After a jury trial, Kendius Quwantez Hill was found guilty of the malice murder of Travis Gober. The trial court entered judgment of conviction and sentenced Hill to life imprisonment. Thereafter, the trial court granted an out-of-time appeal and subsequently denied a motion for new trial. Hill appeals, enumerating as error ineffective assistance of trial counsel. *
1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdict, the evidence shows that Mario Hanes told several persons that he
*522
wanted revenge for a robbery committed by the victim. According to the eyewitness testimony of Eric Pollock, Hanes handed a gun to Hill, who ran up to the victim, accused him of robbery, and fatally shot him in the head. After his arrest, Hill gave police conflicting statements, initially denying involvement and then accusing Hanes of shooting the victim. Hill finally admitted that he shot the victim, but claimed that he acted in self-defense. This evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Hill guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance under
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) Hill contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing certain hearsay to remain in evidence even though it undermined the defense strategy of convincing the jury that Pollock’s testimony was the only corroboration of Hill’s involvement and was seriously impeached.
When the prosecutor asked the lead detective an introductory question regarding how he became involved in this case, he testified that his unit received tips which he and fellow officers followed up and that, based on interviews of several witnesses, they “were able to establish Kendius Hill as the shooter.” In its order denying the motion for new trial, the trial court correctly found that counsel’s initial response to this testimony “was not deficient because trial counsel reasonably objected and moved for a mistrial....” Indeed, defense counsel immediately objected and, outside the presence of the jury, made a motion for mistrial on the ground that the testimony was based on hearsay. The trial court denied that motion, but allowed a continuing objection and warned the detective not to go into what anyone else has said. When the jury returned, the prosecutor “turned to a different line of questioning. Thus, [Hill]
*523
cannot show he was prejudiced by counsel’s behavior regarding this witness. [Cit.]”
Jones v. State,
Hill argues that his trial counsel should have sought curative instructions or at least obtained a ruling in the presence of the jury. As the trial court found, however, it “did give a curative instruction on hearsay ... .” Soon after the jury returned, the trial court instructed the jury that “the law does not permit hearsay,” briefly explained the rule, and “caution[ed] the detective not to go into anything anyone has said if that person is not going to appear and testify.” Therefore, counsel’s failure to seek curative instructions “had no effect on the outcome of the trial.”
Lee v. State,
Furthermore, trial counsel’s failure to seek a more extensive curative instruction does not constitute ineffective assistance. This omission appears to have been a matter of trial strategy since, at the hearing on the motion for new trial, lead counsel testified that curative instructions should be vague and should not overemphasize the error. See
Cross v. State,
(b) Hill further contends that trial counsel was ineffective in requesting a jury instruction which was contrary to the defense strategy of convincing the jury that there was insufficient corroboration of Hill’s statement. That instruction reads as follows:
[A] defendant’s statement unsupported by any other evidence is not sufficient to justify a conviction. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes alleged have been committed may but does not necessarily constitute supporting evidence of a defendant’s statement, if any. Now, the law does not fix the amount of supporting evidence necessary. You, the jury, must determine whether or not other evidence sufficiently supports a defendant’s statement so as to justify a conviction. If you find that there was a statement made by the defendant that was supported by other evidence, the degree of proof necessary to convict is that you be satisfied *524 of the guilt of the defendant beyond any reasonable doubt. Hill particularly complains of the second and third sentences.
“ ‘ “Decisions about which jury charges to request are strategic and provide no grounds for reversal unless such tactical decisions are so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen them.” (Cits.)’ [Cit.]”
King v. State,
supra at 507 (2). The instruction of which Hill complains is supported by appellate decisions and is virtually identical to the charge on corroboration of a defendant’s statement in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 1.32.70. See
Chapman v. State,
Moreover, there is no reasonable probability that the charge would not have been given but for the request by defense counsel, because the State requested the exact same jury instruction. See Arellano v. State, supra at 152 (4). In addition, Hill has failed to show a reasonable probability that, if the charge had not been given, the jury’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence would have resulted in a different verdict. Accordingly, he “has not shown ineffective assistance on this ground. [Cit.]” Arellano v. State, supra at 153 (4).
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The homicide occurred on May 3, 2005, and the grand jury returned an indictment on May 18, 2006. The jury found Hill guilty on March 2, 2007 and, on the same day, the trial court entered judgment. The motion for out-of-time appeal was filed on April 4, 2007 and granted on April 9, 2007. The motion for new trial was filed on April 11, 2007, amended on January 29, *522 2008, and denied on February 7,2008. Hill filed the notice of appeal on March 6,2008. The case was docketed in this Court on April 17, 2008, and submitted for decision on September 8, 2008.