Hilliard v. Commonwealth

Curtis Darnell HILLIARD Virginia. COMMONWEALTH Record No. 0394-02-2. Virginia. of Appeals

Richmond.

Aug. Benton, J., filed an opinion in concurring part, dissenting in part, and concurring the judgment reversing the convic- tions, opinion C.J., in which Fitzpatrick, joined.

Clements, J., concurring filed opinion part and dissent- ing part, Felton, in which Bumgardner, JJ., Kelsey, joined. DesPortes; & Benjamin Benjamin (Betty Layne D.

Steven DesPortes, P.C., briefs), Richmond, for appellant. on (Jerry Witmer, General W. Attorney A. Assistant

Steven General, brief), appellee. on Attorney Kilgore, BENTON, ELDER, FITZPATRICK, C.J., Present: ANNUNZIATA, BUMGARDNER, HUMPHREYS, FRANK, CLEMENTS, KELSEY, JJ. FELTON HUMPHREYS, Judge.

ROBERT J. This matter comes a rehearing before the on en banc unpublished January 6, from an panel decision of 2004. See Vap Hilliard v. UNP 2004 WL Commonwealth (2004). decision, panel In that a divided this Court (in affirmed Hilliard’s convictions for murder violation of Code 18.2-32), (in § use firearm the commission of murder 18.2-53.1), § violation of Code maliciously shooting into an (in occupied 18.2-154), § vehicle violation of Code and dis charging a firearm on or -within feet of school property (in 18.2-280(B)), § violation Code finding that the trial court properly denied Hilliard’s suppress motion to inculpatory statements obtained from by him the after allegedly he invoked his to and that it did err giving an Allen charge during jury guilt phase the trial inor its to from response questions jury during phase the sentencing of the trial on the presumption consecutive sentences and the possibility of geriatric release. By 10, order dated February we granted appellant’s petition banc, for a rehearing en stayed the mandate that decision, and appeal. reinstated the Upon rehearing case banc, en part we affirm in and reverse part and remand.

I. Background In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion suppress, we light consider the evidence in the most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to the Commonwealth all reasonable fairly inferences deducible from the evidence. See Common- Grimstead, wealth v. 1066, 1067, 12 Va.App. 407 (1991). 7,1999, July

On victim, Robinson, Jr., Anthony was shot in Richmond, and killed Virginia. Hilliard was indicted for Robinson’s murder on September and arrested on Police Detectives City Richmond White September him next day. interviewed and Kochell interview, Kochell advised At of the Detective beginning Arizona, Miranda v. rights of his under (1966), 1602, 1625-27, and 469-73, 16 L.Ed.2d indicating form he understood sign asked him to a waiver Before speak signing and to the detectives. rights wished detectives, form, somebody “Can I have Hilliard asked the too, lawyer, like my safety, I mean like just else present ... ?” Detective said, something? I White y’all just Can said, Like up you. Kochell] responded, [Detective “That’s of the just get your side doing today trying all we’re “But story. trying replied, That’s all we’re to do.” I I have a side. don’t.” Detective you, I’m to tell don’t trying not continue they to Hilliard that could explained then White Hilliard signed him he the form. speak signed with unless form, continued the interview. and the detectives the waiver later, the victim being how he knew Moments after asked “honest,” Hilliard the detectives to be being by told stated: all wholehearted- saying

I what both of are understand I that know saying I ... I’m not ly. say need person. I know the You I’m not saying anything. said, / ... I only thing, I’m like saying? know what say here I somebody may like to have else in because would am, I it saying, what don’t even know something incidents, might jam up me me some up, fuck might man. happen, don’t want that to added.) here replied, Kochell “We’re not Detective (Emphasis to jam explained Kochell then you up. Okay?” to trying in a to conducted going was not Hilliard that interview manner, Hilliard then those seen on television. harsh like his conversation with detectives. continued interview, into Detective an hour White Approximately why” and happened “what told Hilliard he wanted to know following story.” tell his “side Hilliard to wanted then occurred: exchange get lawyer

HILLIARD: Can I a here? want do you

DETECTIVE WHITE: Do that? mean, I I already lawyer. HILLIARD: I can talk have a I I you, get just don’t me wrong. But want make sure don’t, before, I just jam said And I’ll myself up. like tell that I This you everything my know. word. fine. Okay.

DETECTIVE WHITE: That’s DETECTIVE KOCHELL: That’s fine. I’m say

HILLIARD: that I will saying anything other know, I just to, because he’s want just you here. I make ... a sure I’d feel little more bit comfortable. That’s problem. DETECTIVE KOCHELL: not a We tried provide you And, a -with comfortable here. atmosphere said, like I it’s you not the stuff that on dealing see TV with Sipowicz, okay, where he him guy up takes and throws on the wall. That’s not what we’re about. I say, go

HILLIARD: will I far say will as as to this. Probably you got what all in that ain’t book nowhere near. DETECTIVE WHITE: I’m not with you. I’m just

HILLIARD: what all saying, you probably have in book, I doubt that it’s it. anywhere near DETECTIVE Anywhere WHITE: near ... of what we why know of it happened?

HILLIARD: Yeah. Well, why DETECTIVE WHITE: that’s we want to hear you, from because we know there’s bigger picture there. Okay? is, [Hilliard], You know what the problem is that you up in it. got caught Yeah,

HILLIARD: I did. I was I’m going just there. say that, I was say else, there. But anything before mean, I already talked to before you go we court. later, A few moments Detective told Hilliard: White said, And like got plenty we’ve of time to sit down talk again your here, like this with okay, because you’ve that’s expressed. what And you’ve told us that picture were there there’s a bigger you’d like to go us, okay, it explain and to your attorney then over it with it. and that’s where we’ll leave thereafter. shortly The interview ended issue, filed charges on a Prior to his trial the the that obtained statement police motion suppress alleging to interview, 16, the September provided during he “fourth, [rights]” and fifth sixth Amendment violation of under “Article rights in violation of his Section “and/or” and Section 19.2-59 Virginia or 11 of the Constitution interview was videotape The that Virginia.” the Code of hearing on Hilliard’s during sole the presented the evidence motion. evidence, he made three argued

