Hikel v. KingHikel v. King
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Platt
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
PLATT, District Judge.This decision is issued in conjunction with the decision of the Court dated February 13, 1987.
Plaintiff, a State prisoner, brought this action pursuant to
Briefly stated, the facts alleged are as follows. At some point, plaintiff had been the victim of a shooting. Examinations Before Trial of Jacob Hikel, Jan. 4, 1985 (“Hikel EBT”) at 9-10. On the morning of April 5, 1984, plaintiff was taken from Long Island Correctional Facility to a New York State court to testify as a prosecution witness in the criminal trial of the alleged gunman.
Id.
at 10. Plaintiff took with him two pieces of paper. One was a document from plaintiff’s own convicting court indicating his conviction and the sentence he was serving.
Id.
at 10-11. The other was a summary, written by plaintiff, of the testimony he planned to give at the criminal trial, which he intended to show the prosecutor.
Id.
at 11. That evening, when plaintiff returned to the correctional facility, he was searched. One of the defend
Magistrate Jordan recommended that defendants’
Magistrate Jordan also recommended that defendants’
On December 10, 1985, defendants submitted objections to the Magistrate’s report, specifically addressing his conclusions with respect to plaintiff’s claim based on destruction of the documents. On February 9, 1987, after a lengthy hiatus to enable plaintiff to obtain court-appointed counsel, plaintiff, by his newly obtained attorney, filed an objection addressing the Magistrate’s recommendation concerning the claim of physical assault and defendants’ arguments concerning the destruction iof the documents. The objection included an affidavit by plaintiff alleging facts with respect to the physical assault claim.
By Memorandum and Order dated February 13, 1987, this Court concluded that plaintiff’s affidavit filed with his objection was sufficient to raise material issues of fact with respect to the physical assault claim and accordingly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on that ground. The opinion did not address the other parts of the motion. On February 24,1987, defendants submitted a memorandum of law arguing that plaintiff’s affidavit did not raise sufficient issues of fact to survive a
A review of defendants’ memorandum, however, does not convince the Court that its decision of February 13 was in error. The Court now addresses the remaining portion of the
The Court adopts the recommendation of Magistrate Jordan with respect to plaintiff‘s claims for verbal harassment and destruction of plaintiff’s photographs, and with respect to defendants’ Eleventh Amendment motion. Since plaintiff’s objection and affidavit fail to address the claim for denial of medical care, the Court adopts the Magistrate’s recommendation with respect to that claim also.
The Court disagrees, however, with the Magistrate’s recommendation concerning plaintiff’s claim arising out of the destruction of the documents. Because the Court believed it necessary to look beyond the pleadings with respect to this claim, the Court notified the parties, by letter dated March 27, 1987, that it intended to convert defendants’
Having recited the lengthy procedural history of this case, we now turn to the merits of the claim based on the de
Whether an allegation of destruction of property asserts a violation of due process, and hence falls under the rule of Hudson and Parratt, or states a claim under the‘substantive right of access to the courts does not turn on a mere technical labeling of the destroyed property as “legal” but rather on whether the destruction of the material could have interfered with plaintiff’s right of access. Put another way, whether property should be classified as “legal” depends on whether it could have advanced plaintiff’s access to the courts.
A prisoner’s right of access to the courts includes the right to seek appellate review and collateral attack of his criminal conviction, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1495, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), the right to challenge the conditions of confinement through civil rights actions, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978, 92 S.Ct. 1190, 31 L.Ed.2d 254 (1972), and even the right to bring an ordinary civil case, see Hawthorne v. Wells, 761 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir.1985).
In the present case, plaintiff has failed to show how the destruction of the documents could have impeded any suit that he had or could have brought. It appears that the documents allegedly destroyed related to plaintiff’s testimony as the victim in the criminal case against another person. Any claim based on plaintiff’s ability to testify in that case is negated by the fact that the documents were allegedly destroyed after plaintiff testified. Hikel EBT at 10-12.
Plaintiff argues that the question of whether defendants’ conduct interfered with his right of access to the courts is a triable issue of fact. That interference is, however, what distinguishes a cognizable claim for the destruction of legal material from a noncognizable claim for destruction of personal property. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment, when the claim is for destruction of property, plaintiff must allege how defendant’s conduct interfered with his right of access to the courts. See, e.g., Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 345-46 (2d Cir.1987) (plaintiff alleged that destruction of his notes, research material, drafts and appellate briefs caused him irreparable harm in perfecting his appeal); Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139-40 (2d Cir.1986) (interference with correspondence between prisoner and his attorney).
Since plaintiff has failed to allege how the destruction of the documents deprived him of his right of access to the courts, the destruction of the documents merely provides the basis for a claim for deprivation of personal property without due process of law, which falls under the rule of Hudson and Parratt. The New York Court of Claims Act provides a State remedy whereby a plaintiff may seek compensation from the State for his destroyed property. Tigner v. State of New York, 559 F.Supp. 25, 27 (W.D.N.Y.1983), aff‘d, 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir.1983) (mem.).
Accordingly, defendants’ motion based on the Eleventh Amendment is denied. Defendants’ other motions with respect to plaintiff’s claims for verbal harassment, deprivation of property, and denial of medical care are granted and those claims are dismissed. As stated in the Court’s order
SO ORDERED.
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendants have moved for summary judgment. This case clearly presents material issues of fact. Accordingly, defendants’ motion must be and hereby is denied.
SO ORDERED.