*1 grant Procedure, sum- in order to 56.03, Civil Under Rule Rules of genuine is- mary is no find that “there trial court must judg- party entitled to any and that either as to material fact sue 340.95,plaintifffs must § under of law.” To recover ment as a matter intoxicating liquors.” bartering giving illegal “selling, We prove or depositions in carefully the affidavits and have reviewed support inference a reasonable which would find no evidence and can illegally the Yanasek brothers any furnished defendants that intoxicating granting facts, liquor. the motions Under the proper. judgment was HILLIGOSS v. CROSS COMPANIES. JERRY 2d 585. N. W.
April 25, 1975 44998,45089. Nos. London, Ramstead, Schermer, Schwappach, Michael J. Borlcon & Diamond, appellant. I. Richard
Carlsen, Rode, respondent. & Law and John E. Greiner Curiam. Per apartment period from defendant for Novem- leased 31,1972. February 1,1971, hospitalized from ber Plaintiff was to October February February apart- February 25, 14 to 1972.From February by occupied plaintiff’s father and son. On ment was changed on all of the doors defendant locks signs indicating building lock had on each door acquired changed keys at the of- and that new could be fice. February 25, notice plaintiff On to find returned to the missing. The personal property still on the door and several entry
investigating signs police found no of forcible officers or doors windows. *2 subsequently the value of Plaintiff commenced action for the this
missing alleging personal property, of defend- the agents argued apartment. in that the ant’s maintenance of the He the posting sign and was vacant was notice to all that the property. personal led to The trial the criminal act and resultant loss of granted ap- judgment. court defendant’s motion for peals judgment pursuant order. from the the court’s entered to alleged negli- principal appeal The issue on whether defendant’s is gence posting plaintiff’s apartment in on the door was the the notice of plaintiff’s personal property. of The definition loss proximate causation, adheres, of which court was stated in to this Chicago, P., Ry. 94, 97, v. Christianson M. & O. Co. 67 Minn. 69 N. W. St. 640, (1896), 641 follows: as “* * * Consequences sequence, which follow in without unbroken an intervening original negligent act, cause, from the are natural efficient proximate; original wrongdoer consequences and such the is responsible, though particular even he could foreseen re- not have the (Italics supplied.) sults which did follow.” general rule, intervening person
As a a criminal act of third an a is efficient cause break of Anderson sufficient to the chain causation. v. Theisen, 369, (1950). However, legally 231 Minn. 43 N. 2dW. to be a intervening cause, sufficient the criminal act itself must not be reason- ably Wallinga Johnson, 436, foreseeable. 269 Minn. 131 W. v. N. 2d (1964); Restatement, 302B, 448, 2d, Torts §§ 449. The of fore- seeability intervening normally of an act one the trial court and jury only might should be submitted to a where there be a reasonable Chicago, opinion. 201, difference of Strobel v. R. I. & P. R. 255 Minn. Co. (1959). 96 N. 2d 195 W.
Although negli plaintiff cites some' decisions which have found the gence aof to be the of landlord cause a tenant’s loss due to party, ap the criminal act of a third we do not feel are those cases plicable strongest argument here. Plaintiff’s is contained in the case City 465, York, (1969), of Bass v. of New 2d 305 N. 2d 801 Misc. Y. S. grounds (1972). App. reversed on other Div. 2d 330 N. Y. 2d 569 S. housing project In that case the lower court found the tenant in a en housing wrongful authority titled recover from the to death of raped roof of his child who had been and thrown from the high pointed in in The crime rate which she lived. court out of the area and the commission of series similar crimes established foreseeability of criminal attack. such a in The record this case does not in show facts similar to those Bass. that, law, Accordingly, in we find as a the criminal act reasonably was, therefore, intervening case was not foreseeable judgment is, therefore, affirmed. efficient cause. The of the trial court MacLaughlin, my
I dissent. In decide the should stealing personal property plaintiff's whether the criminal act of from intervening, superseding was an cause sufficient to isolate allowing posted defendant’s remain notice to days. purpose principal on changing door for I assume several security purposes prevent type the locks was for agree subsequent theft, of theft which occurred. I cannot that alleged during 4-day period which is to have occurred the door that changed, should, was with the notice that the lock had as law, a matter of be held to be an cause which *3 responsibility. will relieve defendant of all It seems to me that under illegal of the circumstances of case the fact of the entrance into the by jury could be well considered a foreseeable to be consequence of defendant’s and that its foresee- ability least, question is at the on which reasonable minds could differ.
I would remand the case for a on trial whether negligence part there was of the defendant and whether that plaintiff’s injuries. determining was a In cause, jury would, course, determine illegal entry whether the into the was unforeseeable and therefore negligence. cause which isolates defendant’s Peterson, (dissenting). Justice join MacLaughlin. I in the dissent of Mr. Justice Rogosheske, join
I in the also dissent. part Mr. Justice Knutson took no in the consideration or decision of this case.