5 Johns. Ch. 184 | New York Court of Chancery | 1821
This is a demurrer to the whole bill, and there are two causes of demurrer assigned, (1.) That the plaintiffs claim to be seized in fee of the premises, and therefore the matter is properly and exclusively cognizable at law. (2<) That the bill contains no matter of equity.
Perhaps it would be sufficient to dispose of the demurrer, by referring to the rule, (Laight v. Morgan, 1 Johns. Cases, 429.) that if a demurrer be general to the whole bill, and be bad, in part, it must be overruled. If it be good for discovery, and not for relief, a general demurrer to the whole bill is bad. The defendants should in such a case give the the discovery, and demur to the relief; and this rule was so settled, in the case referred to, in the Court of Errors. I cannot sée any doubt, in this case, of the right of the plaintiffs to a discovery concerning the deeds charged in the bill to have been lost, and concerning their contents.
But the bill appears to me to state several distinct and sufficient heads of equity jurisdiction.
The allegations in the bill on which so much stress has been laid by the counsel for the defendants, that the plain
The bill also states facts, from which we are to infer, that Vredenbergh and his heirs, the present defendants, are equitably estopped from asserting any claim to a reversionary interest in the land. It is charged, that V. after the death of Carpenter for 13 years, stood by and saw great and costly improvements made upon the land, by persons claiming, and believing themselves to be owners in fee, under Carpenter, and never interposed any pretension of right or title. It appears from the cases referred to in Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, (1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 354.) that though the right of the party, who thus misleads third persons by his silence, be merely a reversionary interest, and subject to a life estate, in the very person whom he suffers to deal with the property as absolute owner, the rule of equity still applies, that he never shall be permitted to exercise bis legal title against such person. He is bound, and all persons claiming under him, are bound, by his silence. This case is much stronger than ordinary ones of the kind; for here the silence was maintained for thirteen years, after the assumed life interest of Carpenter had terminated. If Carpenter was bound to know the duration of his title, those who succeeded to the estate, after his death, were certainly encouraged and misled by the studied silence or express admissions of Vredenbergh ; and the case as stated, presents one of the strongest claims for the assistance of this Court against the assertion of a title under him by his heirs. It is to be traced up to imposition and fraud.
The demurrer must, therefore, be overruled with costs, and the defendant ordered to answer.
Order accordingly.