116 F. 852 | 8th Cir. | 1902
after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The difference between causes of action at law and in equity is matter of substance, and not of form. In the national courts the in
The parties to this action framed their pleadings and argued this case in utter disregard of the long established rule to which we have adverted. The plaintiff pleaded a perfect cause of action in ejectment, and prayed for possession of the premises' and an injunction against their continued use by the defendant. The defendant, by its answer, admitted that it had unlawfully entered upon the premises in dispute, and denied nothing essential to the maintenance of the plaintiff’s action but his ownership of the property. Plaintiff proved his title, and rested. Defendant then offered to prove the value of the strip of land on which its tramway rested. The court refused to permit it to do so, and instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. The judgment upon that verdict is presented for our consideration by writ of erro'r. If the pleadings in this action had been carefully examined at the opening of the trial, a grave doubt might have arisen whether this was an action at law or a suit in equity. But the subsequent proceedings of the parties have settled that question. One who consents to the hearing in equity of a legal cause of action, or to ,the trial of an equitable cause of action at law, is thereby estopped from successfully objecting for the first time in an appellate court to the method of trial which he adopted. Schoolfield v. Rhodes, 27 C. C. A. 95, 99, 82 Fed. 153, 157; Hooven, Owens & Rentschler Co. v. John Featherstone’s Sons, 111 Fed. 81, 86, 49 C. C. A. 229, 234; Preteca v. Land Grant Co., 1 C. C. A. 607, 50 Fed. 674; Railway Co. v. Harris, 12 C. C. A. 598, 601, 63 Fed. 800, 803; Railway Co. v. Phillips, 13 C. C. A. 315, 319, 66 Fed. 35, 40; Tyler v. Savage, 143 U. S. 79, 12 Sup. Ct. 340, 36 L. Ed. 82; Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U. S. 354, 395, 9 Sup. Ct. 486, 32 L. Ed. 934; Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 512, 13 Sup. Ct. 148, 36 L. Ed. 1059; Hollins v. Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113. The defendant consented to the trial of its case at law and by a jury, and it is now too late for it to claim that this was a suit in equity. Moreover, it has brought the case to this court by a writ of error, and not by an
A writ of error challenges the rulings of the trial court upon questions of law, and those rulings only. The only complaint of the action of the court below is that it refused to permit the defendant to prove the value of the strip of land occupied by the tramway, and that it instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff. The admissions of the answer and the patent which the plaintiff offered in evidence conclusively established his right to1 the possession of the premises in the absence of countervailing evidence. Counsel for the defendant invoke the rule that, where the owner of land has knowingly permitted a corporation that is entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain to construct and put in operation its railway, tramway, or other, improvement upon his property, he is thereby estopped from recovering possession of the property occupied, and is restricted to his judgment for just compensation. Buckwalter v. Railway Co. (Kan.) 67 Pac. 831, 832, and cases there cited. Conceding, without deciding, the soundness of this rule, and its applicability to the case at bar, there are two insuperable objections to a reversal of this judgment on its account. In the first place, the estoppel upon which counsel relies is an equitable, and not a legal, one. It is not an estoppel of record, but an estoppel in pais. The defense which he founds upon it is not a defense at law, but a defense in equity; and an equitable defense, as we have seen, is not available in the federal courts in an action at law. The remedy of the defendant is a bill in equity to restrain the action at law until the equities of the defendant can bé considered. In Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. 436, 10 L. Ed. 235, which was an action of ejectment in which equitable titles were pleaded in defense, the supreme court said: “The equity side of the circuit court is the proper forum, and a bill the proper remedy, to investigate the equities of the parties.” And in Foster v. Mora, 98 U. S. 425, 428, 25 L. Ed. 191, that court declared: “In actions of ejectment in the United States courts the strict legal title prevails. If there are equities
There was no error in the trial of this case, and the judgment below is affirmed.