The basis of' the present action is the alleged unconstitutionality of chapter 46, Public-Local Laws, Extra Session, 1924.
It is contended, in the first place, that the act in question is violative of Article II, sec. 29, of the Constitution, which provides, in part, as follows: “The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets, or alleys.”
In
Brown v. Comrs.,
Nor can it be bold invalid, according to plaintiffs’ contention, as violative of tbe provisions of tbe Constitution (1) against taking property without due process of law (Article I, sec. 17) or (2) pledging the faith of tbe county, except for a necessary expense, without a vote of a majority of tbe qualified electors therein (Article VII, sec. 7), or (3) levying a tax in disregard of tbe rule of uniformity in taxation (Article VII, sec. 9).
Plaintiffs have proceeded on tbe theory that tbe act authorizes a county tax for local township roads; whereas, from tbe facts agreed, it appears that tbe designated road forms an essential part of a countywide scheme, affording improved highway facilities to every township in the county and benefiting all.
Again, it would seem that the act here challenged is only declaratory of, or supplementary to, the powers given the defendant under the general law.
Road Com. v. Comrs.,
The exceptions are not allowed.
Affirmed.
