Appellant Rita Hill appeals the district court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Burnet County Sheriffs Department and Burnet County, Texas (“Burnet County”). In two issues, Hill contends that the district court erred by granting Burnet County’s plea to the jurisdiction because (1) she was constructively discharged as defined by the Texas Whistleblower Act, see Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002 (West 1994 & Supp.2002) & § 554.0035 (West Supp.2002), and (2) she was terminated because she made a good faith report of a violation of law. 1 We will reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
From 1994 to 2000, Hill was employed by the Burnet County Sheriffs Department as a dispatcher. In Spring 2000, Hill and two other employees observed that Hill’s supervisor, Janie Prew, was falsifying her time records. Hill and the other employees gave written notice of the time record discrepancies to Sheriffs Department administrators, but no action was taken. Subsequently, Hill and another employee reported their concerns to the Burnet County District Attorney’s Office, and the Sheriffs Department began an investigation. Following her report to the District Attorney’s office, Hill received hostile telephone calls at her home from her superiors. Prew and other Sheriffs Department employees stopped communicating with her except on matters related to the investigation.
In August 2000, a representative of the Sheriffs Department advised Hill that she had twenty-four hours to sign a confidentiality agreement relating to the investigation or else be subject to disciplinary action or termination; no other employee of the Sheriffs Department was givеn a similar deadline or ultimatum. During the investigation, Hill was called away from her station, in Prev/s presence, on two separate occasions to discuss her report and the investigation; no other employee was called away from her station in the same manner. An investigator informed *439 Hill that she would be required to undergo a polygraph test before Prew; no other employees were told they would be required to take a polygraph test. From the time Hill and the other employee made their report to the District Attorney’s office, Hill was subjected to hostility from her superiors at the Sheriffs Department. Because of the stress from the harassment and hostile work environment, Hill resigned from her position on August 16, 2000. Thereafter, Hill engaged in a verbal altercation with Sheriff Jоe Pollock that caused her to physically collapse.
On October 4, 2001, Hill filed her first amended petition contending that she had been forced to resign because of retaliation in violation of the Texas Whistleblower Act. Burnet County filed a plea to the jurisdiction contending that Hill “has pled allegations that affirmatively establishes [sic] this court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. Alternatively, Plaintiff has pled in bad faith with the purpose of attempting to confer jurisdiction when under true and undisputed facts the County’s sovereign immunity has not been waived.” On February 4, 2002, the district court granted Burnet County’s plea to the jurisdiction. Hill appeals the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
Because subject matter jurisdiction presents a legal question, we review the district court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction
de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,
The plaintiff must allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.
Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd.,
On judicial review of a plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, our task is not to determine whether the plaintiff ultimately wins or loses; rather, our task is to deсide whether the facts as alleged support jurisdiction in the trial court.
Id.
Generally, a petition is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court to hear a matter if it gives fair notice of acts upon which the pleader bases his claims so that the opposing party may adequately pre
*440
pare a defense.
See Garvey v. Vawter,
Sovereign Immunity
Because governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it is properly assertеd in a plea to the jurisdiction.
Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8
S.W.3d 636, 637 (Tex.1999);
Federal Sign v. Texas S. Univ.,
The Whistleblower Act contains an express waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.0035. In effect, this waiver permits a district court to exercise jurisdiction once a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a claim under the Whistleblower Act.
See Federal Sign,
The Texas Whistleblower Act
The Whistleblower Act prohibits a state or local governmental entity from suspending or terminating the employment of a public employee who “in good faith reports a violation of law by the employing entity or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 554.002(a).
See also Texas Dep’t of Transportation v. Needham,
The cause of action created in the Whistleblower Act is purely statutory; it creates a right and provides a remedy unknown to the common law of Texas.
Hart,
Burnet County did not challenge the sufficiency of Hill’s pleadings concerning the first four elements. In its plea to the jurisdiction, Burnet County contended that Hill failed to plead an “adverse personnel action” because her “allegations of constructive discharge [we]re insufficient as a matter of law.” In the alternative, Burnet County contended that “Plaintiffs аllegations of a hostile work environment after her alleged report of a violation of law are insufficient, as a matter of law, to support a viable causal link between any adverse • employment action that may be pled, and the reporting of illegal conduct.”
In her petition, Hill asserted that she “was a public employee, working as a dispatcher for the Burnet County Sheriffs Department.” Hill further contended that she “acted in good faith when she first reported to Captain Smith, Ms. Prew’s immediate supervisor, her belief that Ms. Prew was falsifying her time sheets.” Hill also alleged that it was her “belief that falsifying government documents, such as time sheets, was a violation of law.” 3 When Smith failed to take action on Hill’s report, she “believed she had a duty to report what she beliеved in good faith was a violation of law to the next law enforcement agency, the Burnet County district attorney’s office,” and that her reports “were made to the appropriate law enforcement authorities.” Finally, Hill made the following allegations concerning retaliation:
Plaintiff suffered retaliation as a result of making the report by being singled out from her male co-worker during the investigation. Plaintiff was pulled from her duty station in front of and/or with the knowledge of the subject of the investigation, her supervisor, to be interviewed for several hours by the Sheriffs Department investigator and then had to return to her work station under the scrutiny of her supervisor. Plaintiff was retaliated against when she was told that she would have to take a polygraph test before the person undеr investigation, and her co-worker that made the report, was not told he had to take a polygraph test. Plaintiff was further retaliated against when she was given a confidentiality form and told that she had to sign it within twenty-four (24) hours or face disciplinary action, including tеrmination and no one else was given such an ultimatum. Finally, Plaintiff suffered retaliation when she was forced to resign her position because of the stress and physical problems that arose from the hostile work environment and the retaliatory conduct of Sheriff Department officials that occurred after she made a good faith report of a violation of law by her supervi *442 sor to Captain Smith and the district attorney’s office.
Taking the above alleged facts as true as we must, construing the pleadings in Hill’s favor, and looking to Hill’s intent, we conclude the facts alleged by Hill in her petition are sufficient to meet the pleading requirements and are sufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Taken as true, the petition reasonably conveys that Hill observed conduct by Prew that she believed constituted a violation of law. After she reported the violation of law, the Sheriffs Department retaliated against her, ultimately leading to her constructive discharge. Although the facts alleged by Hill concerning retaliation are minimal, they do not affirmatively demonstrate that she did not suffer retaliation. Nor do the facts alleged by Hill negate causation as a matter of law. We are not asked to decide whether Hill’s Whistleblower claim lacks merit because the retaliatory acts she alleged do not сonstitute a constructive discharge or because Hill cannot show that the retaliation leading to her resignation would not have occurred but for her report; we are only asked to determine whether her pleadings invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. Bеcause the facts alleged by Hill are sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, we conclude that the district court erred by granting Burnet County’s plea to the jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
As they relate to her pleadings, we sustain Hill’s issues on appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause for further proceedings.
Notes
. Burnet County restates the issues more accurately as “[wjhether the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Whistleblower Act claim because Plaintiff’s pleadings and the relevаnt jurisdictional evidence establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff has not alleged an actionable constructive discharge based on a report of an alleged violation of law.”
. In its brief, Burnet County concedes that “factual allegations of сonstructive discharge may satisfy the 'termination' requirement under the Whistleblower Act.’’
. In her petition, Hill cites to section 37.10(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code: “A person commits an offense if he knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, a governmental record.” Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 37.10(a)(1) (West Supp.2002).