81 Ga. 516 | Ga. | 1889
This case was before this court at the October term, 1887. 79 Ga. 367. The controlling points in the case were then fully decided. We held in that decision, that the rights of the parties- depended on the construction of the will of L. M. Hill, and the two contracts between B. P. Hill and his son, L. Harry Hill.
Is there anything in the agreement which limits and controls this full power of disposition as claimed? ¥e think this question is clearly answered in the affirmative by the stipulation found in the third paragraph of this agreement, to wit: “In case of death of 33. P. Hill without marriage and further issue, the whole of the property held by D. C. Hill, for the use of 33. P. Hill, is to be conveyed to L. Harry Hill.” The agreement required the transfer of the Taylor plantation to D. C. Hill,* it was so transferred with the full knowledge of 33. P. Hill, as appears from the record, and at the time of his death it was a part of the property held by 3). C. Hill. And 33. P. Plill having died without “further issue,” the only conclusion which can be arrived at by a proper construction of these contracts is, that 33. P. Hill exhausted all the power he had to direct what disposition should be made of the plantation; his power of appointment was terminated when he signed the last agreement, unless it was done at the consent of his son; he had no other children.
B. P. Hill, acquired no legal title to any of the property bequeathed by his father to L. Harry. The rights he acquired in the legacy were such as were given him under the first contract signed by his son. That was, the right to dictate how a part of the legacy should be
If the plaintiff in error is the transferee of the execution named in her cross-bill-, she has a complete remedy at law. No special reason is given why equity should interfere in behalf of this execution, especially as she claims it was transferred to her since this litigation was commenced, and it is not germane to the litigation as it stood when she became the transferee.
"We think the court did right in sustaining the demurrer to the cross-bill as set out in the order, and in rendering the decree which is complained of.
Since we affirm the judgment of the court below, there is no reason why we should pass on the motion to dismiss the bill of exceptions.
Judgment affirmed.