Appellant was convicted of terroristic threats. In this second appearance of his case (see
1. Under
Batson v. Kentucky,
Appellant complains that the prosecutor’s reasoning was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case of discrimination because he did not strike the 27-year-old white male who sat on the jury. However, the record indicates that the prosecutor’s reason not to strike that person was because he was a minister and was adverse to alcohol. Since the voir dire was not taken down and there is no other indication of the extent to which the other veniremen were questioned about their opinions on alcohol and/or drugs, we cannot say that the “persuasiveness of [the] proffered explanation [is] magnified or diminished by the persuasiveness of companion explanations. . . .” Gamble, supra at 327. We find the prosecutor’s reasons to be adequate in light of the Batson standard and affirm the trial court’s findings. Compare Gamble, Division 6.
2. Appellant’s remaining enumerations of error regarding his motions in limine, for directed verdict, for mistrial, and for a new trial were raised in his first appeal but, contrary to the State’s assertion, were not resolved against him at that time. Since this court’s earlier opinion only addressed the Batson issue, we will now examine those still remaining.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State complied with OCGA § 17-7-210 and therefore permitted testimony by the arresting officer-victim about statements appellant made while he was in police custody. The record indicates that at the committal hearing held approximately two months after appellant was arrested, the officer testified that appellant threatened to “blow my
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brains out . . . and made several other threats.” At trial, the officer testified that in addition to the other threats he made, appellant used specific words ascribing to the officer certain relations he allegedly had with his mother and describing the officer as being a certain orifice of his anatomy. Appellant moved in limine to keep the statements out, and his motion was denied. During the testimony, he moved for a mistrial, which the trial court also denied. The testimony was allowed, and appellant claims reversible error. Since the oral statement had been provided in writing by means of the officer’s written report and the committal hearing transcript, and since the written rendition was not significantly different in substance from the oral statements, we find no error in the denial of the motions in limine and for new trial.
Rhodes v. State,
3. In the course of the prosecuting attorney’s direct examination of one of the victims, he asked how the victim knew appellant was talking to him and not someone else. The witness replied, “Well, he knew me; he’d been in jail several times before.” Appellant made no objection but asked to approach the bench, where a sidebar conference was held. The record later indicates that during that conference, appellant moved for and was denied a mistrial. Another witness later testified that appellant “had been [under the influence of alcohol] on the other occasion he’d been brought into the jail . . . ,” at which point the prosecuting attorney stopped the witness and asked another question. Appellant made no objection or motion at that time.
At the close of the evidence, appellant moved for a mistrial on the ground that the State had impermissibly placed his character in issue through the above-stated testimony. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the statements were inadvertent, unintentional, and did not rise to “the level of prejudice that would demand a mistrial.” We agree. “The granting or refusing of a motion for mistrial is necessarily a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and unless it is apparent that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial, the exercise of the judge’s discretion will not be interfered with. [Cits.]”
Stanley v. State,
4. Appellant moved for a new trial, contending that although one of the jurors knew Deputy Sheriff Ken Smith, one of the victims who testified at trial, he denied that knowledge on voir dire. The motion was denied, since the juror’s “knowledge of Mr. Smith was based upon having seen Mr. Smith in [the juror’s] father’s store prior to the trial . . . [and] that he did not know Mr. Smith personally, that he
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had never socialized with him, and that he knew of him, like he knows of the Mayor . . . the only conversation that he ever had with Mr. Smith was of a business nature.” There was no error committed in the denial of the motion for new trial, since there was nothing to show that the juror did not act as an impartial member of the jury, or that he had an ulterior or evil motive in “giving purportedly untrue answers.”
Geiger v. State,
5. Finally, we find no merit in appellant’s contention that his motion for directed verdict of acquittal should have been granted. Appellant was charged with two counts of committing terroristic threats. OCGA § 16-11-37 (a) states that one commits the offense “when he threatens to commit any crime of violence or to burn or damage property with the purpose of terrorizing another. . . .” The statute requires that the testimony of the party to whom the threat is communicated be corroborated.
The victims testified that after they arrested and booked appellant for disorderly conduct, he continually threatened to kill them if he saw them on the street; blow their brains out; and sneak up behind one of them and shoot him in the head. The victims testified that they took appellant seriously and became more cautious in their work in uniform. Another witness who was not a victim also corroborated the victims’ testimony. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of terroristic threats.
Jackson v. Virginia,
Judgment affirmed.