*1 535 S.E.2d Lamont HICKS Kevin v. Virginia.
COMMONWEALTH No. 1895-99-2. Record Virginia, Appeals Court of Chesapeake. 17, 2000.
Oct. *4 DesPortes; D. Benjamin, (Betty Benjamin Steven & Layne DesPortes, briefs), P.C., Richmond, appellant. on for (Mark Theisen, General,
Virginia Attorney B. L. Assistant General, brief), Earley, appellee. for Attorney HUMPHREYS, JJ., and and COLEMAN Present: OVERTON, Judge. Senior
HUMPHREYS, Judge. in a trial de novo conviction appeals Hicks his
Kevin Lamont court) (trial Hicks trespass. to the circuit court appeal 1) his motion denying court erred that the trial complains instructions court with general case to the district remand the court of that judge a different matter to be tried before for the the case Attorney prosecute for the and Commonwealth’s 2) his motion to forum; denying the trial court erred that process that his due grounds on the prosecution dismiss the 3) violated; and the tres- were rights First Amendment and and overbroad. unconstitutionally vague statute is passing follow, his convic- affirm and for the reasons disagree We tion. Background
I. 20, 1999, Hicks had been convicted January Previous February Court on property on the Whitcomb trespassing 1998, 10, 1998, 26, damaging and of respectively, June 27,1998. April there on by the Rich- housing project is a owned Whitcomb Court (“Authority”). Authority Redevelopment Housing mond ordinance, Richmond, city certain by deeded Street, to the the 2300 block of Bethel including closing privatizing Authority express purpose for the signs “No Trespassing” non-residents. them to traffic The Au- streets. privatized at intervals on the placed were to enforce Department Police thority authorized the Richmond including Whitcomb property, on its statute housing man- Rogers, April Mrs. Gloria Court. On notice on Court, a written personally served ager at Whitcomb from the Whitcomb him that he was banned advising Hicks if Hicks specifically This notice advised property. Court be would] caught premises, [he he were “seen receipt by acknowledged Hicks subject by police.” to arrest receiving after notice. On two occasions copy of the signing *5 notice, Rogers permission Hicks went to sought Mrs. property. Rogers to come back on the He told Mrs. that his mother lived there. His barment from the was not lifted. 20, 1999, January
On Officer James Laino Hicks observed walking in the 2300 block of Bethel Street. Laino Officer had personal knowledge that Hicks was the property barred from and had arrested him Hicks previously trespassing. told Laino he was bring pampers baby.” there “to for his Laino issued Hicks a summons for trespassing.
Hicks tried in district general trespassing was court on the April represented by summons on 1999. Hicks was coun- sel. No was on prosecutor present behalf of the Common- wealth. responded by
Officer Laino testified to questions court and was counsel for Hicks.1 cross-examined Hicks on Following then testified his own behalf. examina- direct tion, propounded questions the court counsel several to which objected. for Hicks Counsel for Hicks moved strike Hicks’ in totality.” “testimony granted The court this motion. The in defendant was convicted district court and noted general his appeal to the circuit court. court,
Prior to trial the circuit Hicks motion asking filed a court to trial in circuit remand the case for a new general court judge district before different and with di- Attorney repre- rection to the Commonwealth’s that his office sent new hearing the Commonwealth trial. At the motion, that, his Hicks granting asked alternative to his remand, motion circuit court the case be dismissed. The any grounds authority denied the' motion on the that it lacked to grant it. transcript general
1. The of the trial in the district identifies the court discrepancy Although witness as "Officer James Hannah.” is not record, fully explained appears actually in the that this it witness issued and testified the same Officer James Laino who the summons the circuit court. trial, prior charge Also Hicks moved to dismiss the ground Authority’s trespass policy violates the federal motion, and state constitutions. At a hearing on this Mrs. as to Rogers trespass policy testified at Whitcomb Court. *6 Through Rogers, flyer into introduced evidence which Authority gave to residents and which described the privatization of the streets the housing complex. flyer This Rogers stated and testimony confirmed her that non- residents who have not been barred from the and property who can demonstrate that they by have been invited a resi- dent are not by trespassing affected policy. Rogers also testified that open-air drug market in the area was the reason for much of the policy trespassers toward that it is usually a member of police department who gives the notice and warning. Rogers Mrs. that testified criminal acts premises, including those involving drugs or domestic violence, grounds were for barment. She further testified police were authorized to warn non-residents to leave if they could not demonstrate that they were by invited a resident and to bar them from returning. Addi- tionally, Rogers Mrs. indicated there was a process having a barment lifted submitting a written request through the Authority’s director housing operations. She also testified any organization that seeks to privatized use a street must get permission first requests to hold functions or pass out materials on privatized streets are referred to a “community council.” She testified that she had not denied permission anyone who sought pass had out flyers complex property. denied,
The motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds was and Hicks was subsequently tried de novo in a bench trial and of trespassing. convicted
II. Motion for Remand Hicks first argues that he was entitled to have case his general remanded to the district court for a new trial before another judge judge because the of that court presided who prosecu- the role of a improperly
over the initial trial assumed him. by “cross-examining” tor has held that Supreme Virginia long The Court of judge to a fair trial when a asks damage there is no inherent of a questions witness. on his [may] questions trial ask of a witness either judge
[A] practice examination chief or on cross-examination. Indeed, common there are perfectly permissible. it is his to do so. He is not to sit there and duty times when facts justice prove see a failure of on account of omissions witness, within the but the character plainly knowledge of his not be such as to disclose bias on his questions should the truthfulness of the witness. “For part, or to discredit which has not otherwise purpose eliciting evidence out, brought proper judge put been it is for the to a witness either on his examination chief or questions *7 cross-examination, anything material has on his and where omitted, a wit- duty been it is sometimes his to examine ness.” Commonwealth, 649, 655, 514, 142 128 S.E. 516
Mazer v. Va. (1925) (citations omitted). addition, court, in
In that “the trial we have held discretion, jurors to submit may permit exercise of its sound v. written to be asked of a witness.” Williams questions 153, Commonwealth, 577, 582, 155 24 484 S.E.2d Va.App. (1997). a in function of “[t]he We also noted Williams of all factual jury equitable is to assure a fair and resolution facts, of jury serves as the final arbiter issues. evidence, credibility of ‘charged weighing judging with 582, witnesses, in case.” Id. at reaching a verdict’ to the court belongs 484 at 155. This function no less S.E .2d not determine here serving when as the fact finder. We need judge’s questions court demon- general whether the district because the court prejudice strated an bias inappropriate as well as his questions motion to strike the granted Hicks’ answers. addition, in remedy provided any
In
defendant
criminal
who
error on the
of a trial court is
perceives
part
case
higher
to exercise the
the matter to a
tribunal.
right
appeal
courts,
In the
tried in the
context misdemeanors
district
to a trial de
in
Assembly
right
General
has established a
novo
A
hearing
the circuit court.2
de novo
means a trial anew. On
annulled,
in
appeal,
conviction
the district court is
and a new
trial is held
the circuit court.
Ledbetter v.
See
Common
(1994).
wealth,
805,
Va.App.
Hicks relies on the decision Supreme of the Court of the Monroeville, United States Ward v. Village 409 U.S. (1972), 93 S.Ct. authority L.Ed.2d 267 for his argument that a trial de novo does cure errors committed in a lower court. We find his reliance on misplaced. Ward is Ward, Supreme systemic Court addressed a problem provides § pertinent part: "Any appeal 2. Code 16.1-136 taken under provisions chapter of this appellate shall be heard de novo in the *8 and, pleadings writing; court and shall be tried without formal in ... by jury the accused shall be entitled to trial in the same if manner as he had been indicted for the in the offense circuit court.” 15.2-1627(B) provides part: § 3. pertinent attorney Code in "The for powers imposed upon the Commonwealth ... shall have the duties and law, warrants, by general including duty prosecuting him of all charging felony, may indictments or informations discretion, and he in his misdemeanors, prosecute any Class 2 and 3 or other violation, penalty the conviction of which carries a of confinement in more, jail, $500 aor fine of or or both....” in mayors’ bias inherent the infrastructure of local courts. There, courts, of in mayors villages judges sat as and a major portion village of income was derived from the collection of these fines. that such a the due finding scheme violates courts, process rights mayors’ of criminal defendants infirmity Justice Brennan noted that the constitutional grounded in the of separation powers doctrine.
Although power “the mere union of the executive and the judicial in him power process cannot be said to violate due law,” mayor’s the test is whether the situation is one possible temptation average “which would offer a to the man judge forget proof required as a the burden of to convict defendant, or which him might lead not to hold the nice, balance clear and true between the State and the Plainly temptation” may accused.” that also “possible exist mayor’s when the fi- responsibilities village executive may nances make him to maintain partisan high level mayor’s contribution from the court. (citations omitted).
