*1 any to discern real distinction unable between tbe R. B. Parsons Elec- system installing Company tric tbe under one contract and under separate contracts. If tbe E.R. Parsons .Company Electric in- bad stalled tbe under one contract connections and it was contemplated compressors, refrigerators tbat it sell install tbe coils and wben work, tbat then it did would be fair to tbat, conclude under de- charged theory, fendant’s in this damage suit with tbe installation, it, done tbat if even thereafter, installed tbe com- refrigerators pressors, coils and under another and separate contract. parties separated As stated, before tbe these items in their contract personalty realty and could do this as well in dozen, tract as in a but if tbe installation of tbe damaged connections way building tbe for which defendant, as mortgagee, can com- plain, remedy defendant a proper proceeding. We damage now concerned with tbe done at the time of in- tbe connections, stallation tubing, of tbe such as tbe wiring pipes, solely with whether security defendant’s will be substantially and adversely affected, as installation, by tbe removal, solely, of compressors, tbe coils and refrigerators, having nothing of tbe installation in view save those three articles. is affirmed. All concur. Ap Nafziger Baking
Mrs. Josie Respondent, et al., Co. pellants. 57 S. W. Boley B. TF. respondent. Derge Reeder,
P. E. David R. Winger, Reeded, Barker, Crwm- <& appellants. biner Hazard *2 Workmen’s the
CAMPBELL, proceeding based C. This is a Brewer Josie Compensation Earl Brewer and Act. The facts are: Ger and Brewer parents were husband and wife the of Bernice and Earl marriage of The aldine both of whom are infants. Brewer, Circuit the of and Brewer decree Brewer Josie was dissolved was custody children County said in of Jackson 1920. The a month adjudged $55 to pay the awarded to mother and month. to $40 a This later reduced allowance was in doubt. left payments Earl Brewer thereon but the amount is made other. In 1923 married to each Josie Brewer and Merle Cross to Thereafter, lived Cross, his wife the said children Merle and of Merle gether in death a home Josie until the owned Cross Cross, Cross February which The of Merle 10, 1927. death occurred from the of his widow resulted an industrial accident and questioned. In Work fact, an award of not the was ip Compensation in favor men’s Commission made an award her per paid $20 the sum of week for 365.1 The award was weeks. July, weekly, month 1930. On payments of October D. Hill to each Josie Cross and C. were married living together, thereafter children other and continued live the marriage defendants with them. This latter not revealed to the was July, 1930, the payment compensation, until at which of under time award, Thereupon Josie as natural aforesaid was discontinued. seeking guardian children, proceeding of said infant this instituted of unpaid portion to have said awarded the the benefit children which had theretofore been her. awarded to member commission com-
The claim was heard before a majority pensation denied. review the full commission a “actually dependent of the its members found'that claimants were wages support part for in Merle Cross’ at ’’ injury.
The commission further found that decedent had either of claimants that “when Brewer Cross Josie married Merle together out of a common which lived fund received wages from the of Josie Cross. Merle con- funds Merle Cross and seventy per tributing per $50, Josie or a total $35 $15 week and of Cross, deceased. There- cent of which was contributed Merle children fore, that Merle Cross these the evidence shows had wages contributing contributed and his part in and that he injury, seventy per common fund from at his cent of the the time of opinion that support and it is our claimants derived seventy dependents per cent of to the extent of the claimants his ’’ wages. CO CO liable Cross that Merle concede Plaintiffs contended merely because
support thereafter, “as- he, and their marriage Merle Cross therefore, under was, to them parentis” loco position sumed tending to evidence not find do them. We legal duty -to loco parentis position assumed Merle Cross show posi- assume he did commission find nor did claimants tion. dependents claimants commission finding of holding support a Merle Cross part upon n This father. assumed decedent infant legal duty under father is that a reason furnishing support fulfilled not be duty would this child and dependents who are class designates the Act part.” legislative the absence dependency. *3 define the term it does not legal dependency means will hold term, courts of the definition not en- but legal enforce courts will the reason moral duties. force mere con court in 146, 148, the Towns, 56 Vt. the case Good said: dependent,” any manner struing phrase broad, language is statute true, contended, that “It as is think be it should but all we dependent;’ after any manner ‘in read, though it only, as the same legal dependency to mean a strued scope than given greater dependent.’ If is legally ‘in manner administering There it. great difficulty in this, would be there possible short of stopping-place seem to be no would parties, and relation dependency, whatever the of actual cases obligation support; moral to of even a notwithstanding the absence yet presume for so latitudinarian we would contend no one limit utmost stop then at the of the statute. Shall we construction moral what a obligations"? But the law cannot of moral determine Again, obligation by what rule is, cognizance of them. no takes damages legal no shall be in cases where as here assessed been lost?” Kennedy 452, al.,
In the v. Keller et case S. legal facts were in effect as there considered same instant case. Said the court: plaintiffs obviously totally They had dependent.
“The here were capacity. utterly earning no of their own, means without hardly dependency That is, such was actual —that could real —there suggestion be they depend- whom a doubt. Being they ordinarily pre- ent? be years, infants of tender would dependent upon upon sumed to im- father, their the law whom poses duty primary however, custody, them. Their by they been awarded to their mother decree, divorce were receiving support duty their stepfather, their decree, by imposed upon support them was so imposed thereby father, contrary, but, on the by only primary duty, bound them as a well. by of the decree of the court as law, virtue of the virtue they question support received from can be no that the There legally pro- was such as their bound duty. If, having been abandoned primary vide after as a they charitably strang- some father, had been inclined neighbor, institution, State, or charitable or -the er or some dependent upon would the courts hold were therefore not entitled, support, their father for their and not death, provided bring the death benefit the statute? We our- cannot Legislature intended. pre- selves to believe that the so Yet this is cisely what the defendants’ construction of the statute leads to. Manifestly plaintiffs were, totally under the conceded facts, de- pendent support upon their father at death, the time of his meaning statute, within the and entitled to on that basis.” Kennedy
The holding in the is principle case based may dependent not claim to be a meaning within the of the law support upon of another unless latter is liable to furnish This principle applicable is here and we plaintiff’s not sustain the claim without- bringing our- selves conflict with the case which Kennedy we decline to do. question We do not decide the as or partial to whether not a de- pendent is within the class named in sub-division 1, paragraph (d), section Revised Statutes of Missouri for the reason that question presented. *4 judgment Boyer, C., is reversed. concurs. C., foregoing opinion PER CURIAM: The Campbell, opinion of court. as the is reversed. All concur. City Appellant.
E. R. Missouri, Dusky, Respondent, v. Kansas 58 S. Court