Hilaire v. Trans Union LLCHilaire v. Trans Union LLC
The plaintiff, John Hilaire, inquired about several tradelines that appeared on his TransUnion credit report.1 Dissatisfied with TransUnion‘s response, he asked the company to disclose its “method of verification,” including the “procedures used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the disputed information.”2 He alleges that TransUnion “failed to provide the requested method,” instead “issu[ing] non-responsive communications,”3 and he asserts that “TransUnion‘s failure to provide the method of verification deprived [him] of the ability to evaluate the reasonableness and lawfulness of [the company‘s] reinvestigation.”4 He then initiated this seven-count lawsuit, six counts of which charge TransUnion with violating the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA“),
When a plaintiff requests leave to proceed IFP, the court ordinarily conducts two inquiries. First, it reviews the plaintiff‘s financial affidavit to determine whether he is unable to pay the fee.11 Second, to ensure that the plaintiff is not abusing the privilege of filing a free lawsuit, the court reviews his complaint to determine whether, among other things, it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”12 If the complaint “fails to state a claim,” the court must dismiss it.13
United States District Judge Victor A. Bolden referred Mr. Hilaire‘s case to me, United States Magistrate Judge Thomas O. Farrish, to conduct these inquiries.14 I have thoroughly
In the second step of the analysis, I recommend that the complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Mr. Hilaire asserts that TransUnion violated the FCRA, but he has not explained how or why the information in his credit report was inaccurate. And while he asserts that TransUnion violated CUTPA, he has not plausibly explained how he suffered an “ascertainable loss” from the alleged violation. To be sure, no plaintiff—least of all a pro se plaintiff like Mr. Hilaire—is required to plead all the facts available to him, just to get his complaint off the ground.15 But “even a pro se plaintiff must plead a plausible claim.”16 As Judge Spector explained to him in another one of his cases,17 and as I will explain again in Section III below, Mr. Hilaire‘s omissions render his complaint subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. I further recommend, however, that the dismissal be without prejudice to an amended complaint.
The following factual allegations are taken from Mr. Hilaire‘s complaint,18 and from the exhibits he supplied along with it.19 On August 7, 2025, Mr. Hilaire obtained a “consumer report” from SmartCredit.com.20 The report “reflected multiple tradelines being published by . . . TransUnion[,]” “includ[ing] . . . American Express, Apple Card/Goldman Sachs Bank USA, Navy Federal Credit Union, Nationstar Mortgage, and First Tech Federal Credit Union.”21
On December 13, 2025, Mr. Hilaire submitted a dispute through TransUnion‘s online dispute system.22 In his complaint in this case, he says that his “dispute . . . challenged the accuracy” of his credit report,23 but the actual dispute communication did not explain how any of the information in the report was factually incorrect or misleading.24 Instead, Mr. Hilaire alleged that his creditors never notified him of his “Opt Out” and other rights under the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act,
This case arises from Mr. Hilaire‘s dissatisfaction with TransUnion‘s response to this communication. Mr. Hilaire says that the company merely “issued a determination that the disputed tradelines were ‘verified’ and would remain on [his] credit file.”28 It did not supply him with “documentation, explanation, or procedures demonstrating how the disputed information was verified.”29 Dissatisfied, he then “submitted a request for the method of verification, seeking disclosure of the procedures used to determine the accuracy and completeness of the disputed information[,]” including “identification of the [credit] furnishers contacted, the procedures used, and the documentation relied upon in connection with Trans Union‘s verification.”30 TransUnion answered with “non-responsive communications, including statements that the accounts were ‘previously verified,’ without providing any description of the procedures used to verify the disputed information[,]”31 and it summarily closed its complaint file on January 21, 2026.32
Contemporaneously with his complaint, Mr. Hilaire moved for leave to proceed IFP.41 Judge Bolden then referred the case to me for a ruling on the IFP application and an initial review of the complaint under
II. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION
This is not the first IFP motion that I have reviewed from Mr. Hilaire. Judge Bolden referred an earlier case, Hilaire v. Cohen, Burns, Hard & Paul, LLC (”Cohen“), to me for review of the IFP motion and initial review of the complaint under Section 1915.43 I then issued a recommended ruling, explaining why the IFP motion should not be granted on the record that was before me in that case.44 Because the IFP application in this case is virtually identical to the
As I explained to Mr. Hilaire in Cohen, when a plaintiff files a complaint in federal court, typically he must pay filing and administrative fees totaling $405.00.46 District courts may nevertheless authorize commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees . . . by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement . . . that the person is unable to pay such fees.”47 When a court allows a plaintiff to proceed this way, he is said to be proceeding ”in forma pauperis,” which is a Latin phrase meaning “in the manner of a pauper” or poor person.48
To qualify as “unable to pay,” the plaintiff does not have to demonstrate absolute destitution, but he does need to show that “paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship.”49 The United States Supreme Court has said that a plaintiff makes a “sufficient” showing of inability to pay when his application demonstrates that he “cannot because of his poverty pay or give
In this case, Mr. Hilaire filed an application on the standard District of Connecticut form, but his answers to the form‘s questions are rife with cagy qualifications that leave the reader unsure of his true financial picture.51 Take, for example, his answers to the questions in Sections A and B—the questions about his income and assets. When asked to state his income, he said only that his “[l]ast non-employee compensation was for $650 on 1/27/2026,”52 leaving the reader to wonder whether other forms of income have been omitted. When asked whether he owned any real property, he said only that he did ”not own any income producing real property.”53 And when asked to identify his assets, he says that he “maintains no funds in a bank account,” but he does not say whether he has other types of accounts, e.g., brokerage, cryptocurrency, etc.54
