OPINION
I. Introduction
Appellant Monterio Desha Hill appeals his two convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance; namely, cocaine and eestacy. 1 In twenty-five points, Hill argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence; that the trial court erred by admitting photos of a gun found by police during a search of Hill’s sport utility vehicle (SUV); that the trial court erred by overruling his objections to comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments; and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We will affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
On January 29, 2008, officers for the Fort Worth Police Department’s gang unit were patrolling on the east side of Fort Worth. According to Sergeant Stephen Enright, the area had recently been plagued with a rash of robberies. As a result, there were roughly seven officers patrolling as a group on January 29 — some in marked police vehicles and others in unmarked police vehicles. Enright testified at trial that Hill’s SUV originally caught his attention because it pulled into the back of a McDonald’s parking lot and stopped, but no one got out of the vehicle. After a short time, Hill’s SUV drove away from McDonald’s, only to enter the parking lot of a convenience store about a block away, remain still for a moment, and then eventually continue through the parking lot and back into a parking spot in front of the store — again, no one got out of the vehicle. During his observation of Hill’s SUV, Enright noticed that the SUV had dark tinting on its windows. Enright believed the tinting was illegal. After staying parked in the convenience store parking lot for several minutes, Hill’s SUV left the convenience store, traveled a short distance, and made a left-hand turn into a *869 nearby shopping center. Enright said that Hill failed to use his signal during the turn.
Enright initiated a traffic stop. As several police cars pulled up, Hill, who was driving the SUV, and the front passenger opened their doors and exited the vehicle. They both left their doors open. Officer Jesus Alanis testified that he observed Hill exit his SUV. Alanis said that as he exited, Hill turned to look at Enright and his partner, who had pulled in front of Hill, and that Hill “reach[ed] towards his shirt, kind of reaching under his shirt on his back.” Alanis said that he suspected Hill was reaching for a weapon, so Alanis drew his gun and shouted at Hill to “let me see [your] hands[!]” After Alanis drew his gun, several of the other officers, including Enright, drew their weapons as well. One of the officers placed handcuffs on Hill. The officers also conducted a pat-down of Hill. Alanis said that as soon as the officers determined that Hill did not have a weapon, the officers holstered their weapons and continued the traffic stop, which included determining whether there were other occupants of the SUV.
Alanis said that “the tint and the interi- or of the cabin was pretty dark, so I couldn’t see if anybody was back there.” He eventually ascertained that two more passengers were in the back of the SUV, and he had them exit the SUV.
Enright testified that when he approached Hill’s SUV, the driver’s side door was open because Hill had opened it when he exited. Enright said he simply looked into the vehicle and observed a brown paper bag wedged between the driver’s side seat and the center console. According to Enright, “[I]n that brown paper bag visible was a clear plastic [baggie] containing an off-white rock-like substance, which through my experience led me to believe it was crack cocaine.” Aanis testified that Enright signaled to him that he could see illegal drugs in the SUV. Aanis said that Enright pointed to the front seat, and from Aanis’s view, he could see “a brown paper bag that appeared to be semi-torn open. There was a clear plastic [baggie] container and you could see some off-colored — off-white colored rocks. Looked like crack cocaine.” The officers arrested Hill for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
After Hill was arrested, the officers continued to search Hill’s SUV. The search revealed another bag in the passenger floorboard that contained ecstacy, marijuana, and a digital scale. The vehicle search revealed a container that looked like a salt shaker that had a “false lid” that when opened contained roughly twenty pinkish-orange colored pills later discovered to be ecstacy. The officers also discovered a substantial amount of cash — $1,074 in varying denominations — on the appellant. The officers further found a fully loaded .40 caliber automatic pistol next to the air cleaner under the hood of Hill’s SUV. The officers also determined that the tint on the windows of Hill’s SUV was illegally dark.
