280 F. 525 | D.C. Cir. | 1922
Associate Justice. Appellant, defendant below, guaranteed the payment of her husband’s indebtedness to appellee, a
Appellant relies upon a statute of this District which provides:
“All the property, real, personal, and mixed, belonging to a woman at the time of her marriage, and all such, property which she may acquire or receive after her marriage from any person whomsoever, by purchase, gift, grant, devise, bequest, descent, in the course of distribution, by her own skill, labor, or personal exertions, or as proceeds of a judgment at law or decree in equity, or in any other manner, shall be her own property as absolutely as if she were unmarried, and shall be protected from the debts of the husband and shall not in any way be liable for the payment thereof.” Code D. C. § 1151.
Chief Justice Marshall, affirming the rule- announced in Mills v. Duryee, 7 Cranch, 481, 3 L. Ed. 411, interpreting the full faith and credit clause of the,Constitution (article 4, § 1), and the statute enacted in pursuance théreof (R. S. § 905 [Comp. St. § 1519]), said:
“The doctrine there held was that the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced, and that whatever pleas would be good to a suit thereon in such state, and none others, could be pleaded in any other court of the United States.” Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234, 4 L. Ed. 378.
It is clear that the inhibition of the statute of the District of Columbia could not have been pleaded in the Maryland court, since the guaranty of the wife for the payment of her husband’s debts created a valid obligation, not only in Maryland, but in Illinois, where the obligation was incurred. The rule announced in the Hampton Case has been consistently followed by the courts of this country and was quoted with approval in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 236, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039.
The obligation to accord full faith and credit to a valid judgment,, other than for lack of jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter, or for the enforcement of a penalty, is without limitation. As was said by Chief Justice White in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867, 5 Ann. Cas. 1:
“The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by states to the judicial decrees of other states. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one state is embraced by the full faith and credit clause, that constitutional provision commands that the other states shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the state where rendered. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317.”
“The case was not within the words of article 4, § 1, and, if it had been, still it, would not have and could not have decided anything relevant to the question before us. It is true that language was used which has been treated as meaning that the original claim upon which a judgment is based may be looked into further than Chief Justice Marshall supposed. But evidently it meant only to justify the conclusion reached upon the specific point decided, for the proviso was inserted that a court ‘cannot go behind the judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim.’ 127 U. S. 298. However, the whole passage was only a dictum, and it is not worth while to spend much time upon it.”
This case presents nothing novel. The mere fact that the cause of action in Maryland would not have supported a judgment in this District is beside the case. We may not go behind the Maryland judgment for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim upon which it was based. Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., supra. The certified transcript of the Maryland judgment may be examined here to determihe whether that court had jurisdiction of the parties and of
The. enforcement.' of the judgment of a sister 'state, based upon a claim invalid and unenforceable in the state where enforcement of the judgment is sought, is not new. A judgment in Louisiana against co-partners, with service upon only one of the partners, was held enforceable in New Hampshire, though, a judgment upon such service would have been void in that state. Renaud v. Abbott, 116 U. S. 277, 6 Sup. Ct. 1194, 29 L. Ed. 629. A stockholder of a Kansas corporation was sued in Rhode Island upon a Kansas judgment against the corporation. In Kansas the judgment against the corporation ran also against the stockholder, but this was not the law in Rhode Island. The judgment, however, was held enforceable in the courts of Rhode Island. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 Sup. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619. In Fauntleroy v. Lum, supra, an action was brought upon a Missouri judgment in a court of Mississippi, the defendant pleaded that the original cause of action arose in Mississippi upon a gambling transaction in cotton futures, where the controversy was submitted to arbitrators, the illegality of the transaction not being included in the submission, and an award was rendered against the. defendant. Defendant being found in Missouri, suit was brought upon the award, and the court, refusing to allow the defendant to show that the transaction was illegal and void under the laws of Mississippi, directed a verdict, leaving to the jury only the question whether the submission and award were made. The Mississippi court refused to enforce the Missouri judgment, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed.
It follows, from .the foregoing summary of the law, that, with complete jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties, a judgment shall -be accorded, the same faith and credit in every court within the United States .'as it-has by the law and usage of the courts in the state or territory where it was originally rendered; and this is true, though the cause of action upon which the judgment is based is against the law and public, policy of the state or territory in which enforcement is sought.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs.