This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Allen County granting the motion of Patricia A. High (now Patricia Bassett) requesting that defendant Nick Steven High be ordered to post a cash bond with the court for the purpose of securing future child support payments.
Patricia A. High (“appellee”) and Nick Steven High (“appellant”) were divorced on February 10,1988. The court’s judgment entry of divorce awarded custody of the parties’ three minor children to appellee and ordered appellant to pay child support in the amount of $78 per child, per week. Support was to be paid pursuant to a wage withholding order through appellant’s employer, a corporation of which appellant was the sole stockholder and CEO.
On August 20, 1991, appellee, represented by the Allen County Child Support Enforcement Agency, filed a “Motion for Contempt” and a “Motion Requesting Cash Bond to Secure Child Support,” supported by allegations that appellant was delinquent and sporadic in his payment of child support. A hearing on the motions was held before a referee on October 4, 1991.
The referee’s report was issued on October 31, 1991. Appellant’s objections to the referee’s report were timely filed. The court issued an order overruling appellant’s objections, and filed its final judgment entry on January 9, 1992. Upon recommendation of the domestic relations referee, the court found that appellant was not in contempt for his failure to timely pay child support, issued a new wage-withholding order, and ordered appellant to post a security bond of $1,000. Appeal has been taken from the judgment entry ordering the posting of bond. Appellant has asserted the following assignment of error:
“The court committed prejudicial error to the harm of the defendant-appellant by ordering the defendant-appellant to post a bond to secure the payment of future child support. Such an order constitutes an abuse of discretion, error at law, and a judgment contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.”
*427 To determine whether a trial court’s findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must essentially review the proceedings de novo, relying upon the evidence and testimony which were available to the court. Civ.R. 53(E)(6) delineates the submissions required for the trial court to consider objections to a referee’s factual findings:
“The court may adopt any finding of fact in the referee’s report without further consideration unless the party who objects to that finding supports that objection with a copy of all relevant portions of the transcript from the referee’s hearing or an affidavit about evidence submitted to the referee if no transcript is available.”
Although appellant herein timely objected to the report of the referee, he did not request or submit a transcript of the motion hearing or an affidavit setting forth the relevant testimony. See
In re Swain
(1991),
Appellant argues that the court’s order requiring appellant to post a bond of $1,000 as security for the payment of future child support is in derogation of R.C. 3113.21(D)(6), which prohibits the court from ordering an obligor to post a bond “unless the court determines that the obligor has the ability to do so.” Appellant cites the failure of the court to make a specific “finding [on the record] that there exists an ability to pay,” contending that “such an affirmative finding is necessary in the face of the mandatory nature of the section.” We do not agree with appellant’s contention that the language of the statute mandates an explicit “finding on the record” of the obligor’s “ability to pay.” Rather, we conclude that the findings and conditions imposed in the order to post bond make it clear that “the court determined] that the obligor has the ability to do so.” See id.
*428 A bond is ordered under R.C. 3113.21 if it has become evident to the court that other methods of enforcing an obligation to pay support would not be effective. A review of the record reveals that appellant became delinquent in his child support payments, thus violating the wage withholding order issued in the parties’ previous divorce, due to his failure to issue himself a paycheck from his corporate earnings for a number of months. 1 However, the court found that appellant’s delinquency was not due to “willful” failure, but was a consequence of a failing economy. The court further found that, although appellant did not have the money to immediately post the ordered bond, he was in the process of selling certain assets of his business in order to satisfy his debts. Therefore, the court provided that the bond be paid within two months of the order. Furthermore, pursuant to R.C. 3113.21, the court, in its order for the payment of a bond, notified appellant that he may request a cancellation of the bond order when he obtains employment or recommences the drawing of a salary from his corporation to comply with the wage withholding order.
We may only find that the trial court abused its discretion if it is determined that the court’s actions were clearly “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”
Blakemore v. Blakemore
(1983),
Having found no error in the trial court prejudicial to appellant herein, in the particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.