3 Vt. 507 | Vt. | 1831
It is a conceded point, that public highways, so far as regards those interests, which are common to all the citizens, are subject to the control of the legislature, and may be altered or discontinued by force of statutes, from time to time enacted. But the appellees contend, that their individual interests are affected, in this case, and, therefore, that the section in question has an unconstitutional operation upon these interests. The parties, in argument, seem to consider this section necessarily either constitutional and binding, or unconstitutional and void. This view is correct, it there is no distinction in the cases, upon which it may operate. That is, if all these cases alike involve the interests of individuals, or alike the interests common to community. The road commissioners have no power to lay out a road, till they receive a petition for that purpose, signed by a given number of freeholders. Then a citation issues to, and is served upon, the towns interested, or who would be liable to make the ^•o'ad, if laid out by the commissioners. The commissioners in
Under the faith of this statute, the appellees became petitioners for the laying out of a road; the road commissioners proceeded regularly, and laid out and established the'road, according to the prayer of the petition ; and taxed costs for the petitioners against the town of Sunderland, and, also, made an order for said town to open and make said road by a given time. These proceedings all appear regular, and were all completed as early as September, 1828. The appellees were then as fully entitled to their execution for their costs, as if they had recovered the same before the county court, and they were, also, as fully absolved from all liability to pay costs to the town, as if they had such judgement in their favor before the county court, under the .former system. On the thirtieth of October, 1828, the act passed under which this appeal was taken. The statute gives no appeal to the petitioners if they be ever so much aggrieved; but makes a general provision for towns, that may be dissatisfied with the laying of the road, and the individuals aggrieved by the assessment of damages, to appeal, within twenty days, to the county court, who shall, at their first session, appoint a committee of three
Under this statute, which clearly undertakes to give the right in a case like the present, the town of Sunderland took this appeal. And, if the committee, appointed by the county court, should reverse the proceedings of the road commissioners, and if this statute is operative as applied to such case, instead of the appellees collecting and retaining the costs awarded them by the road commissioners, the town of Sunderland must recover their costs against these appellees. The -effect of the statute would then be, to provide a course of proceedings, by which .a judgement, final and conclusive between the parties long before the statute had existence, might be reversed, and the opposite party recover costs. The very supposition, that a statute could have such a deleterious efiect to unsettle controversies, long settled according to existing laws, exhibits the doctrine of nullification in a form by no means pleasant or useful. As well might a succeeding legislature create a statute provision for the proceedings of this last committee, long before rendered complete, to be carried before the Supreme Court, for the appointment of another committee with dernier powers of reversal. I ought not to use the word dernier. Upon this principle, noihing would be . dernier, but the loss of faith in our government. From this there would -be no appeal, that would restore the confidence of our citizens. As well might the legislature have passed a law, at the same session, granting new trials, before new panels of jurors, in all actions tried by jury, for the year next preceding. The judgements, in all those cases, were no more final between the parties, than was this judgement in favor of the appellees, and against the town of Sunderland, fortheir costs. We might say the same of all judgements, rendered by single magistrates, in any given year: so of all judgements rendered by any courts whatever ; and that, whether on trial or by default. The truth is, there must be an
In this Court, at several different periods-, the cases cited, of Bates vs. Kimball, and Ward vs. Barnard, and Staniford vs. Barry, and others, not reported, adopted the same principle though they differed in this, that the statutes then in question were made for the particular cases,and were not general laws. Still the grand principle relied on was, that those statutes affected individual rights,already so established,that the legislature could not intermeddle with them. Statutes, which grant individual relief, are not, for iha-t reason,void. It is their taking rights from other individuals, that renders them void. A general statute, with this effect, iis void also.
Had this statute- only made provision for the discontinuing of this road, on the terms of the costs taxed for the appellees being paid, and the appellants, recovering no costs, its operation would have been to affect the public, and the -appellees as a portion of the public, on one part, and the town of Sunderland, on the other, No individual'could complain that his private interests were-invaded. But, in-this case, if the new committee decide favorably .to the appellants, the law attaches the consequence, that the appellees lose the costs they'had fairly recovered, and must have execution against them for the costs of the other party.
The road commissioners always have power to -discontinue a road, krthe' eases within their jurisdiction; but, in doing this, they cannot reverse- their former decision with regard to costs. They can relieve the town from the claim of the public, but cannot discharge the debts the town may owe individuals, without providing for their payment. Much moréis it out'of their power, to turn those debts about, and make them become debts due from those
The observations apply with equal force, mutatis mutandis, to appeals from the assessment of damages. A landholder appeals for the purpose of obtaining higher damages. This claims a new decision upon the same question decided by the commissioners, at a timé when no appeal was allowed, and when the statute,' then in force, made the decision as final as can be made by any .statute. In such a case, the town have a right to object to the operation of such a new statute.
The reasoning here adopted, necessarily leads to the conclur sion, that the judgement of the county court, which overruled the motion of the appellees to dismiss the appeal, and appointed a committee under the act of October SO, 1828, must be reversed and holden for nought; and
The appeal must be dismissed.