Based upon attorney, of an but the for the assistance requests interrogation. the continued The each and ignored finding Hilli- suppress, the motion to trial court denied referencing statements were questions ard’s that, if to he invoked his a “even “equivocated” statement,” HiUiard’s admis- immediately prior lawyer purely the crime “was that he was at the scene of sion continuing interroga- the of any was not as result voluntary, or response question.” tion to March February on 2000 and Hilliard was tried deliberations, day, the jury at the end of first During jury split are saying, trial “We foreperson judge sent a note judge The trial can’t reach unanimous decision.” 10-2. We told attor- following day until the jurors released me to them you give meantime if want to “decide neys charge.” the Allen attorneys, judge the trial asked morning, next them give whether or not want

“Have all discussed told the continue?” Hilliard’s counsel charge just the Allen charge. give the Allen he not want the court judge trial did again, just “I will tell them start judge responded, The trial evidence, the evidence and speculate; go don’t over reread the the trial court’s objected to party other.” Neither talk each Thereafter, suggestion. jury returned the courtroom judge and the trial the following jury: made remarks to the know, morning. just Good Seems like we left. You we all job you here, know what kind of all assigned are it’s a difficult very thing. go We can’t out and get twelve better all; to people job you you do this than can job. do this You have a each duty you duty to listen to other have a to follow the and not law But what I to do speculate. you want back, go try is to to start fresh instructions, with the take time, your go through these and the facts to things and talk each other about it. can a You reach decision case. all you go your So back and take time. I think they get will you some you coffee and if a or something— need Coke need, you know; whatever them they let will to glad you. you. accommodate Thank your Continue delibera- tions. objection

Hilliard no made to trial the court’s The remarks. jury subsequently murder, found guilty of use a murder, firearm maliciously the commission into shooting an occupied vehicle and discharging firearm school on/near property.1 verdicts, jury

After the its returned the trial court prepared to jury instruct the respect with to sentencing. trial The Hilliard, court asked “Do want about anything parole Virginia not?” Initially, stated, Hilliard’s counsel “I think say However, should there is no parole.” after further discussion with the judge Hilliard, trial and consultation with Hilliard’s counsel decided not to ask for an regard- instruction ing parole. deliberations,

During its sentencing the jury submitted three written to the questions trial court:

1. Do the sentences run concurrently? separate 1. proceeding, In pled guilty, pursuant North Alford, (1970), Carolina v. 27 L.Ed.2d 162 charge possession the having of a firearm after been convicted of a conviction, felony. sentence, resulting Neither that nor the is at issue appeal. in this get 2. he credit for times served? [sic] Will eligible parole? for will he be When respond jury’s ensuing In discussion about how tell asked the trial court to Hilliard’s counsel questions, would “run jury “there is no the sentences parole” may trial “It run consecutively.” responded: court It run That’s not for them to could concurrent. consecutive. telling served. I don’t mind them decide and credit time mind them as gets telling he credit for time served. don’t concerned, no Hilli- personally parole.” far they’re as there Instead, his objection ard made no to the court’s decision. asked, trial parole issue?” to which the court “Just counsel “All responded, Bring jury] back.” right. [the returned, however, jury Before Commonwealth of how the trial court was intend- sought further clarification In ing respond jury’s questions. reply court stated: Commonwealth’s the trial query, for and Well, parole will he be they say-when eligible me because he when he’s may eligible sort of bothers is, it and then sixty, you or when he’s or whatever seventy concerned, not a far as a is get jury into that’s true—as situation, in they no in But this parole Virginia. there eligible. to know when he will be want then the trial court not to answer The asked Commonwealth that the again Hilliard’s counsel asked question. the parole instructed, trial court parole.” “that there is no The jury be follows: jury then instructed the as it and I talked over your question Bowles I got Ms. to explain it’s—I am lawyers pretty generally, the with listen, the your at this time is take function you heard and decide on you’ve and the law and what evidence in cases. That’s what each of these proper punishment may happen with what yourself You’re not to concern do. in each of punishment set an appropriate afterward. You that other than job. That’s will tell your cases. these circumstances, was parole in abol- Virginia exceptional some to tell you. that’s I’m allowed ago and all years ished several object instruction given. jury Hilliard did the ultimately recommended that Hilliard be to serve sentenced murder, years for for use of years a firearm the murder, for commission years shooting occupied into vehicle, years discharging a firearm within 1000 property. feet of school

At sentencing April Hilliard’s on Hilliard amade motion to aside the on set verdict the basis that the trial court advised improperly jury during its the deliberations guilt phase that, his trial. Specifically, argued trial although jury court’s statement was “not the similar, same Allen it charge, as the ... and that very [was] by improperly comment the Court with interfered jury’s deliberation.” The trial court denied motion. This appeal followed. Analysis

II.

A. On appeal, first contends that the trial court erred his motion denying evidence suppress police because right violated his to counsel as embodied in Fifth Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Because we find that violated Hilliard’s Miranda by to counsel continuing interrogate him after he clearly counsel, and unequivocally invoked his we reverse and remand. that, by

We on begin recognizing an appeal ruling of a on a motion to suppress, by “we are findings bound trial court’s of historical fact unless ‘plainly wrong’ without evidence to them,” support Commonwealth, 193, 198, McGee v. 25 Va.App. 259, (1997) (en banc), 487 261 S.E.2d but we review de novo the trial application court’s of legal defined standards such as probable suspicion cause to particular reasonable facts case, States, of 690, 699, Ornelas v. 517 United U.S. 116 (1996). 1657, 1663, S.Ct. 134 L.Ed.2d 911 An “subject accused who is to interrogation custodial has to consult right attorney with an counsel 668 States, v. 512 U.S.

present during questioning.” Davis United (1994) 452, 457, 2350, 2354, 129 (citing 114 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 362 1625-27); Miranda, 469-73, at see also 384 U.S. at — Patane, U.S.—, 2620, v. 124 159 United States S.Ct. (“[TJhe (2004) rule is a prophylactic L.Ed.2d 667 Miranda protect against violations the Self-Incrimina employed Clause.”). right must police explain [the tion “[T]he 457, Davis, 512 at begins.” questioning accused] before right waives his “effectively 114 S.Ct at 2354. If accused enforce receiving warnings, to counsel after the Miranda law 458, him.” are Id. at 114 question ment officers free However, at “requests any if the accused counsel at 2350. interview, subject ques is to further during time he suspect a has or the tioning lawyer until been made available himself reinitiates conversation.” Id. determining for whether the accused invoked the test