Hill’s trial counsel did not file a written motion to suppress. Instead, after trial began and after the prosecutor asked En-right a few questions, Hill’s trial counsel verbally moved to suppress the evidence found in Hill’s SUV on the ground that the search of the SUV was the “result of an illegal arrest.” The trial court overruled trial counsel’s motion. The trial continued. Enright, Aanis, Officer Perales, and Corporal Combs all testified to their accounts of the evening. That testimony included, without objection, the discovery of the gun *870 under the hood of Hill’s SUV. But when the prosecutor offered photographs of the gun, trial counsel objected on the basis that the gun was not relevant to the charges. The trial court overruled the objection. Later, during closing arguments, the following colloquy took place:
[Prosecutor to Jury]: And, you know, the only reason why they could see who was in that car at the time they did, because these people had a guilty conscience. [Hill] had a guilty conscience and when he sees these officers pulling up on him, I got to get out of this car because my dope is in here, I’m going to distance myself and he starts getting out. The front seat passenger who also knows there’s dope in the car, she distances herself and starts walking away. That’s what they’re doing, because they know what’s in that car.
And don’t tell me that someone from the backseat threw this dope up in the front seat or stuffed it up in that front seat while he was sitting there. You think he wouldn’t put up a fight and say, Man, don’t put your dope on me. You know, that’s not how it happened.
[Defense counsel]: I — Judge, that’s a comment on Defendant’s failure to testify because it’s a question that only he can answer.
THE COURT: All right. That’s — that’s overruled. It’s just final argument. Argument is not evidence, ladies and gentlemen.
After closing arguments, the jury retired to deliberate. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both charges, and the trial court assessed punishment at life for the cocaine and sixty years’ incarceration for the ecstacy. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. This appeal followed.
III. Discussion
A. Motion to Suppress
In his first, second, and third points, Hill argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his SUV. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review for Motion to Suppress
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review.
Amador v. State,
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.
Wiede,
When the record is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when there are no explicit fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings.
State v. Garcia-Cantu,
We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling.
State v. Stevens,
2. The Traffic Stop and the Officers’ Detention of Hill
In part of his first, second, and third points, Hill argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police arrested him without probable cause. Hill predicates his argument on the notion that when he exited his vehicle and the officers drew their weapons on him, handcuffed him, and patted him down, he had been illegally arrested. Hill does not challenge whether the officers’ initially stopping him was legal. The State counters that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Hill in the manner they did because of how Hill and one of his passengers exited the vehicle and because Hill reached back toward his waistband — indicating he was reaching for a weapon. We conclude that the officers’ continued detention of Hill, including drawing their weapons, handcuffing him, and conducting a pat-down, was justified.
In a traffic stop situation, the police may ask for identification, a valid driver license, and proof of liability insurance.
Davis v. State,
During the course of a lawful traffic stop, an officer who develops reasonable suspicion that an occupant of the vehicle is engaged in, or will soon engage in, criminal activity may continue the detention of the occupants of the vehicle to investigate criminal activity beyond the scope of the law violation that formed the basis of the initial stop.
Sims v. State,
In this case, Enright testified that he was initially suspicious of Hill’s SUV because it stopped at a McDonald’s but “no one got out to order food” before Hill’s SUV drove off. Enright became more suspicious when Hill backed his SUV into a spot in another parking lot, stayed a few minutes, and then “started up again and began to exit the parking lot.” Enright noticed that the SUV had unusually dark tint on its windows and believed that the windows were illegally tinted. He also observed Hill fail to signal during a turn— a traffic violation.
Alanis testified that — in his experience — as the officers conducted a stop for the traffic violations, Hill and the front passenger acted out of the ordinary by opening the doors and immediately exiting the SUV. Alanis further said that when Hill exited the vehicle, he “started reaching towards his shirt, kind of reaching under his shirt on his back, and that alerted me that maybe — he was probably reaching for a weapon, which is when I gave him a verbal command to see his hands.” Hill’s behavior prompted Alanis to draw his weapon. Enright also drew his weapon after seeing Alanis do the same. Alanis said that as soon as the officers determined that Hill did not have a weapon, the officers holstered then-weapons and continued the traffic stop, which included determining whether there were other occupants of the SUV. Alanis said that “the tint and the interior of the cabin [were] pretty dark, so I couldn’t see if anybody was back there.” He eventually ascertained that two more passengers *873 were in the back of the SUV, and he had them exit the SUV.
Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s denial of Hill’s motion to suppress and assuming that the officers’ detention of Hill was beyond the scope of the traffic infraction that formed the basis of the initial stop, we hold that under the totality of circumstances the officers in this case had reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Hill to investigate whether Hill was engaged in, or would soon engage in, criminal activity.
See Sims,
3. Evidence Pound in Hill’s SUV
In part of his first, second, and third points, Hill argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because, according to Hill, the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution, as well as article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, when they conducted a warrantless search of his SUV and seized contraband found inside. The State argues that the officers initially observed crack cocaine in plain view and were justified in seizing it. The State further argues that after having seized the crack cocaine and arresting Hill, they were justified in conducting a warrantless search of his SUV. We agree with the State.
a. Plain View
The plain view doctrine involves no invasion of privacy.
See Texas v. Brown,
Officer Enright testified that when he approached Hill’s SUV, the driver’s side door was open because Hill had opened it when he exited. Enright said he simply looked into the vehicle and observed a brown paper bag wedged between the driver’s side seat and the center console. According to Enright, “[I]n that brown paper bag visible was a clear plastic [baggie] containing an off-white rock-like substance, which through my experience led me to believe it was crack cocaine.” Alanis testified that Enright signaled to him that he could see illegal drugs in the SUV. Alanis said that Enright pointed to the front seat, and from Alanis’s view, he could see “a brown paper bag that appeared to be semi-torn open. There was a clear plastic [baggie] container and you could see some off-colored — off-white colored rocks. Looked like crack cocaine.”
In this case, when the officers conducted the traffic stop and approached the SUV while investigating the traffic violations, they were legally in a position to see, in plain view, what was wedged between the seat and console. Both Enright and Alan-is, based on their experience and training, immediately identified what they believed to be crack cocaine. Because the officers saw the crack cocaine in plain view, they lawfully seized it. We hold that the officers seized the crack cocaine found in Hill’s SUV wedged between the driver’s seat and center console under the plain view doctrine and that Hill’s expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment or the Texas Constitution were not implicated.
Regarding the search of the vehicle that followed the officers’ seizing the crack cocaine: the officers were certainly authorized to arrest Hill because the officers had probable cause to believe Hill had committed an offense within then-view. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 14.01 (Vernon 2005);
see also State v. Steelman,
b. Hill’s Reliance on Arizona v. Gant
During oral argument, Hill’s counsel relied almost exclusively on the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Arizona v. Gant
for the proposition that the officers were not allowed to conduct a search — incident to arrest — of Hill’s vehicle. — U.S. -,
To be sure, the facts underlying Gant share some similarity with those in the instant case, but they are sufficiently dissimilar and compel a different outcome than Gant. A review of the facts in Gant discloses that Gant had been arrested during the course of a narcotics investigation on an outstanding warrant for driving with a suspended license. Id. at 1712. After Gant was arrested and secured in the back of an officer’s patrol car, officers searched — incident to arrest — the vehicle that Gant had been driving. Id. Gant moved to suppress the firearm and the bag of cocaine the officers found “on the ground that the warrantless search violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1715.
The Court’s response to these facts was to absolutely transform the search-incident-to-arrest exception.
Id.
In assessing the reasonableness of the warrantless search, the Court held that “[i]f there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply.”
Id.
at 1716 (referring to the possibilities of an arrestee reaching a weapon or destructible evidence). In an attempt to resolve a circuit split and add clarity to the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, the Court ruled that police may “search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”
See id.
at 1719, nn. 2-3. But where the Court limited the search-incident-to-arrest exception concerning officer safety, it left intact, or even broadened, the exception with respect to officers’ ability to gather evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.
Id.
at 1716. Indeed, the Court further held that “circumstances unique to the vehicle context [also] justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’ ”
Id.
