Highgate Pictures, Inc. v. De PaulHighgate Pictures, Inc. v. De Paul
OPINION OF THE COURT
Plaintiff Highgate Pictures, Inc., a New York corporation, and defendant Judith De Paul, an American citizen residing in London, and her corporation, Silver Chalice Production International, Ltd. (a Bermuda corporation), entered into a contract, dated September 24, 1986, under which the defendant and her corporation would render production services for a proposed five-hour miniseries entitled "Queenie”. These services were to be performed in England and France, where financing was to be obtained, and India or Sri Lanka, where it was contemplated the project would be shot. By its terms, the contract was to be governed by California law. Negotiations leading to this contract had been held in New York in 1985 and, after a hiatus of many months, negotiations resumed in
Plaintiff allegedly paid defendant $118,500 in fees and advanced her approximately $500,000 in trust, for use in the project. Such moneys were seized by an English bank in connection with unrelated debts of defendant (or one of her corporations) after she failed to segregate such trust funds.
Plaintiff commenced an action in the Federal court (US Dist Ct, SD NY) against defendant and three of her corporations. The plaintiff voluntarily discontinued that Federal court action against her and the Federal court, in May 1987, found that the corporate defendants had not transacted business in New York, that the contract had been negotiated in all significant aspects in California and was to be performed outside New York, and that the alleged breach of contract and tortious activities occurred outside New York. The Federal court granted plaintiff’s request to transfer the Federal action against the corporate defendants to the Central District of California. An appeal by plaintiff from a sua sponte dismissal of that action for failure to prosecute is now pending.
After the individual defendant, Judith De Paul, moved back to New York, plaintiff commenced this action against her alone, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking an accounting and imposition of a constructive trust.
The IAS court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, finding the action had little connection with New York, the contract having been for the most part negotiated in California, executed in California, governed by California law and that alleged breaches and torts occurred in London and India.
The IAS court denied plaintiff’s motion to reargue and renew. The court adhered to its prior view that the fact that the two parties were New York residents did not warrant retaining jurisdiction over this action having no substantial nexus to New York.
In dismissing the action outright and with prejudice, the IAS court, on the one hand, minimized the importance of the availability of an alternative forum for plaintiff, while, on the other hand, it exaggerated the burden placed on the New York courts by this action.
The availability of an alternative forum for plaintiff, although no longer controlling, remains one of the primary
Thus, the IAS court, at the very least, abused its discretion in not conditioning the grant of the motion on a stipulation by defendant to waive any Statute of Limitations defense and to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the California courts (or those of Great Britain).
We find, however, that the most equitable and convenient forum, under the circumstances presented to us, would be New York.
A defendant has a heavy burden in attempting to establish that New York is an inappropriate forum before plaintiffs choice of forum is disturbed (Bata v Bata,
The Federal litigation against corporate defendants was
Since we are not limited to deciding that the nisi prius court abused its discretion, but may exercise such discretion independently (see, Broida v Bancroft,
Accordingly, the appeal from the order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered November 15, 1988, which, inter alia, granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Order of the Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered April 17, 1989, denying plaintiffs motion to reargue and renew, should be reversed, on the law and facts, and in the exercise of discretion, without costs or disbursements, plaintiffs motion to renew granted, and upon renewal, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
Kupferman, J. P., Carro, Kassal and Rosenberger, JJ., concur.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on April 17, 1989, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, and in the exercise of discretion, without costs and without disbursements, plaintiffs motion to renew granted, and upon renewal, defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to