Hildenbrand Appeal
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
January 2, 1962
405 Pa. 579 | 176 A.2d 900
Uveges v. Pa., 335 U.S. 437, is authoritative. I dissent.
Hildenbrand Appeal.
Argued November 27, 1961. Before BELL, C. J., JONES, COHEN, EAGEN and ALPERN, JJ.
Robert M. Landis, with him J. Stokes Adams, III, and Adams & Childs, and Barnes, Dechert, Price, Myers & Rhoads, for Children‘s Aid Society of Pennsylvania, appellee.
William B. Ball, Milton P. King, and Sterling, Magaziner, Stern & Levy, and David B. Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General, and David Stahl, Attorney General, for Department of Public Welfare, and other nonprofit child caring agencies, as amici curiae.
OPINION BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BELL, January 2, 1962:
Helen M. Hildenbrand, an unwed mother, gave birth prematurely to a baby boy on September 9, 1959. She could not bring the baby to her mother‘s home and had neither a place of her own nor the financial resources to care for him. She got in touch with the Children‘s Aid Soсiety of Pennsylvania and made arrangements to formally surrender the child. All of the facts and factors regarding relinquishment of the child were explained to her by a representativе of the Society. On September 11, 1959, she signed a temporary agreement giving custody of the child to the Society and the child was taken by the Society from the hospital on September 14, 1959. On October 29, 1959, she signed a petition relinquishing forever her parental rights to her child and after a hearing thereon was held in the Municipal (now County) Court of Philadelphia, that Court awаrded the child to the Children‘s Aid Society of Pennsylvania in accordance with the Act of 1953, infra. Thereafter, in March, 1960, Miss Hildenbrand requested the Society to return the child to her, but the Society refused. On May 18, 1960, she filed a pe-
The
“The court shall thereupon fix a time for hearing, which shall be not less than ten days after such petition is presented. The hearing shall be private. At such hearing the court, by examination under оath of the parties to the petition, shall ascertain the truth of the facts set forth in the petition and its execution, and if satisfied as to the truth thereof and that the petition should bе granted, it shall issue its decree so finding, and (1) directing the transfer of the custody of the person to the approved agency or institution, and (2) authorizing such agency or institution to give cоnsent to the adoption of such person without further consent of or notification to the parent or parents.”
Prior to the enactment of this amendment, and even now, unless the voluntary relinquishment procedure is followed, consent by the natural parents to adoption may be withdrawn at any time before the entry of the final decree of adoption: Harvey Adoption Case, 375 Pa. 1, 7, 99 A. 2d 276; Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A. 2d 132. Thus, the prospective adopting par-
Following a two year study by the Governor‘s Committee on Child Welfare of the serious social problems arising under the Act of April 4, 1925, supra, as amended, the Assembly enacted the 1953 amendment: In summarizing the recommendations of the Governor‘s Committee the Court below aptly said: “The Committee saw the then requirement that a child be in an adoption home six months, with the parents signing consents following placement, as a prolonging of the natural parents’ indecision and turmoil, and also as a period of uncertainty [and often heartbreak] for the adoption parents. It also envisioned that the knowledge by the natural parents of the identity of the adoptive parents could present prоblems in later years. To remove that uncertainty in the placement phase of the adoption machinery and to assure anonymity between natural and adoptive pаrents, the Committee recommended, after a two-year study, that there be a preliminary judicial hearing, prior to placement, for use of those parents desiring to relinquish pаrental rights and responsibilities.”
Although fairness to adopting parents and the recommendations of many welfare agencies throughout the State probably and naturally influenced the Legislature, the basic reason for the Act was, as it should be, the best interest and welfare of the child.
All the statutory requirements above set forth were complied with, and under all the facts and circumstances here present we cannot say that the lower Court abused its discretion.
Order affirmed.
*The problem this case presents disturbs me greatly and compels the following dissеnt.
I appreciate the vital need for finality in adoption cases. I am heartily in accord with the recommendations of the Governor‘s Committee on Child Welfare, referred to in the Majority opinion and the purposes of the resulting 1953 statute. I agree further that all of the statutory requirements were complied with in the instant case. However, much more needs to be considered.
The unwed mother of the child involved became pregnant when she was forty years of age. She lived alone with an aged mother. Upon learning of her сondition, appellant, understandingly, became distraught, gave up her employment, and attempted to go to another city to conceal the fact of her pregnancy. When her family gained the news, their reaction was one of hysterical impending disgrace followed by abuse directed toward the appellant. For two months, she was kept a virtual prisoner to hide the situation from the neighbors. Then she was shunted off to a home for aged women and instructed to stay out of sight and in her room. Members of her immediate family during this time vigorously insisted that the expected child be surrendered for adoption, and that the child could not be housed in the family abode. The appellant was financially destitute and the father of the child refused to arrange satisfactory assistance.
The child was born prematurely on September 9, 1959. Just two days later, on September 11, the mother executed a temporary agreement with the agency involved surrendering her rights in the child. The agency took custody of the child on September 14. On October 29, the mother signed the petition for voluntary relinquishment, but only after she had pleaded for an opportunity to see the child and was told that such would be
There isn‘t any doubt in my mind that all during this pertinent period, the appellant was so distraught and confused of mind that her written act of relinquishment was anything but free, voluntary and deliberate. This conviction is strongly sustained by the testimony of a рhysician, who treated her during the period of pregnancy.
I do not think it need be argued that a document of such great import, as the written voluntary relinquishment of a child by his mother, should clеarly be an “intelligent, voluntary and deliberate” act. The law has consistently required that the act of consent to adoption by the natural parents of a child must be of this high charаcter. If the consent is not such, a requested decree of adoption must be refused. See, Susko Adoption Case, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A. 2d 132 (1949). Certainly, a voluntary relinquishment is of equal significance and demands similar consideratiоns and standards.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Berg v. The Catholic Bureau, 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 514, 518, 76 A. 2d 427 (1950), the Court declared invalid an “irrevocable consent to adoption” given by a mother and pointedly stated: “Relatrix testified that she was emotionally disturbed by her predicament and that she signed the agreement placing her child with respondent from necessity. She was distracted and could recognize no alternative. She had no suitable homе for herself and the child at the time and was unable then to provide one. On a change of circumstances she moved with reasonable promptness—about three months aftеr the birth of the child—to regain its custody.”
In the instant case, after appellant regained her employment, and satisfactory support and a home for the child was secured, shе contacted the agency in order to
For these reasons, I feel that the lower court failed to exercise a wise discretion.
I would reverse.