at 1719 (quoting
Thornton v. United States,
Concerning the current case, this court agrees that under Gant, the officers would likely not have been justified in searching Hill’s SUV in order to prevent him from reaching for a weapon or destroying evidence. But we disagree with Hill’s conclusion that Gant’s holding would render the officers’ search per se unreasonable because the case before this court is readily distinguishable from Gant. Hill’s conclusion relies on an unjustifiably narrow presentation of the circumstances of his arrest. It is apparently true that in this case, as in Gant, Hill no longer posed a risk to the officers when they conducted a search of his SUV. But unlike in Gant, the officers in this case arrested Hill for a crime involving narcotics, not upon the basis of the traffic violations that served as the officers’ initial reason for stopping Hill. Because the officers reasonably believed that *876 additional evidence would be found in Hill’s SUV — due to the quantities and nature of the crack cocaine that had been seized in plain view — a search of Hill’s SUV incident to his arrest comports with the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 1723 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arres-tee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”). Contrary to Hill’s contention, Gant supports the admission, rather than the suppression, of the contested evidence in this case. Id. We hold that the trial court did not err by overruling Hill’s motion to suppress and overrule this portion of his first, second, and third points.
B. Relevancy of Photographs of a Gun Found in Hill’s SUV
In his tenth point, Hill argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to the admission of photographs of a gun that was found under the hood of Hill’s SUV after he was arrested. The State argues that Hill waived this issue by not objecting to previous testimony regarding the discovery of the gun. The State further counters that evidence pertaining to the discovery of a gun under the hood of Hill’s SUV “tended to make it more probable that [Hill] knowingly possessed the drugs and that he did so with an intent to sell them.”
Even assuming the admission of the photographs of the gun was error, we conclude Hill has failed to preserve any error for appeal. To preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must make a proper objection and obtain a ruling on that objection.
See
Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. In addition, a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection.
See Valle v. State,
Furthermore, had the error been preserved, we agree with the State that when considering the charges against Hill — possession with intent to distribute — the trial court did not abuse its discretion by deeming the photos relevant and allowing their admission into evidence.
The admission of evidence is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
Wheeler v. State,
Here, the trial court’s allowing the admission of the photos depicting the gun
*877
found in Hill’s SUV, discovered after he was arrested for possession with intent to distribute, fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement as to whether the evidence was relevant to the crime charged.
See Hawkins v. State,
C. Comments Regarding Hill’s Failure to Testify
In his seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth points, Hill argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments, claiming they were improper comments on his decision not to testify at trial. The State counters that the comments made were simply not a comment on Hill’s decision not to testify.
To determine if a prosecutor’s comment constituted an impermissible reference to an accused’s failure to testify, we must consider whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would have naturally and necessarily considered it to be a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.
See Bustamante v. State,
The prosecutor’s comments that Hill takes issue with are those the prosecutor made while explaining during closing argument that Hill must have “had a guilty conscience” because “when he sees these officers pulling up on him, I got to get out of this car because my dope is in here, I’m going to distance myself and he starts getting out.” Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor stated that Hill and the front passenger exited the car “because they know what’s in that car.” The prosecutor then explained that the crack cocaine in the front seat must have belonged to Hill: “You think he wouldn’t put up a fight and say, Man, don’t put your dope on me.”
Hill does not explain how these comments are statements pertaining to his failure to testify, and we conclude that the language used by the prosecutor was not manifestly intended and not of such a character that the jury would have naturally and necessarily considered it to be a comment on Hill’s failure to testify.
See
Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.08;
Bustamante,
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his remaining points, Hill argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to make specific objections to evidence admitted at trial; failed to obtain running objections on specific evidence; failed to file a written motion to suppress; and failed to object to comments made by the prosecutor during closing arguments. We hold that the record is insufficient to sustain Hill’s points regarding any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel’s representation fell below the standard of prevailing professional norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington,
In evaluating the effectiveness of counsel under the first prong, we look to the totality of the representation and the particular circumstances of each case.
Thompson,
The second prong of
Strickland
requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial, i.e., a trial with a reliable result.
Strickland,
As a general rule, we do not speculate about trial counsel’s strategy.
Blevins v. State,
Claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, however, can be properly raised on appeal if the appellate record is sufficiently developed.
Robinson v. State,
It should be noted that trial counsel’s failure to file pretrial motions generally does not result in ineffective assistance of counsel.
Hayes v. State,
In this case, Hill fails to rebut the presumption that the actions of counsel were the result of a strategic or reasonable decision, because the record is silent as to why trial counsel made the decision that he made.
Romero v. State,
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled each of Hill’s points, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Notes
. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.112(d), 481.115(d) (Vernon Supp. 2009).