Defendant-Appellant Hill was convicted of murder after a jury trial before the Delaware Circuit Court. The Honorable Steven Caldemeyer sentenced Appellant to a thirty year prison term.
Appellant's arguments raise two issues for consideration:
1. sufficiency of the evidence; and
2. whether Appellant is insane as defined by law.
Appellant was the boyfriend of the decedent, Velma Jeffries. The two were known to have arguments, during which Appellant sometimes threatened to kill Jeffries. Appellant has a third grade education, an I.Q. in the upper sixties and a history of mental problems, including a ten year stay in a state hospital.
A few days prior to the murder Appellant purchased ammunition for his shotgun. On the day of the murder Appellant and Jeffries argued. Appellant loaded his shotgun and returned to Jeffries' house. During the night, while he stayed with Jeffries, they argued once again. Appellant went to the front porch, retrieved his gun, went back to the bedroom, and fired three shots, two of which struck Jeffries in the head. As Appellant left the house he passed Jef-fries' son, who had been asleep on the couch but was awakened by "explosions." Appellant discarded the shells in a nearby yard. He later admitted to a friend that he killed Jeffries.
Appellant was examined by three psychiatrists, one of whom found Appellant capable of knowing right from wrong and appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. Another found him capable of standing trial, with no evidence of any disturbance, while the third recommended further examination.
I
Appellant raises two sufficiency questions which may be considered together. He alleges his conviction was based on insufficient evidence that he knowingly killed Jeffries. He maintains instead that the evidence points to the conclusion that the killing was performed in a "sudden heat," therefore making the proper charge, if any, manslaughter.
Appellant maintains the "sudden heat" evidence is uncontradicted. He considers only part of the evidence however; that Jeffries' sleeping son heard explosions, that her son saw Appellant leave the bedroom carrying a shotgun; and that Appellant later admitted killing Jeffries to a friend. Appellant argues the state presented no evidence explaining the killing or proving the killing was done knowingly. He states the killing could have been accidental or justified, but does not support or develop this argument other than to explain that the killing followed an argument *748 and was done while Appellant was "so an-1? gry.
Appellant equates his anger with the "sudden heat" contemplated in Ind.Code § 85-42-1-8 (Burns 1985):
"a. A person who knowingly or intentionally kills another human being while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a class B felony. b. The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder ... to voluntary manslaughter."
Appellant cites no authority which would place his actions within the voluntary manslaughter statute due to his anger. The only cases cited by Appellant resulted in upholding the trial court convictions. See Hoskins v. State, (1973)
Where, as here, sufficiency of evidence is challenged on review, this Court will neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, but rather, will look to evidence most favorable to the state together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. We will then determine if there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact might reasonably infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, (1985) Ind.,
We previously have held that the element of intent (whether the killing was done knowingly) may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or bodily harm. Davidson v. State, (1982) Ind.,
The issue of whether the killing was done in a "sudden heat" is for the jury to resolve. Burris v. State, (1983) Ind.,
II
Appellant maintains that his low mentality alone should constitute insanity as defined by law. Appellant acknowledges our contrary holding in Wilson v. State, (1975)
The error in Appellant's proposed standard is that it treats all mentally retarded people alike, ignoring different capabilities *749 and levels of understanding. - Appellant fails to recognize that our statute already protects those mentally retarded people in need of protection:
"(a) A person is mot responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if as a result of mental disease. or defect he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of the offense.
(b) As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" means a severely abnormal mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception ... (emphasis added)."
Ind.Code § 35-41-3-6 (Burns 1985). Rather than key on the state of mental retardation as the deciding factor, our Legislature has chosen to key on the degree of retardation to determine whether or not the person was aware of the wrongfulness of his act.
In the present case there is no doubt that Appellant is mentally retarded to some extent. However, Appellant was examined by three psychiatrists and found capable of knowing right from wrong by at least one of them. A second found him capable of standing trial with no evidence of any disturbance, while the third recommended further evaluation. On appeal from a negative judgment as to the defense of insanity, we will consider only whether the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one conclusion. Only where such a single conclusion is supported and is opposite to the one reached by the trial court, will the decision below fall as being contrary to the law. Gentry v. State, (1984) Ind.,
The trial court is in all things affirmed.