ADAM HILL v. DEXTER PAYNE, et. al.
Civil No. 6:21-CV-06029
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
October 27, 2021
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ECF No. 69; PageID #: 425
This is а civil rights action provisionally filed pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on February 2, 2021. (ECF No. 2). It was transferred to this District on Mаrch 17, 2021. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint (“Complaint“) on May 14, 2021. (ECF No. 31). Plaintiff‘s Complaint centers on his incarceration in the Arkansas Division of Correction Ouachita River Correctional Unit. For his first claim, Plaintiff alleges that on “different dates” Defendants did not follow the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC“) guidance and precautions for COVID-19. (Id. at 4). This led to Plaintiff contracting COVID-19 on July 10, 2020. (Id.). He further alleges that “he faced severe retaliation for exercising [his] First Amendment rights.” (Id.). Plaintiff names Defendants Payne, Straughn, Griffin, Earl, Ball, Hosman, Culclager, Kinnu, Settles Scott, WellPath Medical Corporation, Reed, Graves, Warner, Seeley, Gillette, Collins, Agular, Pitts, Voss, Hosman, and Coleman for this claim. (Id. at 4). He identifies these Defendants as being
For his second claim, Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2020, he was taken out of his Christian “Pals” Program and transferred to another ADC unit. Plaintiff alleges that this was done in retaliation for his filing grievances about the failure to follow CDC guidance and precautions at ORCU. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff names Defendant Ball, Earl, Culclager, Hosman, Payne, and Griffin for this claim. (Id. at 5). He identifies these Defendants as ADC ORCU staff or ADC upper-level administration staff. (Id. at 2-3, 7-11).
For his third claim, Plaintiff alleges he was denied mental health care and mental health medication in retaliation for his filing of grievances.1 (Id. at 12). Plaintiff names the WellPath Medical Corporation, Doe Health Services Administrator and Director of Nursing, Monroe, Collins, Kinnu, McDonald, Anderson, Taliaferro, Griffin, Payne and Earl. (Id.). Plaintiff identifies these Defendants as WellPath, medical staff at ORCU, or ADC upper-level administration staff. (Id. at 2-3, 7-11). Plaintiff does not identify specifically which medical conditions he was denied treatment for, other than the reference to mental health. (Id. at 12).
A. First Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff filed his first motion, entitled “Motion for Update on Case and for TRO/Preliminary Injunction,” on April 28, 2021. (ECF No. 29). He indicates he is now incarcerated in the ADC Tucker Unit, and requests that the Court order Defendants “Payne, Straughn, Reed, Griffin, the Health Services Administrator of Nursing, and WellPath Medical
B. Second Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff filed his Second Preliminary Injunction on August 4, 2021. (ECF No. 38). Plaintiff asks the Court to “stop the retaliation” he is receiving from the ADC. He alleges he is being retaliated against for filing inmate grievances and “other lawsuits.” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff alleges he was discharged from his Christian “Pals” program at the Ouachita River Unit and transferred to the ADC Grimes Unit on November 9, 2020. He alleges he was placed in with inmates of other ADC Class status, and he contracted COVID-19 for the second time. (Id. at 2).
He alleges that in March 2021, he was transferred to the Tucker Unit to take the TC program for his alcoholism. (Id. at 2). When he filed grievances about not being able to social distance in the TC barracks, he was harassed by guards. (Id. at 3). Plaintiff alleges his grievances had merit, which led Defendant Straughn to move the TC program to a different barracks. (Id.). Security staff then started telling other inmates that Plaintiff was a snitch. When he reported this to Security, “a couple weeks later” he was locked up for 8 days, unlawfully removed from the TC
On June 22, 2021, while in the ADC Grimes Unit, he was forced to mow grass, which was a “downgraded job” from the job he had at the Tucker Unit. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Straughn – the Deputy Director of the ADC is “over” the Grimes Unit. (Id.).
On July 14, 2021, he was transferred to the ADC Randall L. Williams Unit, which he alleges had worse living conditions, and where he was placed in a barracks with violent offenders. Plaintiff alleges he is a non-violent Class 1 inmate – “the best class to have.” (Id.). In this barracks he was exposed to second-hand drug smoke and witnessed three gang beatings. (Id.). He had his mother call Dexter Payne, William Staughn, and Rory Griffin, and they refused to believe her and refused to investigate the gang beatings. Plaintiff remained in the barracks. (Id.). His mother also called the warden on the Randall Unit, Joe Page, III. Plaintiff alleges the warden refused to do anything because Plaintiff had named him as a Defendant in Hall v. Page, Case No. 21-cv-00046-BRW-JJV. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff further alleges that he wеnt to a classification hearing on July 28, 2021, and an unidentified deputy warden told the classification committee that he was a “manipulator and had to be watched.” (Id.). As a result, the Committee made him a Barracks Porter in order to keep him in that dangerous environment, with “the intent to get me hurt or killed.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not allege that he was injured in any way, or that any inmate threatened him with injury.
