delivered the opinion of the Court.
Thе relator, Weiner, was convicted in a federal district court of violating a decree entered against him and numerous others by thаt court in a suit in equity brought by the United States under the Sherman Anti-trust Act, Title 15 U. S. C., §§ 1, 2, 4. He, with others, was charged *106 by information with the commission of several specified acts in violation of the decree, constituting criminal con-tempts. Upon a trial before the court sitting without a jury, he was found guilty аnd sentenced for certain of the contempts to imprisonment for six months in the House of Detention, and for other contempts fоr two- years additional in the penitentiary. Upon his application and consent, the first part of the sentence was increаsed from six months in the House of Detention to a year and a day in the penitentiary, but to run concurrently with the two years’ imprisonment.
On June 5, 1935, he was committed to the penitentiary. At thе end of eleven months, he applied by petition to another federal district court to be discharged on habeas corрus, on the ground that the first court was without power to sentence him for a period of more than six months; and, having served that long, that he wаs entitled to be set at liberty.
The district court accepted that view, granted the writ, and ordered the relator discharged.
The case involves a consideration of §§ 21, 22 and 24 of the Clayton Act, Title 28 U. S. C. §§ 386, 387 and 389. * Sеction 21, so far as pertinent, provides that any person who shall willfully disobey any lawful decree of the federal district court by doing any act or thing thereby forbidden to be done by him, if of a character to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute *107 of thе United States or laws of any state in which the act was committed, shall be proceeded against as thereafter provided. Section 22 provides for trial by the court or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury. If found guilty, punishment is to be either by fine or imprisonment or bоth, in the discretion of the court, “but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the accusеd is a natural person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the term of six months.” Section 24, however, provides that “nothing herein сontained [§§ 21, 22, 23, 25] shall be construed to relate to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful . . . decree . . . entered in аny suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf *108 of, the United States, but the same, and all other cases of сontempt not specifically embraced within section twenty-one . . . may be punished in conformity to the usages at law and in equity prеvailing on October 15, 1914.” If § 24 applies, the sentence was within the statutory authority of the court.
First.
The court below held, andi relator herе contends, that the limitation of imprisonment to six months is not affected by the provisions of § 24. A similar question was before this court in
United States
v.
Goldman,
That decision controls here. The object of § 24 clearly was to limit the application of the provisions of § 22, and the other sections named, to prosecutiоns for contempt arising out of cases instituted by private litigants.
Second.
We find nothing in the further contention that this view of the statute results in a discrimination
*109
in thе matter of punishment so arbitrary as to deny due process of law to relator. Whatever may be the restraint against discriminatory legislation imposed by the due process of law clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is not encountered by the legislation here. The constitutiоnal power of Congress to prescribe greater punishment for an offense involving the rights and property of the United) States than for a like offense involving the rights or property of a private person reasonably cannot be doubted. Compare
Pace
v.
Alabama,
Judgment reversed,.
Notes
Seс. 21. Any person who shall willfully disobey any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia by doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden to be done by him, if the act or thing so done by him be of such character as to constitute also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of any State in which the act was committed, shall *107 be proceeded against for his said contempt as hereinafter provided. Title 28 U. S. C. § 386.
Sec. 22. . . . In all cases within the purview of this Act such trial may be by the court, or, upon demand of the accused, by a jury; . . .
If the accused be found guilty, judgment shall be entеred accordingly, prescribing the punishment, either by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court. Such fine shall be paid to thе United States or to the complainant or other party injured by the act constituting the contempt, or may, where more than one is so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the court may direct, but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States exceed, in case the accused is a natural person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprisonment exceed the term of six months. Title 28 U. S. C. § 387.
Sec. 24. Nothing herein contained [that is in §§ 21, 22, 23, 25] shall be construed to relate to contempts committed in the presence оf the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience оf any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command entered in any suit or action brought or prosecuted in the name of, or on behalf of, the United States, but the same, and all other cases of contempt not specifically embraced within section twenty-one of this Act, may be punished in conformity to the usages at law and in equity prevailing on October 15,1914. Title 28 U. S. C. § 389.