“[T]he objective v. to counsel is an one.” McDaniel Common- (en (1999) wealth, 851, Va.App. S.E.2d banc). accused “The Court must determine whether present sufficiently ‘articulated his desire have counsel a reasonable in the circumstances clearly officer attor- statement to be a an would understand the ” Davis, 2355) 459, at 114 S.Ct. at Id. ney.’ (quoting added). Only requested] if “clearly the accused (emphasis attorney” interviewing required stop officers be would the 461, Davis, him. U.S. at 114 S.Ct. at 2356. questioning requested an “clearly An an accused issue whether during question is a mixed interrogation custodial Redmond, of law fact.” Va. Commonwealth “ (2002) opinion). (plurality ‘[T]he 568 S.E.2d actually question said [the what accused] determination those only for clear error.... Whether of fact that we review a legal to counsel is sufficient to invoke words are ” review de novo.’ Id. determination that we Uribe-Galindo, 990 States v. (quoting at 698 United omitted)). (other (10th Cir.1993) citation F.2d in Davis: explained Supreme As the States United

669 Invocation of the Miranda right “requires, to counsel at a minimum, can reasonably some statement that be construed expression to an for of an be a desire the assistance Wisconsin, [171,] 178, attorney.” McNeil 501 111 U.S. [(1991)]. [2209,] 2204, S.Ct. 115 L.Ed.2d 158 But if a an suspect ambiguous makes reference to that is or in that equivocal light a reasonable officer in the would the only suspect circumstances have understood counsel, to might invoking the our do right precedents the cessation require of questioning. U.S. at S.Ct. at 2355. The Supreme Court explained Davis that “when a further makes an suspect ambiguous equivocal or it will good police statement often be practice for the interviewing clarify officers whether he Id, an actually attorney.” wants at at 114 S.Ct. 2356. added, The Court however: “But we adopt decline to a rule requiring officers ask clarifying questions. suspect’s If the an statement is not unambiguous unequivocal request counsel, the officers have obligation no to stop questioning him.” Id. at 461-62,114 2350. S.Ct. at statement,

A however, “either is such an [of assertion the right or it is not. nothing counsel] Where about request for counsel or the leading up circumstances ambiguous, would render it all must questioning cease. In circumstances, these subsequent accused’s state- ments are only question relevant whether accused Illinois, invoked.” Smith v. waived the he had right 91, 97-98, 490, 493-94, (1984) 83 L.Ed.2d (internal omitted). quotation Davis,

In suspect, counsel, waiving after his was by investigators interviewed regarding involvement stated, murder. During interview, the suspect “Maybe should a lawyer.” talk to at at The investigators did not stop Id. point. the interview at that The United Supreme States held that the suspect’s statement “was not a request Id. for counsel.” at S.Ct. at 2357. Redmond, his Mi- accused, after

Similarly, waiving counsel, randa by police regarding was questioned a murder for which he had been arrested. the circumstances of 324-25, 696-97. the interro- During 264 Va. S.E.2d at asked, my “Can I to I can’t speak lawyer? accused gation, kinds lawyer any talk to before I make of comments even [a] Id. at 325, at 697. anything?” 568 The officers S.E.2d their conducting interrogation ques- did discontinue Id. point. of at that In that the tioning concluding the accused a of unambiguous accused to make clear and assertion “failed 700, id. counsel,” 330, at at right his to 568 S.E.2d Court as stated follows: Davis, Supreme

Prior to Court’s decision this Court that a of consistently unambiguous held clear and assertion invoke the right necessary [requir to counsel is to rule an ing interrogation to cease when the accused Commonwealth, 244 See v. Mueller Va. requests counsel]. (defendant’s 396, 380, (1992) 386, question 422 S.E.2d 387 attorney “Do think I need an here?” not clear denied, cert. counsel), 1043, assertion of 507 U.S. right v. (1993); Eaton Common 1880, L.Ed.2d 113 S.Ct. 123 498 wealth, 250, 393, 236, 252-54, 385, 395-96 240 397 S.E.2d Va. (1990) (defendant’s an question say “You did could have attorney right if I wanted one?” not a clear assertion of denied, 824, 88, cert. 112 116 an 502 U.S. attorney), Commonwealth, 401, (1991); Poyner L.Ed.2d 60 229 Va. (defendant’s 410, 815, question “Didn’t S.E.2d to an not a clear of say right attorney?” have the assertion denied, cert. counsel), (1985). Davis And, applied 88 L.Ed.2d 158 Commonwealth, 262, 266-67, 462 250 Va. S.E.2d Midkiff v. (1995) (defendant’s “I’ll with statement be honest lawyer” I’m without to a you, say anything talking scared to counsel). not a clear assertion however, case, at In that Id. 329-30, at 699-700. S.E.2d noted, videotape of the having the Court after reviewed record, in the that “the facts interrogation contained historical the tone questions, as the of the defendant’s such context voice, inflections, his voice and his demeanor support[ed] the conclusion that this defendant did not make a clear assertion of his right best, At counsel. the defendant’s questions may be construed as a desire on his part obtain about his Miranda rights.” more information Id. at at contrast, McDaniel, In we held that the accused’s re- sponse his Miranda being after advised “I rights, think I would rather attorney have an me,” here to for speak was an unequivocal for counsel. Va.App.

S.E.2d at 853. Despite the accused’s use of the “think” words “rather,” we found that the accused “made his choice clear, informing the detective that he desired to him.” Id. speak

In bar, the case at Hilliard contends that he made three requests for the assistance of counsel during September 16,1999 interrogation and that each of those requests equated clear, to a unequivocal request for counsel. Applying the principles above-stated to the facts and circumstances of this case, and after reviewing videotape of his interrogation that was admitted as an in case, exhibit this we conclude that Hilliard’s first two “requests” did not express a clear and unequivocal counsel, desire for but that his final “request” constituted an unequivocal invocation of his right counsel, requiring police to immediately cease the interrogation.

