J. I. Hill appeals his conviction of statutory rape of his nine-year-old daughter.
1. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the victim’s testimony was not corroborated. The evidence showed that the victim’s initial outcry was made to her aunt on Christmas Eve, 1978. According to the victim, shе was scared to go home because appellant, her father, made her take off her clothes аnd go to bed with him. He had had sexual intercourse with her “about 20 times,” the most recent of which had occurred apрroximately one week before her initial outcry. On these occasions the victim’s mother would sleep on the couch while the victim slept with her father. Her father told her not to cry out during these episodes or he would whip hеr. Although the victim’s mother testified that she never saw anything out of the ordinary between her husband and daughter, she confirmed thаt the victim had slept with appellant on several occasions while she had slept on the couch or elsewhere in the home.
We begin with the proposition that no conviction can be had for statutory rape bаsed solely on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim. Code Ann. § 26-2018. Although corroboration is usually had by testimony othеr than the victim’s which fairly tends to prove that the crime was committed
and
which connects the accused therewith, “ ‘сorroborating identification evidence is not necessary’ in statutory rape prosecutions.”
Chambers v. State,
“ ‘It is only when the evidence demands a verdict of not guilty that it is error for the trial court to refuse a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.’ ”
Barnes v. State,
2. Appellant also cites as error the trial court’s failure to charge the provisions of Code Ann. § 38-1806, that the testimony of a witness who swears wilfully and knowingly falsely is to be disregarded unless corroborated by circumstances or by other unimpeached evidence. In order to make this provision applicable “it must appear, among other things, that the witness admits, on the trial, that he wilfully and knowingly swore falsely, or the testimony must be such as to render the purpose to falsify manifest.”
Smith v. State,
The pertinent tеstimony, that of the nine-year-old victim, is as follows: “Q. Had Ricky done something to you, honey? A. Yes sir. Q. He had done the same thing that you say your daddy did to you? A. Yes sir. Q. Do you remember when this happened? A. Yes sir. Q. When was it? A. When I was seven. Q. When you were sevеn? A. Yes sir. Q. Did it happen anytime since then? A. I can’t remember. Q. You can’t remember? A. No sir. Q. Michelle, do you remember, hоney, when we had the hearing before just me and you and the Judge in his office over there? A. Yes sir. Q. And I asked you if he had ever done anything to you. Do you remember that? A. Yes sir. Q. And do you remember what you told me? A. Yes sir. Q. What did you tell me? A. That he hadn’t donе it to me. Q. That he hadn’t done it to you? Is that right? A. Yes sir.” Appellant contends that this self-confessed evidence of impeachment was of great importance at trial in light of a *491 medical doctor’s testimony that the victim’s hymen membrane was not intact. We disagree.
“Code Ann. § 38-202.1 provides generally that in rape prosecutions, evidence of the past sexual behavior of the complaining witness shall be inadmissable unless the accused also particiрated in that past behavior or unless such behavior would support an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained оf. . . . Although the act is applicable by its terms to rape cases, logic and the intent of the act show that it should be equally applicable in statutory rape cases, except that the exceptions in the act rеlating to consent and the accused’s prior participation would be inapplicable in statutory rape cases.”
Barnes v. State,
If testimony is not relevant, then it is also not material, the definition of material evidеnce being that which “is relevant and goes to the substantial matters in dispute, or has a legitimate and effective influеnce or bearing on the decision of the case.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1128 (4th ed. 1968). Since a witness may not be impeached because of a discrepancy as to a wholly immaterial matter
(Gilbert v. State,
Judgment affirmed.