182 Ga. 595 | Ga. | 1936
Lead Opinion
F. C. Hicks, a former employee of the Louisville & Nashville Eailroad Company, recovered a verdict against the company for $9000. The action was brought under the Federal employer’s liability act. Defendant pleaded the defense of assumed risk, and in its motion for new trial contended that the evidence established this defense as a 'matter of law. The trial court refused to grant a new trial, and the defendant excepted. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment solely upon the ground that the evidence failed to support the verdict. The case is now before this court on the grant of a certiorari.
The defendant in certiorari insists that the case as presented to this court involves no question of gravity and importance, and should be dismissed upon the ground that the writ of certiorari was improvidently granted. After a careful examination of the record, we agree with this contention.
The Court of Appeals summarized the case as follows: “The evidence for the plaintiff showed that he had been in the employ of the defendant company for nearly twenty years, and that he, at the time he was injured, was employed as a fireman operating a train between Marietta, Georgia, and Ellijay; that while in the act of firing the engine on this particular trip, plaintiff observed that the coal feed stopped, and he took his coal-pick and dug into the coal and found a large lump. He attempted to burst the lump by striking it with a coal-pick, and in striking it a small particle flaked from the same and struck him in the left eye and caused the loss of his eyesight. It was pleaded and admitted that the following rule was in effect at the time: ‘Coal will be broken to the proper size for firing and will be kept within reach of the
In its decision the Court of Appeals said: “It cannot be doubted, under the evidence in this case, that the plaintiff was fully aware of the fact that coal at times contains slate, and that lumps of coal or slate, when struck by a pick, would probably burst and cause particles or fragments thereof to scatter in all directions. It is also in evidence that he took no precaution to avoid injury because of such fragments, and that he did not wear any goggles at any time to protect his eyes. The evidence discloses that he fully knew and understood that such was and would be the natural and probable result of striking a lump of coal or slate with a pick. It is fairly inferable that such an occurrence •was a frequent happening. Nevertheless this plaintiff in line of his duty, and even though the railroad company did not furnish to him coal that might be handled at all times with a shovel,' acted in the face of an obvious danger with full knowledge of its consequences; and for this reason the evidence failed to support the verdict, and it was error for the court to overrule the motion for new trial.” The petition alleged that this “ruling and decision” was erroneous, for the following reasons: “(a) That portion, to wit, ‘It is fairly inferable that such an occurrence was a frequent happening’ is erroneous and is assigned as error, for the reason
It is perfectly clear that these assignments of error do not involve any question of gravity and importance, so as to authorize a decision by this court on the merits. Hnder Rule 45 (formerly rule 2), the petition for certiorari “must specify the decision complained of and the alleged errors.” 'Code, § 24-4549. So far as the petition complies with this rule, it alleges only that the decision and various parts of it were unwarranted by the evidence. No ruling or decision by the Court of Appeals on any proposition of law is complained of; but the only question presented to this court is whether the verdict in favor of the plaintiff was supported by the evidence as against the defense of assumed risk. On principle, this case is identical with Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tomlin, 161 Ga. 749 (132 S. E. 90), where this court, after granting a certiorari and after argument, dismissed the writ as having been improvidently granted. That case was also brought under the Federal employer’s liability act, and involved assumed risk as the principal defense. A comparison of the assignments of error there presented will show that they were not less important from the standpoint of public interest than the assignments in the case now before us. The opinion in that case quoted from a number of
Writ of certiorari dismissed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I sincerely regret that I cannot concur in the opinion of my very learned associates. It is stated in the opinion of the majority that “On principle, this case is identical” with Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Tomlin, 161 Ga. 749 (supra). As I dissented in the Tomlin case, I am not bound by that decision, because it is only the decision of five Justices; and unless I have changed my views since that time, it would at least be consistent if I should dissent in the present case. The ruling of the majority in the present case is in effect (as will appear from reading the opinion) based upon the proposition that this court will not look into the evidence, or decide any question arising from the evidence, in a petition for certiorari; and it is to' this proposition that I dissent
There are several decisions of this court where a consideration of the evidence gave birth to a decision of the Supreme Court on petitions for the writ of certiorari. On certiorari to the Court of Appeals, in Thompson-Starrell Co. v. Johnson, 174 Ga. 656 (163 S. E. 745), Mr. Justice Hill, delivering the unanimous opinion of this court, said: “The findings of the industrial commission as to facts are conclusive where supported by evidence. The finding in this case was authorized.” In that case, as in this, the superior court affirmed the finding of facts, except that in the Thompson-Starrett case the facts were found by the industrial commission (now the Department of Industrial Eelations), and in the case now before us, by overruling a motion for a new trial, the judge affirmed the finding of facts by the jury. In the Thompson-Starrett case the judgment of the superior court was reversed, as in the case now before us, by the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. However, as the question with which I am now dealing is as to a consideration of the evidence upon adjudicating the merits of a petition for certiorari, and as I assert that in many cases the evidence should be considered, it is only necessary for me to quote what this court held in the Thompson-Starrett case: “We have examined carefully the evidence introduced before the industrial commission on the application of the defendant in error for compensation, and are of the opinion that the finding of the commission was authorized; and therefore the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment of the superior court which affirmed the finding of the industrial commission, must be reversed.” An examination of the record in the Thompson-Starrett case shows that every assignment of error in the petition for certiorari was based wholly upon the evidence, and complained, as in the present case, in effect, that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the evidence. The case concerned only the running of a truck by Thompson
In Independence Indemnity Co. v. Sprayberry, 171 Ga. 565 (156 S. E. 230), Mr. Presiding Justice Beck, said: “Upon a careful review of all the evidence introduced before the industrial commission hearing the application of the plaintiff in error, upon which they based their opinion and finding and upon which they held that the employee, the applicant, failed to carry 'the burden in this case/ and that 'the accident did not arise out of and in the course of her employment/ this court is of the opinion that this finding was not without evidence to support it, and that the commission was authorized, in view of the law which makes their finding on the facts conclusive, to disallow the employee’s claim for compensation; and the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing the judgment of the superior court affirming the findings of the industrial commission, must be reversed.” In DeKalb Supply Co. v. Moore, 162 Ga. 758 (134 S. E. 620), five Justices reached their conclusions upon a consideration of the evidence. Mr. Justice Gilbert dissented for the same reasons for which he dissented in Bryant v. Georgia Railway & Power Co., 162 Ga. 511 (134 S. E. 319), and was of the opinion that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed as improvidently granted. Four of the Justices held that “the trial court did not err in granting a nonsuit,” and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Justice Beck dissented from the ruling made by the four Justices, “being of the opinion that the jury under the evidence was authorized to find that the case as made in the declaration had been proved.” He also declined to decide whether a cause of action was stated, for the reason that there was no exception to the judgment overruling the demurrer. In Bryant v. Georgia Railway & Power Co., supra, Mr. Justice Hill, delivering the opinion of the majority of the court, held that “Under the pleadings and the evi
As appears from the opinion of the majority in the instant case, the applicant for certiorari assigned error on various excerpts from the opinion of the Court of Appeals. It therefore is unnecessary for me to reproduce them here. I think it will be obvious to