In the instance, first after being advised of his Mi randa rights, asked, Hilliard “Can I have somebody else present too, I mean just for my safety, like a lawyer, like you all just said, or something? Can I ... ?” Uncertain about Hilliard’s response, one of the detectives replied, up “That’s you.” by When told the detectives that they could not talk to him signed unless he form, the waiver signed Hilliard form, agreeing speak to the detectives without a lawyer being present. Thus, Hilliard’s question was, most, at inquiry designed to elicit clarification from the detectives regarding the rights he had just read, been not an unequivocal Redmond, at attorney. for an 264 Va. request See S.E.2d at 700.2 stated, said, I I thereafter, Hilliard

Shortly “[L]ike I say else in somebody may would like to have here because I and saying, might I don’t even know what am it something ” added.) Although .... Hilliard’s jam up (Emphasis ... me “expresses statement his about the wisdom reservation interrogation there to continuing the without” someone assist him, a “it communicate clearly unambiguously does at Midkiff, desire invoke to counsel.” Va. Thus, request 462 S.E.2d at 115. it was not a clear counsel.

However, later, asked, approximately one hour Hilliard I lawyer in here?” Detective then asked get “Can White “Do clarifying want do that?” question, mean, “I I I can already lawyer. responded, you, talk to But I to make get wrong. just don’t me want sure don’t, I’ll before, myself And just jam up. like said tell Hilliard’s I know. This is find everything my word.” We context, regard, statements in this when their considered for counsel. unequivocal constituted a clear Redmond, Supreme Virginia Like Court of we have “independently] videotape of Hilliard’s custo- review[ed]” weight interrogation given dial we have “due therein.” inferences drawn from the historical facts Red- mond, at at From that examina- 568 S.E.2d Va. tion, could only we conclude Hilliard’s statements officers, under the circumstances by understood reasonable case, as an of his unambiguous issue assertion context,” id., of counsel. historical facts such as “[T]he leading up circumstances the re- question, Hilliard’s “the Smith, 97-98,105 at “the tone of quest,” U.S. at demeanor,” inflections, his voice, totality, and his his voice argue appeal made 2. not that his waiver was without Hilliard does on requisite knowledge intelligence, was nor that it made involun- opinion. tarily. Accordingly, we address issues in this do not those support clearly conclusion that Hilliard re- reasonable police proceeded counsel before fur- quested presence Redmond, at interrogation, ther with the Va. Davis, at 700. also S.Ct. at See (noting suspect ‘speak “a need not with the discrimina- Dumas, ”); of an 750 A.2d tion Oxford don’ State (R.I.2000) (“We statement, a ‘Can I get believe lawyer?’ circumstances to sufficiently could clear in some normal this parlance, syntactic phrase- meet this standard. In ology is an to frame a acceptable way request. reasonable A his or her to counsel need not suspect asserting speak perfect may but use manner of formality, any colloquial with or reasonably so as his her statement would be speech, long added) (emphasis for an attorney.” understood as (footnote omitted)).3 reasons, For we these reverse the trial denial of suppress court’s Hilliard’s motion to the extent it final held Hilliard’s for counsel was “request” “equivo- cated.” that, however,

Our analysis, does not there. note end We acknowledged after the officers invocation of his Hilliard’s counsel, right to following exchange occurred: fine. Okay. DETECTIVE WHITE: That’s DETECTIVE KOCHELL: That’s fine.

HILLIARD: saying say I’m not that I anything will other just to, know, just because here. want you he’s make sure I I’d have ... feel a little more bit comfortable. problem. DETECTIVE KOCHELL: That’s not a We tried And, provide you atmosphere with comfortable here. said, like I it’s not the stuff that on dealing see TV with fact, although dispositive analysis, In to our the officers here clearly subjectively understood Hilliard’s statements to be more than simply part a "desire on obtain more information about his Redmond, rights.” Miranda 264 Va. at 568 S.E.2d at 700. In- deed, And, responded, “Okay. the officers That’s fine.” after a brief discussion, interrogation, stating terminated the officers "like said, got plenty we’ve again of time to sit down talk like with here, your attorney okay, (Em- you’ve expressed.” because that’s what added.) phasis 674 up throws him on guy takes a where he

Sipowicz, okay, what we’re about. That’s not the wall. say this. as far as to say, go will

HILLIARD: will near. in that ain’t nowhere all book Probably got what Miranda, that, suspect “if the pursuant it is true While during interrogation, time any counsel at requests has been made until an must cease interrogation the interro- suspect or the reinitiates suspect available Edwards, 451 at 698 U.S. (citing at gation,”id in Blain 1885), 484-85, recognized at we 101 S.Ct. at (1988), Commonwealth, 10, 15, 371 S.E.2d Va.App. that: its express questioning [and] ...

[I]nterrogation includes Innis, Island v. Rhode U.S. equivalent.” “functional (1980). 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d “functional defined the Supreme] The States [United on the or actions “any as words questioning equivalent” know are should police ... part from incriminating response to elicit an reasonably likely foresee Id. If a was not suspect’s statement suspect,” statements “Volunteered able, it is volunteered. then and their the Fifth Amendment by are not barred any kind Miranda, by [Miranda].” is not affected admissibility the Innis interpret at 1630. We objective an whether requiring as determination standard de or actions as an officer’s words would view observer incriminating response. to elicit an signed nor Detective Kochell that neither record establishes after he invoked any questions asked Hilliard Detective White go “I I will say, he will stated: to counsel before all in that book got what say Probably this. as far as Moreover, hardly argued it can near.” ain’t nowhere atmo- the “comfortable about Kochell’s statements Detective were words police officer fictional television and the sphere” likely “reasonably view as observer would objective that an thus It is from Hilliard. incriminating response” elicit a “volun- was regard in that Hilliard’s statement clear that not af- and, therefore, admissibility its teered statement” Edwards, Miranda-, invocation of Hilliard’s any by fected court’s affirm the trial Consequently, to counsel. we particular motion to as suppress of Hilliard’s denial statement.

Nonetheless, police and the discussion between as continued follows: you. I’m not with

DETECTIVE WHITE: probably HILLIARD: all have just saying, you I’m what it. book, I that it’s near anywhere that doubt ... we near of what Anywhere WHITE: DETECTIVE happened? know of itwhy

HILLIARD: Yeah. Well, hear why we want to that’s

DETECTIVE WHITE: there. bigger know you, picture from because we there’s is, [Hilliard], is that problem You Okay? know what in it. got caught up Yeah, just I there. I’m going

HILLIARD: did. I was else, I that, say But say anything there. before was mean, I we to court. already go talked before scene of presence statement about his at the Clearly, Hilliard’s by express questioning crime as a produced was result have above, questioning As stated that should the officers. after it clear the officers immediately ceased became Thus, the trial court right Hilliard invoked his counsel. regard. in that have Hilliard’s statement suppressed should inculpa- found Because the trial court that statement “could be interest,” we ... tory, against a declaration [Hilliard’s] ground convictions on this and remand reverse Hilliard’s is so proceedings matter for if the Commonwealth further inclined.

