Hill v. HillHill v. Hill
This is a suit for divorce from bed and board on the ground of extreme cruelty.
The parties were married in 1912, and resided together until the early part of 1918, when the wife withdrew from the defendant‘s home for a short time, returning to him, however, and remaining with him until December, 1922. She alleges that the hiatus in their cohabitation was due to attempts upon his part for sexual intercourse in perverted form. Although this is strenuously denied by him, I am inclined to believe that what she says is true, both because of corroborating circumstances proved in the cause and the man‘s undoubted salacious mind. His entire appearance and manner would tend to classify him as of a rather undeveloped mind, and of habits that would account for his possession of an
The main ground is an unwarranted accusation of sexual infidelity against the petitioner. She swears that the defendant constantly accused her of adultery, in which she is corroborated by her daughter and the postmaster at Hackensack, in an incident where the husband discontinued the delivery of mail at his home, and called for it in person at the general post office, in the hope, unquestionably, of thus securing some incriminatory letters from her suspected paramours. It should be said that there was not a scintilla of evidence of adultery produced. The petitioner says that on one occasion, in the lobby of a theatre, her husband said to her: “Turn around; it looks as though you were lying on the flat of your back in the grass some place.” He says that he said no such thing, but did say to her: “Look at your coat; it looks terrible: looks as though you were laying in the grass.” I also believe the wife rather than the husband in this respect, and look upon his testimony as the customary effort of one who cannot deny a conversation, garbling it so as to give an entirely different impression from the true state of fact. In addition, he was guilty of the most atrocious remarks to his wife, sometimes alone and sometimes in the hearing of their own daughter, such as when reading a newspaper, and saying: “Look here; here‘s another woman who got children from another guy.” “No man knows if the children are his.” “How do I know what guy comes in here at night.”
The only act of threatened violence to which the petitioner testifies took place in December, 1922, just prior to the final separation of the parties; but I must confess that I do not consider it of any importance in this case because it was an isolated instance, never repeated, and because from her future conduct I do not believe that the petitioner was really placed in fear for her personal safety. I believe that it was the occasion of her leaving her husband, but not the cause.
Thus, there is presented a case wherein there has been no violence exhibited against the wife and no reasonable fear thereof, but only a systematic and persistent course of the vilest accusations of adultery against a woman by her husband, who not only presents no evidence thereof, but, in his denial of her testimony, concedes her to be a virtuous woman, and, in fact, says that there never was any doubt of her virtue in his mind. I have been considerably puzzled as to the decision that ought to be reached in this case. In the language of the bar, it is a very close one. At the close of the hearing, it was my first impression that extreme cruelty had not been proved. It appeared to be a case similar to Linnekogel v. Linnekogel, 122 Atl. Rep. 372. But in that proceeding there was no persistent charge of adultery, or any at all, in fact, and comment thereon was made, and such accusations were characterized, as “the most grevious insult that can be put upon a woman.” But, taking into consideration all the circumstances, I have determined that this woman is entitled to the decree she seeks. For many years it was seriously mooted by members of the bar as to whether or not there should be a finding of extreme cruelty in the absence violence exhibited against the wife and no reasonable fear of some specific act of violence. As early in the annals of this court as Graecen v. Graecen, 2 N.J. Eq. 459, Chancellor Pennington was in some doubt and expressed difficulty in defining “extreme cruelty.” In reply to the objection that there had been no actual violence, he said: “What are the limits to which the court are confined under this act, it may not be easy to define, and it is not necessary so to do in the present case.” He then found, as might have been expected, that an attack upon the wife by the husband, armed with an axe, did not constitute actual violence.
In the case of Close v. Close, 24 N.J. Eq. 338, Chancellor Runyon said that what he called “indefensible” language on the part of the husband did not constitute extreme cruelty in the absence of physical violence. On appeal, the decree of the chancellor was reversed, but the opinion in 25 N.J. Eq. 526, shows that the appellate
“The court has not found as a fact, in any reported case, that mere words, however coarse, abusive or threatening, have impaired the wife‘s health or endangered her future safety * * *. Yet the court does not exclude the possibility of a case where words only will suffice. Some regard must be paid to the refinement and circumstances in life of the parties, where actual violence is absent.”
Quoting Close v. Close, supra. The first and, so far as I know, only reported case where a successful wife, in a suit on the ground of extreme cruelty, proved no violence upon the part of her husband, and the case to which I have just referred, is Doty v. Doty, 92 N.J. Eq. 660. In that case, the husband was frequently intoxicated and out of work, with the consequent deprivation of the necessaries of life to his family, called his wife vile names, and, as in the case at bar, charged her with adultery, introduced dissolute men and women into his house until late hours of the night, with indecent language, so that the petitioner was unable to secure her proper rest. In that case, the familiar language of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet was quoted, as expressed by him in Black v. Black, 30 N.J. Eq. 215, to be found on page 221. The Black Case, it will be recalled, was a property suit, not involving the subject of divorce, so that the language of the vice-chancellor, adopted by the court of errors and appeals, is no exception to the presence of violence prior to the Doty
Of course, no decree would be advised unless I was absolutely assured and completely convinced that the petitioner had suffered the insults alleged. But she has succeeded by such clear and convincing proofs in substantiating her charge
I will advise a decree of divorce from bed and board for life.