and convert it into a tenancy in common.
Halleck,
By extension, we presume that defendants would also contend that the 1978 deed is ineffective, because delivery, which is an essential element of a valid deed, requires a present intent tо pass an interest in the property.
See generally Halleck,
We note that, even if there were an ambiguity in this regard, we generally would construe the ambiguity against the grantor and in favor of the grantees.
Hurd v.
Byrnes,
Indeed, defendants identify no basis for saying that giving the grantees a right of survivorship was even a unilateral mistake. Not only were the terms in the 1978 deed unmistakable, but it appears from the face of the 1983 deed that mother intended to clarify only the percentage of property each of the grantees would receive, not whether the grantees held the property as tenants in common or with the right of survivorship.
When an action is commenced within the analogous statute of limitations, the burden of proving laches remains on the defendant.
We explained in Assn, of Unit Owners:
‘TA] property owner who has record notice of ‘possible problems’ with the owner’s title may, but is not required to, bring an action to eliminate those problems. When a property interest is actually repudiated or challenged, or an adverse claim is asserted against the interest, the property owner is obligated to act within a reasonable time to protect the owner’s interests.”
In this case, the analogous statute of limitations is 10 years.
See