B. violated next contends the officers also counsel, September because the his Sixth Amendment 16,1999 occurred interrogation “post-indictment.” Sixth Amendment counsel is triggered “at or judicial

after the time that proceedings been initiated ... by way charge, preliminary 'whether formal hearing, ” indictment, information, arraignment.’ Brewer v. Williams, 387, 398, 1232, [1239,] 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. (1977) Illinois, Kirby L.Ed.2d (quoting U.S. 1877, [1882,] (1972)). 92 S.Ct. 32 L.Ed.2d 411 We have held that an accused is denied “the protections” basic of the Sixth Amendment “when there used him at against [is] words, trial of his evidence own which incriminating [police] ... deliberately him elicited from after he had been indicted the absence of his counsel.” Massiah v. United States, [1203,] 12 L.Ed.2d (1964); Illinois, Patterson v. [487 cf. (1988)] 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (holding the Sixth postindictment Amendment does bar questioning in [sic] the absence if counsel a defendant waives the right to counsel). States,

Fellers v. 519,-, 1019, United 124 S.Ct. 1022, (2004). However, 157 L.Ed.2d 1016 the Commonwealth contends that Hilliard’s regard contention this not was properly preserved pursuant to Rule 5A:18. agree. We

It is well-settled that ruling “No of the trial court ... will be considered as a for objection basis reversal unless the was stated with together grounds the therefor at the time the ruling, except good for or cause shown to enable the Court of Appeals to the justice.” attain ends of Rule 5A:18. purpose

The main of requiring timely specific objections is trial opportunity afford the court an to rule intelligently on presented, the issues avoiding unnecessary appeals thus addition, In a specific, contemporaneous reversals. objection the gives party the opposing opportunity meet objection that of the stage proceeding. Babcock, Weidman 241 400 Va. S.E.2d (citation (1991) omitted). Thus, the Appeals Court of will not consider an that argument appeal presented on was not to the Commonwealth, trial Va.App. court. Ohree v. See (1998). to constitutional applies That rule S.E.2d Id. claims, claims. as well as non-constitutional that made a bare reference we recognize While sup- broadly-written in his motion Amendment Sixth acknowledge if likewise remiss we did not press, we would be not reference to the Sixth single that Hilliard’s counsel made In motion to hearing suppress. on his during Amendment not that with fact, spoke Hilliard’s counsel did mention remotely that nor he contend “post-indictment,” did from him designedly information police deliberately elicited his counsel. after he had been indicted in the absence Fellers, at-, at 1028. See objection rule— above, the contemporaneous As indicated court ... that a inform the trial 5A:18—“requires party Rule objection or its to the action the court to take of the it wishes therefor.’” Lash v. of the court and the ‘grounds action Henrico, 926, 929, 421 Va.App. S.E.2d County of (1992) 8.01-384). not § While rule does (quoting Code trial presented reliance on statutes or cases not prohibit court, any appeal it that on be “ade- require position does 929, 421 at 853. presented” Id. at quately below. fact, In That did not occur here. because Hilliard’s counsel during not raise issue of the Amendment did Sixth opportunity the Commonwealth had no suppression hearing, opportunity the trial court had no to render respond and Thus, Hilliard is ruling on that we that now barred issue. find time on Rule raising appeal. from issue the first Moreover, argued appeal 5A:18. has not on because Hilliard circum- any apply to Rule 5A:18 would exception case, the issue presented stances we do address further.

C. above, For the affirm the trial court’s reasons stated we any as it suppress denial Hilliard’s motion relates here statements Hilliard made to to what we have prior for unequivocal his counsel. We request determined to be affirm further the trial court’s decision not suppress his statement, volunteered but find that the trial court in erred motion it denying any as related he statements made As thereafter. we have those found statements be inculpa- (in tory, we reverse Hilliard’s convictions for murder violation 18.2-32), § of Code use of a firearm in the commission of (in 18.2-53.1), § murder violation of maliciously Code shooting (in occupied into an 18.2-154), § vehicle violation of Code a firearm on or discharging within feet of school property (in 18.2-280(B)), § violation of Code and remand this matter for further if the is proceedings Commonwealth so inclined. Further, light holding in of our in this we find regard, no reason to address Hilliard’s remaining contentions. reversed,

Affirmed, part, in in part, and remanded. BENTON, J., FITZPATRICK, C.J., joins, with whom part, in concurring, dissenting, part, concurring in the judgment reversing convictions.

I agree majority opinion judge with the that the trial erred in denying believe, however, the motion to suppress. that each of Curtis Darnell Hilliard’s three assertions were un- therefore, equivocal requests attorney, and, for an I would hold that statements made after any he his first for an attorney should be suppressed.

I. by Court, Under the standard Supreme announced Hilliard asserted his Fifth Amendment counsel. right to required]

Courts to “determine [are whether accused invoked actually to counsel.” To avoid difficulties and to proof provide guidance to officers conducting objective interrogations, this is an Invocation of inquiry. minimum, “requires, the Miranda to counsel at a some reasonably that can an expres- statement be construed to be sion of attorney.” a desire the assistance of an But if a suspect makes a ambiguous reference that a equivocal light reasonable officer suspect circumstances would understood only do counsel, our precedents the invoking might be of questioning. the cessation not require counsel. request unambiguously must Rather, the suspect asser- such an observed, either is “a statement As we suspect a Although is not.” counsel or it the tion of don,” of an Oxford with the discrimination “speak need not suffi- present counsel to have articulate his desire he must in the circum- officer that a reasonable ciently clearly for a the statement be would understand stances attórney. an States, 452, 458-59, 114 v.