Id. at
Hicks was with Code which any person without author- provides pertinent part “[i]f lands, or ity goes upon upon buildings of law or remains thereof, another, or after premises any portion area ... having having been forbidden to do so after been [or]
571 guilty ... shall be by sign signs posted to do so a forbidden 1 of a Class misdemeanor.” to come concedes that he had been forbidden
Hicks
so
Court
and admits he did
property
onto the Whitcomb
Furthermore,
apparently
he
notwithstanding his barment.
through
took
his barment
official channels
steps
appeal
no
that,
Instead,
argues
or the courts.
Hicks
Authority
of the street where he was
notwithstanding
privatization
cited, it
a
forum”
public property constituting
“public
was
Alabama,
of Marsh v.
501,
326 U.S.
66 S.Ct.
holding
under
(1946).
276,
First,
disagree.
Supreme
Hicks also argues
privatization
the street
trespassing
policy infringes
enforcement
on his freedom to
that,
previously
associate. We have
noted
although the First
association,”
Amendment does not explicitly protect
“right
a
the Supreme Court of the
States has recognized
United
such a
circumstances,
right in two
“intimate association”
“expres
Commonwealth,
sive association.” See Collins v.
Va.App.
443,
(1999).
The evidence in the record Hicks’ “intimate associa- tions” Whitcomb Court are his statement Laino Officer “bring[ing] pampers baby” he was to his his state- ment to Mrs. that his Rogers Assuming mother lived there. without deciding that this evidence constitutes a sufficient by the implicated to association is right that Hicks’ showing policy consider whether trespassing policy, we Authority’s intimate fa- with such unjustified interference constitutes an milial associations. noted, a reasonable policy serves already
As Court. of Whitcomb Hicks was not resident safety purpose. to the that Hicks was invited is no evidence before us There contains trespassing policy procedures complex. for a to come onto the permission guest to secure resident any is silent as to efforts but the record Authority’s property convict- previously Hicks was procedure. with such comply Any property. criminal acts committed on the repeated ed of with resi- intimately in Hicks’ associate right interference is limited to Court caused his barment dents of Whitcomb stated, which, Authority already though publicly owned, for First Amendment “non-public constitutes a forum” to the extent Hicks’ on these facts that purposes. We find *11 his to “inti- right from the interfered with property barment Court, such with residents of Whitcomb mate association” reasonable, justified. limited and interference was Trespass
IV. Statute uncon- trespassing statute as Finally, challenges Hicks further, unconstitutionally that it is stitutionally vague and note, however, attacks We that while he overbroad. his focus instead on grounds, arguments statute on these dual Authority’s policies. void-for-vague “A penal unconstitutionally statute is if not criminal offense with sufficient ness it does define the can understand what conduct ordinary people definiteness encourage not arbi a manner does prohibited v. Common enforcement.” Santillo discriminatory trary (1999) (cita wealth, 733, Va.App. 517 S.E.2d omitted). tion complex § no means or difficult
Code 18.2-119 is It ordinary comprehend. punishes for intelligence one of another upon upon those who enter or remain after having been forbidden to by posted do so or sign personal admonishment. We do not find this statute unconsti- tutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to Hicks.
We turn now to Hicks’ argument that the tres passing unconstitutionally statute is overbroad.
A may statute be if overbroad it “is one that is designed to punish burden or activities which are not constitutionally protected, but the statute includes scope within its activities which protected by are the First Amendment.” Over- breadth is doctrine dissipates whose reach when a statute proscribes primarily conduct speech. and not If a penal proscribes statute both conduct and speech, “the over- breadth of the statute must ... be substantial ... relation to plainly the statute’s legitimate sweep.” Commonwealth, Parker v. 681, 690, 24 Va.App. 485 S.E.2d (1997) (citations 150, 154-55 omitted).
“[T]here must be a realistic danger that the statute
itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amend
ment protections
parties
not before the court for [the
facially challenged
statute]
be
grounds.”
overbreadth
(citing City
Vincent,
Id.
Taxpayers
Council v.
