31 S.E.2d 246 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1944
1. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the verdict.
2. The court did not err in failing to charge the jury in the language of the Code, § 26-1014.
3. The court did not err, under the evidence in this case, in failing to give in charge to the jury the law of involuntary manslaughter.
4. The court did not err in submitting to the jury the question of voluntary manslaughter under the doctrine of heat of passion and mutual combat.
5. In the trial of one accused of murder, if an erroneous instruction to the jury be given on the doctrine of reasonable fears, and the verdict is for voluntary manslaughter, such erroneous charge affords no reason for reversing the judgment. A verdict for manslaughter is an acquittal of a charge of murder. The doctrine of reasonable fears has no connection with the offense of voluntary manslaughter.
1. As to the general grounds, the State introduced positive evidence that the accused inflicted the mortal wound on Melvin. The jury were authorized to believe this evidence, and to disbelieve that for the accused. The status of the accused is to be determined by whether he would have been guilty of voluntary manslaughter had he killed Horn instead of Melvin. This is conceded by his counsel. The evidence supports the verdict in so far as the general grounds are concerned. *529
2. Special ground 1 complains because the court failed to charge the provisions of the Code, § 26-1014, as applicable to mutual combat. When we take the charge as a whole, and in the absence of a written request, the failure to charge in the language of this section is not reversible error. In our opinion the general charge on justifiable homicide was sufficient.
3. Special ground 2 complains because the court failed to charge the principle of involuntary manslaughter. Under the evidence this assignment of error is without merit.
4. Special grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 assign error because the court submitted to the jury the question of voluntary manslaughter both as applied to this offense under the general law and as applied to mutual combat. The evidence authorized the court to submit to the jury the question of voluntary manslaughter both as applied to killing under a heat of passion and also as applied to mutual combat. These assignments of error, under the facts of this case, are without merit.
5. In special ground 10 exception is taken to the following excerpt from the charge to the jury: "I charge you further, gentlemen, in connection therewith, this, that before one would be warranted in taking the life of another on account of words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures, it must be made to appear by some act or deed done or committed by the person killed in connection with such words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures, that he had the present purpose of immediately putting into execution such words, threats, menaces, or contemptuous gestures." It is contended that this charge is a misstatement of the law, under the decisions of the Supreme Court in Cumming v.State,
Judgment affirmed. Broyles, C. J., and MacIntyre, J., concur.