7 La. 406 | La. | 1844
The petitioners allege, that the defendants are indebted to them in the sum of $11,666 66, with interest thereon at the rate of eight per cent from the 21st of May, 1836, as the holders and endorsees of a note for the above sum and interest,
The defendant Jacobs, after a general denial, avers, that the plaintiffs sold to him all their title and interest in the note mentioned and in the mortgage given to secure it, in full payment for which he executed his four notes, payable to them at nine and twelve months, amounting altogether to the sum of $9461 25, which by agreement were to remain deposited in the hands of a third person, and be delivered whenever he should receive the ■ titles to the aforesaid tract of land and slaves, on which the plaintiffs claimed to have a mortgage derived from Hunter. He alleges, that the money intended to be secured by his notes was the . value at which the plaintiffs estimated their note and mortgage, and that it was a condition precedent that the notes should be deposited until the completion of the title. That the plaintiffs always looked upon the transaction as a sale of their interest in
Lambeth & Thompson commence their answer by a qualified general denial, and then proceed to aver, that, the plaintiffs, being willing to sell all the title and interest they had in the note of Hunter for the sum aforesaid, agreed with Lambeth to sell the same for two notes of their co-defendant Jacobs, to be dated on the 1st of June, 1842, one payable at nine months for $4676 25, to the order of the plaintiffs, and the other at twelve months from said date for the sum of $4085, also payable to them; and that they (plaintiffs) drew a receipt for the said respondents to sign, which they did, but that the plaintiffs never called upon them for it. They further state, that at the time they were negotiating for the .purchase of the interest of the plaintiffs in the aforesaid note, they (plaintiffs) well knew that they were acting for their co-defendant (Jacobs,) and not for themselves, wherefore, they (plaintiffs) “ chose rather to place themselves in direct privity with the real vendee, and accordingly entered into a new and distinct agreement, as to the purchase money and the time and manner of payment with him, with which these respondents had nothing to do.”
The respondents aver, if they should be held responsible because of their agency in behalf of Jacobs in said transaction, that he (Jacobs) gave the price which the plaintiffs required for their interest in said note, and executed his four promissory notes for the sum to be paid, two payable at nine months and two others at twelve months, which were deposited in' the hands of the person agreed upon, to be held and delivered when he (Jacobs) should receive titles for the tract of land and negroes of Hunter, which were mortgaged to secure the payment of said note held
1 he origin of the note in controversy is fully stated in the opinion of this court in the cases of Bludworth &c. v. Hunter, Lambeth & Thompson, Intervenors and of Bludworth v. Lambeth & Thompson, decided at the last October term, in the Western District.
At the sale made by the Sheriff of the parish of Natchitoches, on the 4th of June, 1842, under the order of seizure and sale obtained by Bludworth & Bullard against Hunter, Lambeth <fc Thompson were the last and highest bidders. The Sheriff refused to make them a deed, because they refused to pay the sum which the Sheriff contended was coming to the plaintiffs in execution, and over whom they (L. & T.) contended they had a preference, in consequence of the postponement of privilege and mortgage made by Charles A. Bullard, the assignor of Bludworth & Bullard, in the act of mortgage given by Hunter to Lambeth & Thompson, he (the Sheriff) saying, ho would not do so, un
The court below gave a judgment for the plaintiffs against Jacobs, for $16,650 33, with interest at eight per cent, from November, 1842, on $11,666 66, until paid ; and a judgment in favor of Lambeth & Thompson. Jacobs only has appealed.
