American Express sued Ricky Hill to recover $47,716.44 in unpaid credit card charges. Hill did not dispute that he owed money, but contended that the applicable statute of limitation barred suit on all but a small portion of the amount claimed. The trial court held that the six-year statute of limitation for simple contracts applied in this case and granted American Express’s motion for summary judgment and denied Hill’s motion for summary judgment. We agree that the statute of limitation in this case is six years and affirm.
All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11 or to negotiable instruments under Article 3 of Title 11.
*577 OCGA §9-3-24.
Hill argues that the applicable statute of limitation is OCGA § 9-3-25, which provides:
All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand 1 of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11.
1. This is not an action on an open account.
[A] contract was effected in this case when the plaintiff issued its credit card to the defendant to be accepted by [him] in accordance with the terms and conditions therein set forth, or at [his] option to be rejected by [him]. Such rejection need take the form of returning the card, or simply its non-use. The issuance of the card to the defendant amounted to a mere offer on plaintiff s part, and the contract became entire when defendant retained the card and thereafter made use of it. The card itself then constituted a formal and binding contract.
(Citation omitted.)
Davis v. Discover Bank,
2. We also reject Hill’s contention that OCGA § 9-3-25 applies in this case because he did not sign the contract. Because this was a written contract, 2 the form of Hill’s acceptance is immaterial and the provisions of OCGA § 9-3-24 governing contracts in writing apply.
Hill cites to
Seaboard Air-Line R. v. Averett,
In this case, there is a simple contract in writing. That the contract was agreed to, not by signature, but by use of the card does not take it out of OCGA § 9-3-24. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that American Express’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitation.
Judgment affirmed.
