LARRY HILAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LARRY G. TRENT, Director, Department of State Police, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Third District No. 3-06-0500
Third District
May 16, 2007
582
Stanley L. Tucker (argued), of Hartzell, Glidden, Tucker & Hartzell, of Carthage, for appellee.
PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Department of Illinois State Police, denied plaintiff Larry Hiland‘s application for a firearm owner‘s identification (FOID) card. Codefendant, Larry G. Trent, Director of the Illinois State Police, denied Hiland relief from that decision. Hiland filed an action for administrative review in the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the Director‘s decision. We affirm the circuit court.
BACKGROUND
In 1988, Hiland was convicted of several federal crimes, including
In 1989, the Department informed Hiland that he was no longer eligible to possess a FOID card because of his convictions. Pursuant to the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (Act) (
At the hearing, Hiland testified that he had been married for 29 years and had two grown children. He explained that in the early 1980s he was president of a pharmaceutical company, and part of his job was to approve products to add to the company‘s product line. In 1983, the executive vice president of operations for the company suggested that he add vitamin E I.V. to the product line. That vice president, who was in charge of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, and the president of the company that manufactured the drug told him that he did not have to obtain “New Drug Approval” from the FDA because the drug was not new. Based on that information, Hiland introduced the drug to the market without FDA approval. The drug was used by neonatal centers to prevent blindness in premature babies.
Approximately four months after introducing the drug to market, Hiland and his company were notified that the drug was causing babies to die. Hiland immediately discontinued the sale of the product. The Justice Department conducted an investigation and determined that Hiland should have obtained “New Drug Approval” from the FDA. In 1988, Hiland was indicted for his role in introducing the drug to the market without FDA approval. Following a trial, he was convicted. He was required to pay a $65,000 fine and spend six months in a halfway house. He also performed over 800 hours of community service. Hiland testified that he “feel[s] terrible about the incident.”
Hiland introduced several character reference letters on his behalf at the hearing. The authors of those letters described Hiland as honest, reliable, caring, sensible, responsible and possessing good judgment. The pastor of the church that Hiland attends stated that Hiland‘s “‘character’ is beyond reproach.” A letter from Hiland‘s former probation officer stated as follows:
“Mr. Hiland has made a very positive adjustment to supervision and is not perceived as being a threat to himself or the community. He has no history of violence in his past and I can see no reason why his rights to own and possess a firearm should not be restored as long as he meets all the filing requirements of your agency.”
Following the hearing, the hearing officer recommended that Hi-
In 1997, Hiland‘s FOID card expired, and he filed an application for a new one. That application was granted. In 2002, Hiland again filed an application for a FOID card. The Department informed Hiland that his application was denied because of his 1988 convictions. Hiland requested a hearing pursuant to section 10(c) of the Act (
A hearing was held in 2003. The evidence at that hearing established that Hiland had not been charged or convicted of any crimes since 1988. Hiland was very remorseful for his actions that led to his criminal convictions, stating, “I‘m sorry for everything that has happened.” Hiland testified that he was seeking a FOID card so that he could hunt on his own property. All of the information and documents from Hiland‘s previous hearing, including the character reference letters, were admitted into evidence at the 2003 hearing.
After the 2003 hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Hiland had not committed a forcible felony within 20 years and that Hiland‘s criminal history and reputation were such that he was not likely to act in a dangerous manner. However, the ALJ found that granting Hiland a FOID card “would be contrary to the public interest as Section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act (
Hiland appealed the Director‘s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court reversed the denial, holding that the Director abused his discretion by denying Hiland‘s FOID card application.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendants argue that the Director properly denied Hiland a FOID card because Hiland‘s federal criminal convictions prevented him from possessing a firearm under federal law.
The Director‘s decision to deny Hiland a FOID card will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Rawlings v. Department of Law Enforcement, 73 Ill. App. 3d 267, 391 N.E.2d 758 (1979). An
Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, the Department has authority to deny an application for a FOID card if the Department finds, among other things, that the applicant is prohibited from acquiring or possessing a firearm by state or federal law.
In denying Hiland relief, the Director found that Hiland had satisfied the first two conditions of section 10(c). Nevertheless, he found that Hiland had not satisfied the public interest prong of the Act because section 8(n) “prohibits the issuance of a FOID Card to an individual who is prohibited from possessing firearms or ammunition under federal law.”1
Here, the Director found that it would be contrary to public policy to grant Hiland a FOID card solely because he belonged to one of the classes enumerated in section 8, i.e., those prohibited from possessing firearms under federal law. By not exercising the discretion granted to him in section 10(c), the Director ignored the overwhelming evidence establishing that defendant Hiland has been a law-abiding citizen and productive member of his community since his convictions. Based on the evidence, we agree with the trial court that the Director‘s decision to deny Hiland‘s application was an abuse of discretion.
The judgment of the circuit court of Hancock County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, JJ., concur.