Davis United omitted). (1994)(citations 2355, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 Hilliard by telling interrogation began the The detectives and to “hear straight” “get things some they were there Hilliard he told say.” had to After detective what [Hilliard] every person must read to a form to him that had to read Hilli- the Miranda warnings to interview, an he read before acknowledging that the form sign He asked Hilliard ard. indicating him sign again and then were read to warnings signed to him. Before Hilliard detectives could talk lawyer. for a form, requests first of three he made the too, I mean said, somebody present else Hilliard “Can I have said?” y’all just like One just safety, lawyer like a my get they just trying were responded the detectives signed talk after he they said could story side of the form, contin- the detectives Hilliard signed form. When said, said, I “Like Hilliard then interrogation. ued the interrogation somebody to have else here.” would like continued. Hilliard that the detectives told dialogues,

During lengthy they and said him as the killer than identified people more two to know his him wanted evidence to convict but had sufficient killing. in the involved story. being Hilliard denied side of the of the of the location diagram him a As the detectives showed said, him, “Can interrogate continued to murder and discom- Although expressed lawyer here?” get assistance, without continuing interrogation fort with requests. failed to honor his detectives “appropriate responses Hilliard’s statements were warnings, gave which the choice of speaking with the [him] an attorney detective without having present while McDaniel Common- questioned the detective him.” wealth, (1999). Va.App. 518 S.E.2d To “ of deny that each Hilliard’s three ... ‘statements can rea- sonably construed to expression be be an of a desire for the ” Davis, 459, of an attorney,’ assistance at 2355, is to of disadvantage because his lack of linguistic upon very skills and to him impose requirement that the Supreme expressly rejected—that has he “need ” not ‘speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.’ Id. (citation omitted). circumstances, Under the Hilliard “articu- his desire to have present sufficiently clearly late[d] counsel that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would understand [each of] statements] be Id. Thus, attorney.” judge failing the trial erred in to sup- statements, press the all of which were in violation of obtained Hilliard’s Fifth Amendment rights.

II. In his to suppress, alleged motion that “evidence was dining obtained interview ... violation fourth, fifth and sixth amendments of the Constitution of the United States.” would that this hold motion was sufficient to apprise the trial action judge of the Hilliard desired the for the motion. See judge to legal take basis Code § 8.01-384 (providing party, having after made an “[n]o objection court, or motion known to the required shall make such objection again preserve or motion order therefore, right hold, appeal”). would also that Rule preclude 5A:18 from considering does this Court Hilliard’s claim of a Sixth Amendment violation. Supreme the United

Recently, States Court addressed this precise Sixth Amendment protection. triggered

The Sixth Amendment “at or counsel is that judicial after the time been proceedings have initiated hearing, charge, preliminary of formal way by ... “whether ” v. Brewer information, arraignment.’ indictment, [1239,] 1232, Williams, 430 U.S. 97 S.Ct. Illinois, 406 U.S. v. Kirby (1977) (quoting L.Ed.2d (1972)). [1882,] We 32 L.Ed.2d 689, 92 S.Ct. of the protections” “the basic is denied that an accused held him at his against used “when there [is] Amendment Sixth words, federal which incriminating of his own trial evidence he had been him after elicited from deliberately ... agents v. Massiah his counsel.” the absence indicted 1199, [1203,] 12 States, 84 S.Ct. United Illinois, (hold supra v. Patterson (1964); L.Ed.2d cf. postindictment not bar Amendment does that the Sixth ing waives counsel if a defendant in the absence questioning counsel). States, 519,-, 540 U.S Fellers United (2004). above, rec- I have addressed the circumstances Under interrogated officers that the clearly ord established his to an right invocation of and his post-indictment ignored already “I Indeed, Hilliard told the detectives: attorney. with him here.” more comfortable lawyer. I would feel have a in violation of Sixth Yet, continued interrogation therefore, hold, judge that the trial I would Amendment. the statements. failing suppress erred in

III. reasons, judge that the trial erred I would hold For these statements, incriminating motion to denying suppress a new and remand for I the convictions and would reverse trial. BUMGARDNER, FELTON

CLEMENTS, J., with whom dissenting, KELSEY, JJ., concurring, part, join, part. opinion Judge Humphreys’s join portion with that his claim that, properly preserve failed to

holding having his Sixth Amendment right violated, counsel was Hilliard is barred from raising that issue for the first on appeal. time further concur with Judge Humphreys’s decision that neither of Hilliard’s first two purported requests during the custodial interrogation constituted clear invoca- tion of the Miranda right However, to counsel. I disagree with Judge Humphreys Judge Benton’s view that Hilli- ard’s third “request” was a “clear and unequivocal request for counsel,” requiring the cessation of the interrogation and the suppression of Hilliard’s subsequent inculpatory statements. Hence, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that the trial court erred in denying Hilliard’s motion to suppress his inculpatory police, and, statements to for the reasons that follow, I would affirm Hilliard’s convictions.

I. MOTION TO SUPPRESS contends, on appeal, that he made three requests for an attorney during September 1999 custodial interrogation by police. argues He that his clear invocation of Miranda to counsel required the immediate cessation of the interrogation and the suppression of the incriminating statements he gave thereafter to police when the interrogation was not terminated. Finding purported Hilliard’s re- quests for counsel were not clear and unequivocal invocations Miranda of his counsel, I would hold that the trial court did not err in the motion denying to suppress.

