85 S.W.2d 91 | Mo. | 1935
Appellants brought this suit in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis seeking an injunction to restrain respondents *294 from proceeding to award and perform a contract between the City of St. Louis and Skrainka Construction Company for paving a public alley in St. Louis and to restrain respondents from levying a special tax against appellants' property on account of the proposed improvement. A general demurrer was filed to the petition by all the defendants and this demurrer was sustained by the trial court. The sole ground of the demurrer was that the petition failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. Appellants having refused to plead further, final judgment was entered dismissing the petition and from this judgment appellants have appealed to this court. The petition alleges violation of the Constitution of Missouri and of the United States and hence the jurisdiction of this court attaches.
The contentions made by the parties in this court render it unnecessary for us to set out in detail the averments made in the appellants' petition. The petition charged that prior to awarding the contract for the proposed improvement the city had passed a purported ordinance known as Ordinance No. 40179 which, among other things, prescribed minimum rates of wages to be paid by contractors doing work under contract with the city; that all bidders for the work involved in the proposed improvement here in question were notified, prior to submitting their bids for such work, that they would be required to comply with the provisions of such ordinance and that the ordinance would in terms be made a part of any contract which might be awarded to the successful bidder for the work; that respondent Skrainka Construction Company was the lowest bidder for the work in question, and that the city has signed, or is about to sign, a contract with that company for the work and that such contract by its terms will require the company to comply with the provisions of Ordinance No. 40179 before mentioned; that if such contract is awarded Skrainka Construction Company and the work therein provided for performed by said contractor that a special tax will be levied against appellants' property and that such special tax will purport to be a lien and cloud against the title of appellants as owners of the property. As the present controversy is submitted here we understand that all parties concede that its proper solution turns entirely upon the validity of Ordinance No. 40179 heretofore mentioned. We understand also that it is conceded by all parties that if the ordinance just mentioned is valid the judgment of the trial court was a proper one and on the other hand if the ordinance is void the judgment below was erroneous and the cause should be reversed and remanded.
The Constitution of Missouri has conferred authority upon the qualified voters of the city of St. Louis to frame and adopt a charter. The existing charter of the city of St. Louis was adopted in 1914, and by virtue of its adoption it became and remains the organic *295
law of the city. [1] In general the charter of a city bears the same relation to its ordinances that the Constitution of a state bears to its statutes. [Quinette v. St. Louis,
"If there be any craft or trade not included in the crafts or trades specified in Section 2 hereof, from which workmen or laborers are required to be used in the completion of any contract mentioned in Section 1 of this ordinance, for which such craft or trade there be in effect in the City of St. Louis at the time of advertising for bids for such work, wage rates established by agreement for such craft or trade between contractors and workmen for private work similar to the public work to be done by such craft or trade, such wage rates so established by contract or agreement are hereby declared to be the wages required to be paid by Section 1 (b) of this ordinance for such crafts or trades not specifically included in Section 2 hereof."
[2] In this State it is well settled that charter provisions requiring that contracts for public work be awarded, upon a public letting, to the lowest responsible bidder are intended to secure free and unrestricted competition among bidders, to eliminate fraud and favoritism and to avoid undue or excessive cost which would otherwise be imposed upon the taxpayer or property owner. [Curtice v. Schmidt,
[5] Respondents further contend that the ordinance here under consideration can be sustained as a proper exercise of the general police powers vested in the city by the provisions of its charter. The provision of the charter requiring "all public work" to be let by contract "to the lowest responsible bidder" is a specific requirement prescribing the course to be followed in awarding contracts for public work. The charter provision last mentioned itself relates to the exercise of police powers by the city and prescribes how the powers vested shall be exercised. We are of the opinion that the general police powers vested in the city by its charter cannot properly be so interpreted and applied as to modify or relax the specific requirements of the charter as to the letting of contracts for public work.
For the reasons heretofore stated we are constrained to conclude that Ordinance No. 40179 is void because of the minimum wage provisions contained therein. As this ordinance is void it necessarily follows that the contract awarded Skrainka Construction Company is also void and that any special tax sought to be imposed upon appellants' property for the paving of a public alley by virtue of work to be performed by the Skrainka Company under the purported contract with the Skrainka Company would also be void. Upon well-established principles it is clear that appellants, if they establish the essential facts set forth in their petition, would be entitled to the equitable relief they pray in their petition. The redress they seek is to enjoin the assessment of the purported special tax against their property, or if the assessment has been made to cancel the tax bill and thus remove any cloud upon the title to their property which may have resulted from the illegal assessment of the tax. [Verdin v. St. Louis,
For the reasons above set forth the case will be reversed and remanded. It is so ordered. *298