466 U.S.
789, 800-01,
(1984)
2118, 2126,
104 S.Ct.
We do not find Code 18.2-119 to be overbroad. The legitimate purpose conduct, of the punish statute is to protected speech. It applies only on private non-public property. requires The statute prior given notice be to those implicated by its reach. We do not find that the statute imposes substantial on constitutionally protected burden *12 conduct nor do we find realistic any danger that the First rights Amendment not parties before the court will be significantly compromised. reasons,
For all of these we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed. dissenting, and COLEMAN, part, Judge, concurring, part. holds opinion which majority II of the
I with Part concur refusing to remand by not err circuit court did that the However, I with disagree court. general case to the district and Redevelopment that Richmond holdings majority’s (RRHA’s) and “tres- proceeding barment Authority’s Housing and the due First Amendment not violate the pass policy” do of the United Amendment clause of the Fourteenth process States Constitution. that the barment majority’s conclusion disagree
I with the case, statute, in this restrict applied trespass and procedure forum,” private consists of which “non-public in a conduct my In development. public housing streets and sidewalks are Court and sidewalks of Whitcomb the streets opinion, and, as large at by public to travel property open public any effort such, Accordingly, forum.” public are a “traditional protected constitutionally to control by City of Richmond strict pass must public in a traditional forum conduct procedure because the barment scrutiny my opinion, test. freely right on Hicks’ move infringed statute and forum,” the barment- a “traditional present and to be Fourteenth Amend- violates the First and trespass proceeding holdings. those I dissent from Accordingly, ments. of its Richmond, to make certain in an effort which autho- an ordinance passed “private” property, RRHA. After the streets were those streets to deeding
rized through- RRHA, signs posted were Trespass” “No deeded streets are Court, that the stating out Whitcomb However, gated, barri- the streets are private property. only to Whitcomb caded, or restricted or otherwise closed to vehicular traffic open The streets remain Court traffic. RRHA’s public. open are to access the sidewalks was to make of the streets “privatization” goal stated housing devel- from the by removing persons safer community drugs acts, involving particularly unlawful who commit opment for residents firearms; provide opportunity better *13 to community initiatives, develop safety such as resident patrols neighborhood watch; and to hold residents ac- countable for knowingly harboring criminals.
Although City the Richmond ordinance and conveying deed the streets and sidewalks to RRHA purport to make them private property, both specifically documents provide that the designated streets “shall be public highways for law en- forcement purposes Virginia accordance with Code Section 46.2-1307 ... City and that the shall retain a full right width way maintenance easement in the streets.” City After the “privatization” deed, executed the RRHA’s Director of Hous- ing signed a written “authorization” implementing the bar- proceedings. ment The authorization provided that “each and every Department Richmond Police officer [was to authorized] notice, serve either orally or in writing,” forbidding any person from returning to if person such could not demonstrate that he or she was a resident or employee, or that he or she was there for a legitimate business or social purpose. According to a printed brochure issued by RRHA to residents, the Whitcomb Court persons,” “unauthorized who subject are to the barment proceedings, are all non-residents who cannot they demonstrate that are premises “visit- ing lawfully resident, residing or on the development con- ducting legitimate business.” officer, police
The who decides person whether the is to be barred, determines whether the person is a tenant or is there at tenant, the invitation of a or whether the reason for being Thereafter, there is legitimate. person barred, once a is he or she is subject being prosecuted for being on the streets or sidewalks if Whitcomb Court even the person is subsequently there at the invitation of a tenant or there on Thus, legitimate business. to be barred from Whitcomb Court, one does not guilty have be crime Whitcomb Court or to anything rather, have done wrong, simply but one has to fail to fit within the category people who RRHA has deemed entitled be on the streets and sidewalks barred, housing development. Once person who whether, returns is a trespasser regard without on that occasion, legitimate he or she there on business subsequent is of a Whitcomb Court tenant. or at the invitation entitled, is in within constitu- required fact limits, so make its and sidewalks as to tional to control However, not, it may control crime thereon. them safe and to *14 streets, so sweep control on the in its endeavor to crime innocent or unduly that restricts or criminalizes broadly it Because officers have such police behavior. protected person, in a was on determining broad