Plaintiff sums up his second motion as follows:
ADC Defendants and other ADC staff has evil intent to do me harm. Taking my рrograms from me for exercising my constitutional rights was done to keep me in prison. Defendants are guilty of failure to act because they know I am being treated
unconstitutional but they choose to do anything about it other then participate in violating my rights.
(Id. at 6).
C. Third Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Plaintiff filed his third Motion for Preliminary Injunction on October 7, 2021. (ECF No. 61). Plaintiff does not indicate where he is currently incarcerated in the Motion. The return address on the envelope for this Motion, Plaintiff‘s current mailing address with the Court, and his ADC records all indicate he is currently incarcerated in the ADC Tucker Maximum Security Unit. (ECF No. 61 at 5). He asks the Court to order ADC Medical Director Rory Griffin to get him to outside medical treatment for a proper diagnosis and treatment. (Id. at 1). Plaintiff alleges his gums are peeling, “blister up,” bleed and are very painful. (Id.). He further alleges that he has nasal blockage and bleeding, with large sores and nosе bleeds. (Id.). He alleges this condition has now attacked his eyes, causing blurred vision and constant watering in his eyes. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff alleges that WellPath medical staff have given him different diagnoses. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff alleges he was taken to several outside providers, including the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, but then Defendant Griffin “has just gave up on getting me the proper outside medical.” (Id. at 3). He alleges he first noticed the problems оn May 1, 2020, the day he came to the ADC, and it has progressed during his time in the ADC. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff does not allege that the difficulty in diagnosing his medical conditions has been done in retaliation for the exercise of any constitutional right. Instead, he alleges his medical care amounts to deliberate indifference. (Id. at 4).
D. Motion Responses
The ADC Defendants (Ball, Coleman, Culclager, Earl, Graves, Griffin, Hosman, Payne, Reed, Settles, Voss, and Warner) filed an Answer and a Motion for Extensiоn of time on August 27, 2021. (ECF Nos. 45, 46). This was granted, and they filed a Response to Plaintiff‘s Second
II. LEGAL STANDARD
While no single factor in itself is dispositive, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held “the two most critical factors for a district court to consider in determining whether to grant a рreliminary injunction are (1) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (2) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if an injunction is not granted.” Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 206 (8th Cir. 1976). The burden of proving a preliminary injunction is warranted rests on the movant. Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition, the Eighth Circuit has instructed that “in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution because judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
A. Plaintiff‘s First and Third Motions for Injunctive Relief are Unrelated to his § 1983 Complaint
Preliminary relief is granted “to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm until the court has an opportunity to rule on the lawsuit‘s merits.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the party requesting preliminary relief must “establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party‘s motions and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff fаiled to establish any relationship between the allegations in his Complaint and the relief requested in his First and Third Motions for injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 29, 61). His Complaint alleges three claims centered on the time he was housed in the Ouachita River Unit. First, various staff assigned to that Unit, as well as ADC upper-level administrative staff, failed to follow CDC guidance to prevent the spread of COVID-19, and Plaintiff contracted that disease. Second, various staff assigned to that Unit, as well as upper-level ADC administrative staff, retaliated against him for filing grievances and lawsuits by transferring him out of the Ouachita River Unit, which resulted in him being removed from his “Pals” program. Third, various staff assigned to that Unit, as well as upper-level ADC administrative staff, denied him medical care for conditions identified only as a mental health concerns in retaliation for filing grievances.
In contrast, Plaintiff‘s First Motion, (ECF No. 29), indicates he was, at thе time of filing the motion, housed at the ADC Tucker Unit. He asks that Defendants “Payne, Straughn, Reed, Griffin, the Health Services Administrator of Nursing, and WellPath Medical Corporation” be ordered to take him to an outside medical provider so that he can receive a correct diagnosis for persistent issues with his nasal passages and gums. (ECF No. 29). He also asks that “Parsins and Scamster” be ordered to continue outside care. Parsins and Scamster are not named in this lawsuit
In his Third Motion (ECF No. 61), Plaintiff was housed in the ADC Tucker Maximum Security Unit. Plaintiff asks the Court to order Defendant Rory Griffin to get him outside medical care so that he can get a correct diagnosis and treatment for the same issues he complains of in the first motion concerning his gums and nasal passages. He also alleges he is now having issues with his eyes. Plaintiff does not allege that the difficulty in diagnosing his conditions was a form of retaliation for filing grievances or lawsuits. Instead, he alleges that his medical care amounts to deliberate indifference.