It is well settled that “law enforcement officers must imme diately questioning suspect cease clearly who has asserted his right to have present counsel during custodial interroga States, Davis v. tion.” United 114 S.Ct. 2350, 2352,129 (1994) Arizona, (citing Edwards v. L.Ed.2d 362 (1981)). 68 L.Ed.2d 378 In Davis, Supreme that, the Court held avoid difficulties of “[t]o proof provide and to guidance to conducting officers interroga tions,” the determination whether an accused invoked the Miranda right to counsel is “an objective inquiry.” Id. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. at 2355. held, The in Supreme Court also Davis, that, to invoke the Miranda counsel, right “[t]he Id. at 459,114 counsel.” unambiguously request must suspect “ ‘either is to counsel The reference suspect’s at 2355. S.Ct. ” Id. or it is not.’ to counsel right of the such an assertion Illinois, 91, 97-98, Smith v. (quoting curiam) (brackets (1984) and internal (per 83 L.Ed.2d 488 omitted)). explained Court Supreme marks quotation discrimi- that, ‘speak not with the “[although suspect need don,’ to have must articulate desire nation of an Oxford he a reasonable sufficiently clearly that present counsel the statement in circumstances would understand officer id. at 476, 114 Id. attorney.” (quoting for an be a Thus, (Souter, J., concurring judgment)). at 2364 S.Ct. further, “if a makes a reference to an suspect explained Court in that a reasonable ambiguous equivocal or have understood of the circumstances would light officer counsel,” suspect might invoking right that the be only Id. at 459, 114 at ceased. S.Ct. interrogation need words, voluntary waiver knowing In other “after a the Miranda may of law officers continue rights, enforcement clearly[, unambigu- until and unless the questioning suspect Id. at ously, attorney.” unequivocally] requests otherwise, noted, at 2356. To require S.Ct. “ the Miranda transform into irra- safeguards wholly “would ” legitimate police investigative activity.’ tional obstacles to (quoting Michigan Mosley, Id. 460, 114 S.Ct. at 2356 (1975)). 46 L.Ed.2d 313 of requiring suspects wanting Aware that its rule assistance counsel to invoke clearly, unambiguously, unequivocally drawbacks, the Miranda right to counsel was not without its noted, Davis, as follows: Supreme Court farther recognize a clear assertion requiring We who—because might disadvantage suspects counsel some skills, fear, intimidation, linguistic variety lack of other reasons—will not articulate their clearly although they actually lawyer pres- counsel want to have a subject ent. But the primary protection suspects afforded is the Miranda warnings to custodial them- interrogation comprehension rights selves. “Full of the to remain silent an request attorney dispel sufficient to whatever [is] in coercion is inherent A interrogation process.” sus- who pect knowingly voluntarily waives his after having right explained counsel that to him has indicat- willingness ed his with Al- deal unassisted. though provides Edwards an protection—if additional suspect subsequently requests attorney, an questioning must cease—it is one that must affirmatively by be invoked suspect. 460-61, Burbine, Id. at (quoting S.Ct. at 2356 Moran v. 412, 427, 1135, 1144, (1986)). S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d Supreme that, The also Court noted when a suspect makes an or ambiguous equivocal state- ment,] it often good police practice will for the inter- viewing clarify officers to whether or not he actually wants an attorney.... Clarifying questions help protect the rights suspect by of the that if ensuring gets attorney he an he one, wants and will minimize the chance of confession being suppressed subsequent judicial due to second-guess- as to ing meaning suspect’s statement regarding counsel. But we decline to adopt requiring a rule officers to ask If clarifying questions. suspect’s statement is not counsel, or unambiguous unequivocal request for officers have no obligation stop questioning him. 461-62, 114 Id. at S.Ct. at 2356. Davis, concluded, Supreme Court the appel

lant’s statement the custodial I during interrogation, “Maybe clear, should a lawyer,” talk to did not constitute a unambigu ous, and, hence, unequivocal request for an “was not a requiring interroga counsel” cessation of the tion or suppression appellant’s subsequent inculpatory ad 462, 114 missions. Id. at at 2357. Redmond,

In Commonwealth v. Va. (2002) (plurality opinion), our found Supreme questions during interroga- that the defendant’s the custodial tion, I speak my “Can can’t even talk to lawyer? [a] lawyer any anything?,” before make kinds comments of his unambiguous “a clear and assertion did not constitute decision, applied In the Court reaching to counsel.” by the principles [United States] the “substantive articulated Davis, as its own about precedent, as well Supreme Court” it stated as follows: which Davis, Court’s decision Supreme

Prior asser unambiguous held that a clear and consistently Court to invoke the rule right necessary tion of the to counsel is interrogation an when the [requiring police cease Commonwealth, Mueller v. See requests accused counsel]. (1992) (defendant’s 380, 386, 396, 422 244 S.E.2d 387 Va. you attorney “Do think I need an here?” not a question denied, cert. counsel), right clear assertion Eaton v. (1993); 1043, 1880, 123 L.Ed.2d 498 Commonwealth, 385, 236, 250, 252-54, 240 397 S.E.2d Va. (1990) (defendant’s 393, say “You did I question 395-96 an if I not a clear could have wanted one?” denied, cert. 824, to an 502 right attorney), assertion U.S. v. Poyner Common (1991); 112 S.Ct. 116 L.Ed.2d 60 wealth, (defendant’s 329 823 Va. S.E.2d I question you say right attorney?” “Didn’t have the an denied, cert. counsel), not a clear assertion of (1985). And, 865, 106 88 L.Ed.2d Commonwealth, Davis applied Court Va. Midkiff (1995) (defendant’s 262, 266-67, state S.E.2d “I’ll say anything ment be honest with I’m scared to you, talking without to a not a lawyer” clear assertion of counsel).

Id. at 329-30, 568 S.E.2d at 699-700. that “a reason- Holding ... able officer would have concluded that the defen- dant did not invoke his right during to counsel the custodial interrogation,” Supreme upheld the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the confession he Id. during interrogation. made at 700. Here, the facts to the third pertinent purported request counsel undisputed. Approximately waiving are hour after Miranda rights, Hilliard asked the detectives conducting I lawyer here?” The follow- interrogation, get “Can place: then took ing exchange you Do want to do that?

DETECTIVE WHITE: mean, HILLIARD: I have a I I can talk to already lawyer. I I you, get wrong. just don’t me But want to make sure before, don’t, I I’ll just jam myself up. like said And tell that I This word. you everything my know. Okay. That’s fine.

DETECTIVE WHITE: That’s DETECTIVE KOCHELL: fine. I’m I saying say anything

HILLIARD: that will other to, know, I just just you because he’s here. want I ... make sure I’d feel a little bit more comfortable. That’s not a tried problem. DETECTIVE KOCHELL: We And, with a provide you atmosphere comfortable here. said, like it’s not the stuff that see on with dealing TV Sipowicz, guy up where he takes a and throws him on the wall. That’s not what we’re about.

HILLIARD: I will far as to this. say, go say will as all in that ain’t near. Probably got what book nowhere Talking about what? DETECTIVE WHITE: just you HILLIARD: I’m what all have in saying, probably book, I it. anywhere doubt that it’s near Anywhere near ... of what we DETECTIVE WHITE: know of itwhy happened?