discretion whether who housing of was development, the streets and sidewalks “legiti- at the or was there for a there invitation tenant could, here, they the officers as did bar a purpose, mate” a property exercising constitutionally from for person public barred, to be person Once continues protected right. conviction, Hicks, as subject trespass barred and to a with though may she be at the subsequently even he or there legitimate invitation of or for purposes. general a tenant See Alabama, 1302, 1313, 84 S.Ct. ly NAACP v. 377 U.S. (1964). The that L.Ed.2d 325 evidence does indicate initially any Hicks was barred because he had committed act According unlawful in Whitcomb Court.4 the unrefuted counsel, from avowal of defense Hicks was barred Whitcomb he there to visit his moth- repeatedly Court because returned er, aunt, his mother of infant who live and the his two children barred, given After Hicks being Whitcomb Court. barment, of his for which he from signed, written notice housing manager Rogers. On the occasion for which Gloria charged trespass that is the subsequently Hicks was with of the subject appeal, walking this he was sidewalk of Bethel Street Court and was block Whitcomb child, lived to see that his who there with its purportedly there mother, diapers. received notes, private majority destroying Hicks
4. As the was convicted being barred there property in Court after he had been Whitcomb However, express a of a tenant. not as tenant or at the invitation private destroying property was irrelevant to the barment conviction for trespass proceeding or to Hicks' conviction. question presented The this is appeal whether the bar- RRHA, ment which proceeding adopted authorizes Rich- City police mond officers to do people banish who not fit within narrowly group coming a defined from upon Court, sidewalks Whitcomb and the statute as proceeding, used to enforce the barment violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The issue in answering critical question and, public whether the streets and sidewalks are such, forum,” public are “traditional they whether are and, “private” thereby, “non-public forum.” constitutionality of government regulation of its own property depends the character of upon at issue. For purposes analysis, First Amendment Court Supreme types has identified three of government- forum, owned the traditional property: public designat- forum, ed A nonpublic forum. traditional forum, such as a street or is one has as park, “a principal purpose ... the free A exchange ideas.” desig- forum is nated one which the government intentionally *15 the opens public expressive activity. to for Government limitations on expressive activity in tradition- designated al public public fora and fora to subject are strict scrutiny; they narrowly must be tailored to a compel- serve ling By state interest. contrast forum nonpublic “[a] ‘public property designation is not by which tradition or a ” public communication,’ forum for and limits on access to only such be need reasonable.... 546, (11th Cir.1994) City Tampa,
Daniel v. 38 F.3d 549 of (citations omitted). grounds buildings the and
Although public housing development “non-public are a forum” to designed provide residents, 550, housing safe for its public see id. at the streets and in private sidewalks Whitcomb Court are not do not lose a public merely their character as “traditional forum” an City passes because the ordinance and executes a deed private them to declaring property. be The streets and barricaded, gated, sidewalks have not been or closed a restricting public Although Trespass- manner travel. the “No
579 for the exclusive that the streets are signs street declare ing” business, on legitimate and those there use of the tenants as to serve the same function and sidewalks continue streets travelling public. equally before are accessible process by police have which previously approved We housing authority may designated agents as officers be housing on trespassing notices on persons serve barment Commonwealth, Va.App. see v. 30 authority property, Collins 449, (1999); v. 443, 277, Holland 517 S.E.2d 280 Common (1998). wealth, 67, 70-76, 502 S.E.2d 146-49 Va.App. Collins, In further that the barment notices prohibit- we held from ing coming upon housing authority proper- non-residents not association” ty “right protected do violate First or the clause of Fourteenth process Amendment due Collins, 450-53, 517 at Va.App. Amendment. See at S.E.2d those, However, distinguishes 280-82. what this case from found my opinion, guilty trespass is that Hicks was sidewalk, adjacent having gone upon Bethel Street and the Collins, whereas both Holland and the defendants were housing in the non-public grounds buildings authority. Daniel, holding in majority upon relies F.3d warning” “trespass
for its conclusion that the
after
restriction
to a
housing authority
placed upon
“non-public
had
access
my opinion,
forum” was reasonable.
Richmond
Ordi-
97-181-197,
deeding
city
nance No.
which authorizes
certain
in an
“privatize”
RRHA
effort
streets
to the
subject
Court and make them
Common-
Whitcomb
statute,
18.2-119,
not
§
did
make the
wealth’s
Code
any
thoroughfare
street
less a
street
and did
forum,”
in Daniel.
