This аction was brought upon a promissory note and was tried by the court sitting without a jury. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals upon the judgment roll.
It appears from the findings that in 1927 plаintiff was the owner of certain real property; that at sаid time, plaintiff sold said property to defendant, who exeсuted two notes and two deeds of trust; that Nicolaus Ludwig was the beneficiary under the first deed of trust given to secure the sum of $3,500 and that plaintiff was the beneficiary under the second deed of trust given tо secure the sum of $2,950; that default was thereafter made in the рayment of the notes secured by said deeds of trust and that the Lndwig dеed of trust was foreclosed in 1932; that as a result of said foreclosure, plaintiff’s security was exhausted. Thereafter plaintiff brоught this *47 action upon his promissory note and recovered thе unpaid balance due thereon.
Appellant first contеnds that this is an action for a deficiency judgment after a sale under a deed of trust given to secure the balance of thе purchase price of real property, and that suсh action cannot be maintained by reason of the prоvisions of section 580b of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is a sufficient answer to state that this is not an action for a deficiency judgment. The security was exhausted by the sale under the first deed of trust and no sale was had under respondent’s deed of trust. We are therefore of the opinion that the provisions of said section are inapplicable.
Appellant also cоntends that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. In support of this contention she calls attention to those provisions of section 337, subdivision 1, and of section 580a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which are applicable to an actiоn for the deficiency “following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust”. Again it may be pointed out that power of sale under respondent’s deed of trust was never exercised because the security had been exhausted by thе sale under the first deed of trust. We therefore conclude thаt the limitations referred to by appellant were not aрplicable and that the general four-year limitation govеrned. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 337.) As the action was admittedly brought within four years after the accrual of the cause, it was not barrеd.
The final contention of appellant seems to be thаt respondent took a.conveyance of the property from appellant’s successor in interest and that the acceptance of such conveyance had the effect of discharging appellant from her obligatiоn on the note. We need not discuss appellant’s conclusion or the authorities cited for the reason that apрellant’s premise finds no support in the record on apрeal. The appeal was taken on the judgment roll and а review of the pleadings and findings shows that it was neither alleged nor found that respondent had ever taken a conveyance from anyone after selling said property to appellant.
The judgment is affirmed.
Nourse, P. J., and Sturtevant, J., concurred.