[]In 2009, appellant George Hickey was found guilty by a jury of rape, kidnapping, and first-degree terroristic threatening. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment. We affirmed. Hickey v. State,
|⅞⅛ an appeal from a circuit court’s denial of a petition under Rule 37.1, the question presented is whether, based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsеl’s performance was not ineffective under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
Thе Strickland standard is a two-prong test. When a convicted defendant complains of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must first show that counsel’s performance was deficient through a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteеd the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. Secondly, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires a showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Andrews v. State,
There is a strong presumption that counsel’s сonduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Noel v. State,
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(a) provides, “If the petition and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, the trial court shall make written findings to that effect, specifying any parts of the files, or records that are relied upon to sustain the court’s findings.” The trial court has discretion pursuant to Rule 37.3(a) to decide whether the files or records are sufficient to sustain the court’s findings without a hearing. Greene v. State,
I. Failure to Obtain and Present Testimony of a Medical Expert
Appellant first argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to consult with and elicit the testimony of a medical expert regarding the lack of appеllant’s DNA found on the victim. In his petition for postconviction relief, appellant alleged that a medical expert would have testified that appellant’s DNA was not found on the victim and to the probability of whether a perpetrator’s DNA evidence would be found on a victim after being vaginally аnd orally raped for hours, as the victim in the instant case testified. The circuit court found this allegation to be conclusory and denied relief. We agree.
|4The burden is entirely on the petitioner in a Rule 37.1 proceeding to provide facts that affirmatively support the claims of prejudice. Jonеs v. State,
As appellant failed to offer any evidence that his counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with and call as a witness a medical expert regarding the lack of DNA evidence on the victim and failed to establish that a reasonable probability еxisted that the outcome of the trial would have been dififerent had his counsel pursued the issue, he did not meet the standard under Strickland, for a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, the decision of whether to call particular witnesses is a matter of trial | fistrategy that is outside thе purview of Rule 37. Noel v. State,
II. Failure to Investigate
Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present to the jury the lack of physical evidence in his case. Specifically, appellant asserts that the prosecution relied solely on the victim’s testimony and that had defense counsel conducted a proper investigation, he could have presented to the jury a “reasonable explanation” for the lack of physical evidence.
In Flores, we explained the duty of trial counsel to investigate:
[T]rial counsel had a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, |r,a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. Strickland, supra. However, “when the appellant shows that defense counsel failed to exercise the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exhibit under similar circumstances, that presumptionmust fail.” Starr v. Lockhart, 23 F.3d 1280 (8th Cir.1994).
In his petition for postconviction relief, appellant contended that if the rape had occurred as the victim alleged, “[a]m-ple physical evidence would have been found” and that the outcome of the trial would hаve been different if defense counsel had properly investigated and presented the lack of physical evidence to the jury. However, as previously discussed, the jury was apprised of the evidence in the case, or lack thereof, as it pertained to DNA evidence. Further, apрellant fails to delineate the actual prejudice that arose as a result of the alleged ineffectiveness. As the jury was made aware that appellant’s DNA was not found on the victim; that Derrick Baker, who was present in appellant’s residence at the time of the rape, did not witness appellant having sex with the victim; and that Baker did witness appellant and the victim going into a separate room, but did not hear a commotion or any noises that would otherwise indicate that a rape was taking place, we cannot say that any additional investigation or presentation tо the jury regarding the lack of evidence would have changed the trial outcome. Thus, appellant did not meet the standard under Strickland for a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel on this claim. Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied relief on this claim without a hearing.
III. Failure to Present to the Jury a Timeline of Events
Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that defense 17counseI was ineffective in failing to develop and present to the jury a time-line of the incident. Specifically, appellant contends that establishing a timeline would have allowed the jury to take notice of the inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony; however, appellant does not specify which inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony would have been revealed had a timeline of events been presented to the jury. Nor does appellant affirmatively prove that his defense was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present to the jury a timeline of the incident.
Unless appellant makes both Strickland showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Strickland,
Furthermore, we have repeatedly held that matters of trial strategy and tactics, evеn if arguably improvident, fall within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment and are not grounds for a finding of ineffectiveness of counsel. Springs v. State,
IV. Failure to Call Appellant as a Witness on His Own Behalf
As his final point, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that ^defense counsel was ineffective in failing to call him as a witness on his own behalf. Specifically, appellant asserts that defense counsel advised him, through coercion
We cannot say that the circuit court erred in denying relief on this claim. “The accused has the right to choose whether to testify on his own behalf. Counsel may only advise the accused in making the decision. The decision to testify is purely one of strategy.” Chenowith v. State,
In his petition for postconviction relief, appellant stated that defense counsel advised him that if he testified on his own behalf, he would be оpen to questioning on his prior felony convictions. Thus, it appears that defense counsel made a professional judgment that it would be improvident for appellant to testify given his criminal history. While another attorney may have assessed the situation differently, the decision to advise a client tо testify on his own behalf is a tactical one within the realm of counsel’s professional judgment, and matters of trial tactics and strategy are not grounds for postconviction relief. Isom,
The circuit court’s denial of postconviction relief is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant subsequently filed a "Motion Requesting Leave to File an Amended or Supplemental Rule 37.1 Petition," which the circuit court denied on the grounds that appellant’s motion failed to identify any grounds that he was unaware of at the time he filed his original Rule 37.1 petition.