The objection made by the counsel of Jacobs to admitting the copy of the paper in evidence, is, that the original was not accounted for. In overruling this objection, we think the Judge did not err. The clerk of the defendants, Lambeth & Thompson, swore that he had given it to Lambeth in the counting-house. We may, therefore, well suppose that it remained there in possession of the firm. When called on to produce the paper} neither Jacobs nor Thompson made any effort to find it. They do not seem to have gone to their common counting-house to make a search, nor to have asked for time to do so. They used no diligence to find the original; and we cannot presume that Lambeth excluded them from an examination of the documents and papers in the common office in his absence. They said they knew nothing of this paper; but did not manifest any wish to obtain information, or seek for it. We are also of opinion that the Judge did not err in refusing to continue the case. It was on trial, and the- absence of Lambeth, one of the defendants, was no cause for a continuance. He could not have been examined as a witness if he had been present, and his statements could have had no influence, except upon his co-defendants. If the
The document thus received in evidence, contains a brief statement of the sale from O. A. Bullard to Hunter of the half of the land and slaves, the names of the latter, the price, and terms of payment. It then goes on to state, what slaves had been previously sold by the Sheriff; how many had died ; and how many had been sold by Hunter himself. It then gives the appraisement in round numbers ; the price bid at the sale on the 4th of June, 1842, say $18,400 ; and deducts a previous mortgage of $1000, showing a balance of $17,400, as all that was applicable to the two liens of $11,666 66|- each, with interest for about six years on the one held by the plaintiffs, and for two years on the other. What Lambeth orally represented to the plaintiff or his co-defendants we are not informed; but it is a fair inference, that he and Jacobs understood each other, as they lived together, and one acted as the agent of the other in a matter that was to be mutually beneficial to them. The document submitted was calculated to induce a belief that there must be a heavy loss on the notes, and that there had been a sale of the property by the Sheriff. The other testimony shows, that there was a representation as to a difficulty about the title ; and, altogether, 'a case was made out, Well calculated to produce an impression that the plaintiffs Would have to submit to a serious loss, or to a protracted and questionable suit in a distant parish. It is upon these grounds that the plaintiffs say they were led into error ; and we think the evidence supports the allegation. We think both error in fact and motive, are conclusively shown.
We have been favored by the counsel for the defence with voluminous briefs, and long oral arguments, to prove, first, that there was no error in the transaction; secondly, that if there were, the suit should have been brought for a rescission of the sale ; and lastly, that there was a legal adjudication to Lambeth & Thompson, on the 4th of June, 1842.
In support of the first ground, it was much relied on, that the first arrangement between Lambeth and the plaintiffs was not
The second ground of defence is not, in our opinion, more tenable than the other. The plaintiffs never pretended that they had made a sale of their note and mortgage to Jacobs, or to any one else. Their allegations are, that by the representations of the defendants they obtained possession of the note and mortgage illegally, and used it for their own benefit, not having given any consideration therefor. The fact of there being a sale, is what the plaintiffs never admitted, but on the contrary, have always denied; and the transaction cannot be so considered. The parties do not seem to have considered the transaction as a sale, on the 22d of June, 1842, when Lambeth <fc Thompson gave their receipt for the note. They call it a settlement; and promise to preserve the mortgage for plaintiffs’ benefit. Nor does Jacobs, in his letter to Mathews, say any thing of having purchased the note and mortgage. Nothing in the parol or written testimony induces us to conclude that a sale was made, or that one was intended.
The third point is not, in our opinion, sustained. It is clear that Lambeth did not acquire any rights by his bid made on the 4th off June, 1842, when the Sheriff offered the undivided half of the land and slaves for sale, under the order of seizure obtained by Bludworth & Bullard. He has always contended that the mortgage of Hunter to Lambeth & Thompson, for upwards of $29,000, with interest, has a preference over that in favor of Bludworth & Bullard, and on this ground refused to pay the amount of his bid. Assuming this to be true, then there are mortgages for more than $40,000, exclusive of interest, on the property; and
But, say the defendants’ counsel, their client was not bound to ' pursue any particular mode of completing his title. This perhaps, may be true ; but the particular bid was used for the purpose of imposing on the plaintiffs, and being invalid, it cannot be made effective, and fix the amount the plaintiffs shall receive under their mortgage.
The counsel further urges, that there are various errors in the calculations made by the Parish Judge, by which the amount of the judgment was ascertained. This is probably true; but, as our calculations, made from different data, show that as large an amount should be paid to the plaintiffs, we will not attempt to correct calculations which will not benefit their clients. We are not responsible for the reasons that may induce the inferior judges to come to their conclusions. It is our duty to see if the judgment is correct; and being satisfied that substantial justice has been done between the parties, we will not disturb the judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
Bullard, J. did not sit on the trial of this case, having an interest in the question.
The opinion in these cases, which were.tried together, was pronounced at the last October term, but the judgment did not become final until the present term. The opinion will be found in the 9th volume of these Reports, p. 256.