“non-public
make it a
the situation
*16
the mission of the
The Eleventh Circuit held
Daniel
residents,
to
for
housing authority
housing
safe
provide
place
to
“a
disseminate ideas.”
provide
not
non-residents
to
Thus,
a
buildings
grounds
non-public
and
were considered
to
determining
forum for
the extent
which
purposes
Amendment,
could,
reg-
with
First
government
consistent
activity
property.
ulate the
on the
See
However, the Daniel court was careful to out that the point Tampa “trespass after to warning” apply ordinance did and persons surrounding “streets sidewalks and inter- secting” 3, housing authority See id. at 548 n. property. n. 550 9. forum,
“A
public
traditional
such as a
or
one
park,
street
that has as ‘a
...
principal purpose
the free
exchange
”
at
(quoting
Legal
ideas.’
Id
549
Cornelius v. NAACP
Inc.,
Fund,
788, 800, 105
3439,
& Educ.
473 U.S.
S.Ct.
Defense
3448,
(1985)).
The fact that to title the streets is from a transferred municipal a government government agency which owns operates public housing development changes a in way no public nature and character of the streets sidewalks provide public part City. which access to to this of the See Alabama, v. Marsh 326 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed. (1946) (holding that privately owned streets and sidewalks in company-owned public town which are access are open traditional forums that public by are circumscribed First Amendment constitutional guarantees). cannot public private transform the streets Whitcomb Court into non-public by declaring them closed ordinance and conveying governmental entity they them another when public continue to serve the same as before. purpose Thus, City’s and RRHA’s effort to control conduct or street, city the lawful freedom of movement which is a forum,” by “privatizing” “traditional the street and must prohibiting using citizens from the streets and sidewalks scrutiny a strict test. order pass barment-trespass test, scrutiny satisfy the strict the enforcement policy
581
compelling
to serve a
narrowly
must be
tailored
procedure
to
interest,
housing
development
safe
the
providing
state
view,
privatization
RRHA’s
effort
my
the
residents.
that the
satisfy
requirement
the
procedure
barment
does
narrowly
the
procedure be
tailored because
barment-trespass
(1)
constitutionally protected right
procedure
infringes
from
to another
place
freedom to “remove
one
person’s
Fears,
270, 274,
inclination,”
179
v.
U.S.
to
Williams
according
(1900),
a
128, 129,
freely
and move
in
21
Perhaps, gated, phys- Street been ically public not free to restricted traffic where travel, communities, the be consid- gated as with street would But, in non-public public ered and not a “traditional forum.” no more my opinion, City can “close” streets thereby them open public, Court and leave Whitcomb forum,” than “non-public to make them a it could purporting all neighbor- “closed” Richmond’s troubled declare areas, all thereby denying access to hoods and residential their invitees those citizens the residents and except having neighborhoods. Neighbor- business legitimate Court, streets, are public such as those in Whitcomb hood streets, funds, public the use for and maintained with paid public. and benefit of the use of entity public property can restrict public
While for its using who are buildings those “non-public” purpose, building, intended such as an it office public property cannot restrict that is considered “traditional forum,” sidewalk, such as a street or that is being used in a lawful and for way a lawful purpose constitutionally Kokinda, 720, 727, protected. See United States v. 497 U.S. (1990) 110 S.Ct. 111 L.Ed.2d (holding *18 in of post sidewalk front office solely provide “constructed to passage the in is engaged postal individuals business” forum). Here, effect, non-public RRHA, and City attempting to convert the private streets sidewalks to property, attempting upon are confer RRHA same rights as a private property may everyone owner who restrict upon private from coming property owner’s except invitees, the owner’s tenants and tenants’ regard- less whether the invitees had anything done unlawful. fact, the City’s attempt control access to the through sidewalks barment-trespass proceeding exceeds right private of a landowner because under barment barred, once an proceeding, can longer invitee tenant no lawfully upon come the property. I conviction,
Accordingly, would reverse Hicks’ trespass because Richmond’s barment-trespass procedure, an effort drugs activity control and criminal a public and around housing unconstitutionally infringes citi- development, upon a zen’s First and rights lawfully Fourteenth Amendment congregate public place.5
5. Because I would reverse on failure of the to establish that procedure barment-trespass scrutiny requirements, meets the I strict do notice, barment-trespass procedure, .including not address whether the heard, opportunity appeals procedure, to be and an administrative procedural process requirements satisfies the due of the Fourteenth only majority vague Amendment. Because the addresses they procedure, overbroad issue relate to the statute I barment-trespass procedure vague decline to address whether the overbroad.