The lack of clarity continues in Section C, the section in which Mr. Hilaire was asked about his monthly obligations. He claims to spend $1,200.00 each month on rent, and to have no mortgage, leading the reader to believe that he is a renter rather than a homeowner.55 But he then says that he has dispute over an alleged $120,000.00 debt to U.S. Bank Trust,56 and in a two-page attachment to his form application, he adds that he “lives in the property that is the subject to a pending federal dispute“—all of which suggests he was a homeowner at the time of his application,
As noted in the introduction, Mr. Hilaire has filed ten federal cases in the last ten months, and his filings in other cases shed light on these qualifications. In Hilaire v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Mr. Hilaire explained that he does not believe himself to be a “person,” because a federal appellate court allegedly held that “[a] ‘person’ is ‘a variety of entities other than human beings.‘”62 Citing
There are other reasons to question whether Mr. Hilaire has been completely candid about his financial picture. To begin with, at the time he filed his motion, his trust was the record owner of the house in which he lived, yet he did not disclose it. The Bridgeport assessor‘s office appraised the value of the home at $301,896.00.66 Moreover, he claimed to be essentially penniless in the
Finally and more fundamentally, Mr. Hilaire‘s application makes no sense. No one can live for very long on no income, no assets, and no savings. And when an IFP applicant claims to do just that, courts typically conclude that his application “must be incomplete and, by extension, do[es] not support in forma pauperis status.”71 Here, Mr. Hilaire has been claiming to live on no income, no liquid assets, and no more than $150.00 in savings for nearly a year and a half.72 “The question of whether a plaintiff qualifies for IFP status is one that lies ‘within the discretion of the district court,‘” and in exercising that discretion, courts are not required to accept such implausible
I recognize that Mr. Hilaire was granted leave to proceed IFP on an essentially identical application in five other cases.74 But I respectfully submit that the better course is to deny his motion as it is currently presented, and to advise him that, if he wishes to proceed without paying $405.00 in filing and administrative fees, he must fill out another application with the “particularity, definiteness and certainty” that the law requires.75 This would entail filing another application, the accuracy of which does not depend on fanciful theories about the definitions of “person,” “employee,” “income,” and so forth. Other IFP plaintiffs with questionable affidavits have been directed to better explain themselves,76 and Mr. Hilaire should do likewise.
III. REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
When a plaintiff neither pays the filing fee nor demonstrates that he is unable to do so, some courts dismiss his case for that reason alone—in other words, without proceeding to the
A. Applicable Legal Principles
IFP status “comes with a consequence.”79 The same statute that authorizes courts to grant IFP status to qualifying plaintiffs also directs them to review complaints to ensure that those plaintiffs are not abusing that status. Because IFP plaintiffs lack “an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious or repetitive lawsuits,” the statute instructs courts to review their complaints and dismiss certain types of obviously unmeritorious claims.80
Specifically,
The second circumstance is most relevant here, so I will discuss it in more detail. To “state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the plaintiff‘s complaint “must include enough factual allegations to add up to a legally meritorious claim, assuming that he could prove them.”85 Although detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must include sufficient facts to afford the defendant fair notice of the claims.86 Conclusory allegations are insufficient.87 Put differently, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”88 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”89
These and other pleading rules are applied liberally in favor of pro se plaintiffs like Mr. Hilaire—that is, people who bring lawsuits by themselves, without a lawyer. “Since most pro se plaintiffs lack familiarity with the formalities of pleading requirements,” courts must “construe pro se complaints liberally, applying a more flexible standard to evaluate their sufficiency than
“Still, even a pro se plaintiff must plead a plausible claim.”92 “Although courts still have an obligation to liberally construe a pro se complaint, the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to meet the standard of facial plausibility.”93 And while “courts are obligated to draw the most favorable inferences that a pro se plaintiff‘s complaint supports, they cannot invent factual allegations that he has not pled.”94
B. The Fair Credit Reporting Act95
In this case, Mr. Hilaire asserts six claims against TransUnion under the FCRA. The first four allege violations of
The first five claims—that is, the claims under Sections 1681i and -1681e(b)—all “have the same threshold requirement.”101 “A prerequisite for any FCRA claim is that the challenged credit information is incomplete or inaccurate.”102 “[A] credit entry may be ‘inaccurate’ within
In this case, Mr. Hilaire has not plausibly alleged facts that, if he were to prove them later in the case, would show that TransUnion‘s credit report was “patently incorrect” or “misleading[.]” He does not allege, for example, that TransUnion reported that he had taken out credit with a creditor when he had not; that it reported that he had failed to make payments that he had, in fact, made; or any of the other, paradigmatic examples of inaccurate reporting. Rather, his “challenge[ to] the accuracy” of TransUnion‘s report is essentially a legal argument. He reasons that, because his creditors allegedly never complied with GLBA or obtained his consent under RFPA to report him to credit agencies, any debts he might have otherwise owed them were invalid,106 and that any
Mr. Hilaire‘s sixth FCRA claim—that is, his claim under Section 1681b—is likewise subject to dismissal, though for somewhat different reasons. Whereas Sections 1681i and 1681e(b) implicate the procedures that reporting agencies use to prepare credit reports and to respond to disputes about their accuracy, Section 1681b governs the “permissible purposes” or “circumstances” under which a credit reporting agency like TransUnion can “furnish” even an accurate “consumer report” to third parties.109 But just like any other claim, a claim under Section 1681b must be plausibly pled, and even a pro se plaintiff must come forward with “facts suggesting the circumstances . . . under which [the credit reporting agency] actually furnished his report,” including “who received the report” and “why they received it.”110 Here, Mr. Hilaire‘s allegation boils down to a single, conclusory sentence: “Defendant reported and continued to publish the disputed tradelines without maintaining or producing procedures capable of verifying the accuracy and completeness of the information.”111 This is insufficient.
C. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
In his seventh claim for relief, Mr. Hilaire asserted a CUTPA claim.112 He alleged that TransUnion acted deceptively and unfairly when, among other things, it “[r]epresent[ed] that disputed information had been ‘verified’ without providing or possessing documentation or
Mr. Hilaire made substantially the same allegation against Experian.114 In analyzing whether that CUTPA claim should proceed, Judge Spector applied the liberal construction due to pro se pleadings and looked beyond the four corners of the complaint, into the accompanying exhibits.115 In that case, as in this one, Mr. Hilaire included his dispute letter in his exhibits—and that letter likewise asserted that his creditors had not complied with GLBA or RFPA, and that it was therefore unlawful of Experian to report those creditors’ tradelines.116 Judge Spector concluded that these allegations were sufficient to satisfy the first of the two required elements of a CUTPA claim—that is, that “the defendant engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce[.]”117 He then noted, however, that there was no plausible allegation supporting the second element of “an ascertainable loss of money or property[.]”118 Taking no position on the first prong, I conclude that the second prong is no more plausibly alleged
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, I first recommend that Mr. Hilaire‘s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied on the current record for the reasons stated in Section II, without prejudice to a renewed motion supported by a much more complete and careful application. Any such motion must (a) carefully identify all of Mr. Hilaire‘s income and assets, which shall include (but not be limited to) an explanation of the ownership of 85 Victory Avenue and the whereabouts of the proceeds of the April 2026 sale; (b) carefully identify the income and assets of any other person who provides him with support;119 (c) if his expenses exceed his income, candidly explain how he supports himself; and (d) be signed under penalty of perjury. If he would rather pay the filing fee than file another in forma pauperis motion, he may do so.
Next, I recommend that Mr. Hilaire‘s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim, for the reasons stated in Section III. I further recommend, however, that the dismissal be without prejudice. If my recommendation were to be accepted, that would mean that Mr. Hilaire could attempt to cure the defects in his pleading by filing an amended complaint. There may be no cure for these defects, but pro se plaintiffs are usually permitted at least one try.120
/s/ Thomas O. Farrish
Hon. Thomas O. Farrish
United States Magistrate Judge
Notes
Although I conclude that Mr. Hilaire‘s complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, I pause to observe that it may present jurisdictional issues as well. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, plaintiffs cannot launch lawsuits against credit reporting agencies solely by alleging that the agencies “failed to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files;” plaintiffs must also plead and prove “that they suffered a concrete harm.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 417 (2021). When a reporting agency mishandles a consumer‘s file, but the error causes no concrete harm, the consumer lacks “standing” to sue. And “[w]here a party lacks standing to bring a claim, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claim.” Zlotnick v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 583 F. Supp. 3d 387, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2022).
In this case, Mr. Hilarie claims to have “suffered injury in fact, including damage to credit reputation and creditworthiness, denial of credit, increased cost of credit, including higher down payment requirements for automobile financing, and other economic and non-economic harm.” (Complaint, Docket No. 1 at paras. 38, 47, 57, 67, 76, 86, 97.) He also claims that he will be able to prove $176,000 in damages at trial “for injuries suffered” as a result of the defendant‘s conduct. (Complaint, Docket No. 1, at p. 12.) But these are merely conclusory allegations, and some courts have found similar allegations to be insufficient to establish standing to sue. E.g., Zlotnick v. Equifax Information Services, LLC, 583 F. Supp. 3d 387, 391-92 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (dismissing FCRA claims because injury was insufficiently pled to establish standing to sue in federal court); Charles v. Verizon Communications, Inc., No. 25-CV-03234 (NRM) (AYS), 2025 WL 3042161, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2025) (same). If Mr. Hilaire opts to file an amended complaint, he will need to lay out in more detail how TransUnion‘s actions or inactions caused him actual injury.