This case is here on exception to the trial judge’s order sustaining an oral motion to- dismiss by the defendant. It thus becomes our duty to measure the petition by the standard laid down by Chief Judge Hill in
Moone v. Smith,
Under the allegations of the plaintiff’s petition, it is clear that the plaintiff and defendant had entered into a guest-innkeeper relationship. This relationship- has the necessary legal concomitant of a duty placed upon the innkeeper. This duty is well-settled in Georgia as “the duty to exercise ordinary care to afford [guests] premises that are reasonably safe for use and occupancy.”
Hotel Richmond, Inc. v. Wilkinson,
Thus, the duty the law places upon the defendant is clear. But what of the breach? The plaintiff’s allegations of negligence, as amended, are set out above.
The defendant contends that the alternative allegation) that the dangerous condition of the handle “was known or should have been known” to the defendant was only an allegation of
*734
constructive knowledge. The trial court also used this theory as one basis for granting the oral motion, citing
Howerdd v. Whitaker,
This statement is correct when applied to the factual situation in
Howerdd.
However, the rule is different where “the facts show the relation from which the duty to know arises, [then] a general averment that the defendant knew or ought to have known of the defects from which the injury resulted is sufficient. . .”
Fulton Ice & Coal Co. v. Pece,
The Fulton Ice & Coal Co. case, supra, at pp. 518, 519, discusses the situations where alternative allegations of knowledge are attacked by general demurrer: (1) where the duty to- know arises from the relationship, and (2) where the duty does not arise by reason of the relationship but arises only after actual knowledge. The facts of the Howerdd case clearly place it in the second category.
As to cases in the first category, alternative allegations are good as against general demurrers. The prior discussion of the case sub judice shows clearly the pre-existing duty growing out of the innkeeper-guest relationship. Therefore, in the *735 absence of special demurrers, the alternative allegations of knowledge were sufficient.
The defendant also contends that there are no> facts pled which show that the duty owed the defendant -would involve an inspection of the handle, or that if inspection was the measure of “ordinary care,” that such would have enabled the defendant to discover the defect, if any. The trial .court agreed with this contention in sustaining the oral motion.
However, it is well to recall that we are dealing here with a motion in the nature of a general demurrer. As against such a motion, general allegations of negligence are good.
McPhail v. A. C. L. R. Co.,
The question of a violation of “the duty to exercise ordinary care to afford [guests] premises that are reasonably safe for use and occupancy,” which is the duty an innkeeper owes his guests, is a question of negligence and this court is bound by the rule that such matters are for the jury except in plain, palpable and indisputable cases.
Code
§ 81-304, catchword “Negligence.” Further, the innkeeper has a duty to inspect and is liable for such injuries caused by defects as would be disclosed by a reasonable inspection.
Johnson v. John Deere Plow Co.,
However, we do not intend to hold here that if such an inspection had been made, it would have disclosed the defect complained of here. Such is in the province of the jury. It may be that the evidence will show that the defendant could not have discovered the defect if an inspection had been made and that it had no other way of knowing of the defect. See Annot.
Judgment reversed.