HILLIARD: Yeah. Well, that’s to hear why

DETECTIVE WHITE: we want from a you, bigger picture because we know there’s there. is, Curtis, Okay? you got You know the is that problem what in it. caught up Yeah, just I I I’m to going

HILLIARD: did. was there. else, that, I I I say say anything was there. But before mean, I to court. already go talked before we in police I do not that a reasonable officer these believe question, circumstances would have understood Hilliard’s “Can here?,” for an unequivocal request I a in to be an get lawyer of Davis or Redmond. Certain- attorney meaning within the no than first ly, question equivocal Hilliard’s less his two for purported requests counsel the defendant’s question Redmond, best, I speak my lawyer?” “Can At “a reason in light able officer of the circumstances would under might invoking stood only [Hilliard] be Davis, 459, 114 Likewise, counsel.” at at U.S. S.Ct. Hilliard’s statements and actions to the detective’s response that?,” clarifying question, “Do want to do were follow-up Instead equivocal. directly answering ques of the detective’s affirmative, tion in again merely “expressed] about the of continuing interrogation reservation wisdom consulting lawyer” without a talking and continued clearly unambiguous detectives in manner that did “not ly communicate a his right desire invoke to counsel.” Midkiff, 250 Va. Thus, S.E.2d at 115. under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would not have necessarily understood Hilliard to an making unequivocal be “the likeli an attorney. for Consequently, because hood that a suspect wish present would counsel is not the test for of of applicability requiring [the rule cessation counsel],” if McNeil interrogation suspect requests Wisconsin, 171, 178, (1991), L.Ed.2d Hilliard’s to a lawyer, reference like those Redmond, Davis of the defendants “fell short manner,” counsel in requesting unambiguous a clear and Midkiff, Va. at 462 S.E.2d at 115. conclude, therefore, that Hilliard’s third purported request clear, did not constitute unambiguous, Miranda

unequivocal invocation of the requir- counsel ing the interrogation cessation and the suppression Hilliard’s subsequent inculpatory Accordingly, statements. would hold that the trial court did in denying not err Hilliard’s suppress motion to his admission that he was at scene of the crime.

II. ALLEN CHARGE contends, further Hilliard on that court’s appeal, the trial comments the jury jury to after notification from the receiving

688 that it

during phase of the trial guilt its deliberations a was 10-2” and could not “reach unanimous decision” “split comments, argues, “sug- were The court’s improper. kept unanimity would until was gested jury that, charge coercive Allen4 reached” amounted effect, jurors minority change in the the two instructed their votes. 5A:18 this

The contends that Rule bars Commonwealth issue, this no consideration of because made Court’s objection judge’s agree remarks. contemporaneous with the Commonwealth. that, 5A:18,

In this has held applying Rule [wjhere court made alleges an accused trial has jury in the of the fails improper presence remarks but object, cautionary instruc- contemporaneously request a mistrial, challenge tion move for a he waives the or “A for a is appeal. remarks on motion mistrial those when it made after the untimely properly refused jury has retired.” Commonwealth, Va.App. 514 v. 29

Humbert (1999) (citations omitted) 804, Cheng v. (quoting 808 Common- (1990)). wealth, 39, 599, 26, 393 S.E.2d Va. case, In contemporaneous objection Hilliard made no objected to the initially court’s he trial remarks. While the trial court stated its giving charge, of an Allen once remarks, Hilliard gave contempora- did intentions its Indeed, nothing jury he did before the retired object. neously court that the remarks were erroneous apprise trial cautionary any He neither improper way. requested It not until nor for a mistrial. was sentenc- instruction moved charge’ upon Su the United States so-called ‘Allen is based "The 492, States, preme Allen v. Court decision in United (1896). Supreme approved Virginia Court has L.Ed. 528 Commonwealth, Va.App. v. ‘Allen Gardner use of the 418, instruction.” (1986) (citing 229 n. 1 Poindexter 419 n. 350 S.E.2d Commonwealth, S.E.2d 200, (1972)). Va. later, that to ing, several weeks he moved have the verdict set therefore, issue, properly aside. was not preserved. Moreover, of in my review the record this case does not reveal reason to invoke cause” or “ends of any “good the justice” exceptions to Consequently, Rule 5A:18. would hold that of this claim error is procedurally barred.

III. SENTENCING INSTRUCTION contends, also Hilliard on that the appeal, trial court failed to properly jury instruct the that multiple sentences are presumptively consecutive. He also trial court contends the failed to the properly jury parole, instruct on the possibility of specifically singular geriatric the circumstance of release.

The Commonwealth contends that Rule 5A:18 likewise bars issues, this Court’s consideration of these because did object to gave response the instruction the trial court to questions the jury’s concerning parole concurrency and the of the Again, agree sentences. with the Commonwealth.

Although initially asked the trial court to answer the jury’s questions by instructing jury multiple the consecutive, sentences are presumptively he made contem- no poraneous objection trial to the to reasoning ruling court’s contrary the or to the court’s to response instruction the jury’s question regarding concurrency of the sentences. Likewise, Hilliard no contemporaneous objection made court’s respect instruction with to issue Hilli- parole. ard’s to preserve failure properly these issues this precludes Court from his to considering “challenges jury instructions raised for the first on appeal.” time Commonwealth v. Jer- man, (2002) 93-94, Va. 556 S.E.2d 757-58 (holding that defendant “was to required any objection state circuit court’s any instruction and to court ask the other instruction on the subject that he necessary” deemed and his timely failure to do so “bars present to that challenge instruction”); Commonwealth, see also Cherrix 257 Va. (1999) (holding that defendant’s “failure proffer parole eligibility instruction and his failure response court’s instruction object trial addressing ... from merits

jury’s inquiry precludes us Hence, error”); no finding this Rule 5A:18. assignment justice” excep- reason invoke cause” or “ends of “good 5A:18, I claim of tions to Rule would hold error procedurally barred. also

IV. CONCLUSION reasons, For I would convictions. these affirm Hilliard’s

601 S.E.2d 667 TRIBE, T. THE MATTAPONI INDIAN Carl Eagle Custalow, Lone Assistant Chief

v. Virginia DEPARTMENT OF of ENVIRON- COMMONWEALTH QUALITY, EX MENTAL REL. STATE WATER CONTROL Secretary, Burnley, BOARD, Robert Director & Executive G. City Newport of News. and Foundation, Chesapeake Bay Mattaponi,

Alliance Save Association, Inc., Mattaponi Pamunkey Rivers Sierra Club, Paulette P. Berberich Warren Mountcastle Quali- Virginia, Department of Environmental Commonwealth Burnley, ty, Control Board Robert G. ex rel. State Water Newport Secretary, City of News & Executive Director 2338-03-1, 2469-03-1. Record Nos. Virginia. Appeals

Chesapeake.

Aug.

Case Details

Case Name: Hilliard v. Commonwealth

Court Name: Court of Appeals of Virginia

Date Published: Aug 31, 2004

Citation: 601 S.E.2d 652

Docket Number: 0394022

Court Abbreviation: Va. Ct. App.