Thus, these two motions for preliminary injunction center on Plaintiff‘s disagreement with medical care while at a Unit different than the one in his Cоmplaint, and at a Unit that is, moreover, outside the jurisdiction of the Western District of Arkansas.4 Because his injunctive motion allegations center on the Tucker Unit, his injunction allegations are moot as to the majority of the named Defendants for this case, who, with the exception of the upper-level ADC staff,5 all work at the Ouachita River Unit. See Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997) (release from the institution in which the injunctive relief is sought against moots the request for injunctive relief). See also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding an inmate‘s
Nor are the claims of his Complaint and these motions for injunction in any way related. In his Complaint Plaintiff‘s alleges he was denied medical care and treatment for mental health issues while at the Ouachita River Unit, and this denial was done in retaliation for his filing of grievances and lawsuits. In these two motions for injunction, Plaintiff asks fоr outside medical care for medical conditions completely unrelated to those in his Complaint, and makes no allegation that the difficulty of getting a correct diagnosis was in any way a form of retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. His requests for injunctive relief, therefore, should be denied. See, e.g., Devose, 42 F.3d at 471 (denying a preliminary injunction where a prisoner‘s retaliation allegation was “entirely different from” the inadequate medical care claims and relief requested in his
In his First Motion, Plaintiff also asks for a case update. As the Court has already ordered a copy of the docket sheet to be sent to Plaintiff, this portion of the First Motion should be denied as moot.
B. Plaintiff Has Not Met His Dataphase Burden for his Second Motion for Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff‘s Second motion (ECF No. 38) alleges he has been transferred to different ADC units, removed from two inmate programs, and has suffered inmate classification changes in retaliation for his filing of grievances and lawsuits. Plaintiff asks the Court to order the ADC to “stop the retaliation.” Plaintiff is effectively asking the Court to permit him to choose where he will be housed in the ADC, what inmate classification he should receive, and what programs he
Further, as the ADC Defendants correctly argue, Plaintiff‘s request to “stop the retaliation” asks the Court to grant the ultimate relief sought in the second claim of his Complaint, without the inconvenience of having to first prove that any retaliation occurred. This is not an appropriate use for an injunсtion. See WarnerVision Ent. Inc. v. Empire of Carolina, Inc., 101 F.3d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is not to give the plaintiff the ultimate relief it seeks.“); Sanborn Mfg. Co. v. Campbell Hausfeld/Scott Fetzer Co., 997 F.2d 484, 490 (8th Cir.1993) (affirming the denial of a request for preliminary injunction as seeking improper injunctive relief, because the motion asked for an affirmative action to correct an alleged issue before that issue had been decided on the merits).
Second, Plaintiff has not demonstrated he will suffer any irreparable harm if injunctive rеlief is denied. Plaintiff alleges only that they are transferring him, removing him from programs, and changing his classification “to keep me in prison.”6 Combining this statement with his reference to a hearing with the classification committee, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that he is being harmed because these actions are negatively affecting his eligibility for parole. As Plaintiff has no constitutional right to parole,7 being kept in prison pursuant tо his criminal sentence does not allege an irreparable injury. Plaintiff does not allege he is being kept in prison beyond the expiration of his sentence. He suffers no cognizable injury as a result. Without a finding of irreparable injury, a preliminary injunction should not be issued. Modern Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
While not necessary to the conclusion here, the Court will also consider the harm and injury to Defendants if an injunction is granted and assess whether the issuance of an injunction would be in the public interest. In assessing the public interest, it must be remembered that “federal courts do not sit to supervise state prisons, the administration of which is of acute interest to the States.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 229 (1976). Granting injunctive relief at this point based on Plaintiff‘s unsubstantiated allegations would amount to direct interference by the Court with the operation and administration of the ADC, which is harmful to Defendants and does not
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, I recommend that Plaintiff‘s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Case Update (ECF No. 29) be DENIED. I further recommend that Plaintiffs two additional Motions for Preliminary Injunction (ECF Nos. 38, 61) should be DENIED.
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to
DATED this 27th day of October 2021.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE