160 Ga. 883 | Ga. | 1925
Lead Opinion
1. It is provided in section 1 of the act approved December 14, 1895 (Acts 1895, p. 46), that '“The several judges of the superior . . courts of this State shall have power and authority to hear and determine, in vacation as well as in term time, without any order of court passed in term time, all motions for new trial, certioraries, and all such other matters as they can now hear and determine in term time, and which are not referred to a jury.” The substance of this part of the statute is now embraced in the Civil Code (1910), § 4852. Section 2 of said act provides: “That the hearing of all cases provided for in the first section of this act shall be fixed by the judge upon the application of either party or his counsel, of which time and
The case differs on its-facts from the following cases: That of Dixon v. Hawkins, 100 Ga. 5 (27 S. E. 188), related to a term order which provided for a hearing “on a day to be fixed by the
Rehearing
ON MOTION ROE REHEARING.
If the question which was propounded by the Court of Appeals had been to the same effect as that suggested in the motion for a rehearing, I would be heartily in favor of granting the motion for a rehearing. However, under the ruling in Georgian Co. v. Jones, 154 Ga. 762, (115 S. E. 490), the jurisdiction of this court is restricted to answering nothing more or less than the precise question submitted by -the Court of Appeals. In this case the question propounded by the Court of Appeals is set forth; and being convinced that the facts upon which the Court of Appeals predicates its question are correctly stated (and being -without power to inquire of the record to ascertain that they are not correctly stated), I am compelled to concur in the judgment refusing the motion for a rehearing.