Hiawatha Manor Association, Inc. v. AbernathyHiawatha Manor Association, Inc. v. Abernathy
SO ORDERED. SIGNED 22nd day of April, 2026
Randal S. Mashburn
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Plaintiff Hiawatha Manor Association, Inc. (the “Debtor“) filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 6, 2025, with the stated goal of selling two improved parcels of real property that are divided into condominium units and then fractionally owned in weekly timeshare intervals. Bankruptcy is sometimes used as a mechanism to facilitate sales of property. In fact, there are probably as many sales arising out of Chapter 11 in this district as reorganizations. In this case, the bankruptcy sales process is being used in a somewhat unconventional manner to take timeshare property interests held by several thousand owners and convert the real estate back to fee simple ownership.
The Court has at times expressed some hesitation about the Debtor’s goals and has insisted on extensive transparency and maximum due process to protect the rights of the multitude of timeshare owners. After a year of effort and multiple hearings, the Debtor has satisfied the Court’s concerns. The proposed sale of the whole properties benefits the bankruptcy estate as well as the defendant timeshare owners. The Debtor may proceed with selling its own and all co-owner interests in the properties pursuant to
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties and the Properties
The Debtor is a Tennessee non-profit corporation and the condominium owners’ association for Hiawatha Manor Resort (the “East Property“), located at 8005 Cherokee Trail, Crossville, Tennessee 38572. This is the property at issue in Hiawatha Manor Association, Inc. v. Abernathy, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051. The East Property has 47 condominium units, and the Debtor owns approximately 1,764 timeshare intervals as tenant-in-common with other timeshare
Hiawatha Manor West (the “West Property“, and together with the East Property, the “Properties“), located at 8007 Cherokee Trail, Crossville, Tennessee 38572, is the property at issue in Hiawatha Manor Association, Inc. v. Carrara, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052. The West Property has 70 condominium units, and the Debtor owns 70 timeshare intervals as tenant-in-common with other timeshare owners. The West Property has a separate owner’s association, the Hiawatha Manor West Association, Inc. (the “West Association“), which holds and administers timeshare interests in that property. There are approximately 2,800 timeshare intervals not owned by the Debtor, and the West Association itself also owns a portion of the timeshare intervals. With the exception of the West Association, the other timeshare owners are named as defendants in that adversary proceeding.
Both Properties are situated in or near the Lake Tansi Village Resort. They were developed to be timeshare properties and were organized under Tennessee’s Horizontal Property Act approximately 45 years ago. The Properties are currently managed by HPP Property Services LLC, d/b/a Lemonjuice Solutions (“Lemonjuice“).
Property Decline and Financial Distress
The Debtor described years of declining ownership participation in the payment of homeowner fees, resulting in declining maintenance of the Properties. Since 1979, thousands of timeshare intervals have been sold in Hiawatha East, but owner delinquencies have climbed to approximately 75 percent, leading to severe shortfalls in collection of dues or maintenance fees. Many owners have abandoned their interests or transferred their interests to timeshare relief
According to Lemonjuice, Hiawatha West has suffered similar financial losses and difficulty maintaining its property.
Retention of Lemonjuice and Steps Taken Toward Sale
In February 2024, the Debtor replaced its management company with Lemonjuice. The Debtor alleges that its prior management company, which managed both the East and West Properties, contributed to the Debtor’s revenue shortfalls and financial distress. Lemonjuice was retained to both manage the East Property and identify a strategy to restore the Debtor’s financial stability and address the East Property’s deteriorating operations. Strategies to be considered included reorganization, termination of the timeshare structure, or outright sale of the East Property.
In August 2024, the Board of Hiawatha West followed the Debtor’s course of action and retained Lemonjuice for the same purposes of evaluating the West Property’s financial viability and identifying a path to stability.
Upon its retention at each Property, Lemonjuice assumed management duties and began examining and reconciling title status, delinquency levels, owner abandonments, budget deficiencies, and unpaid maintenance accounts.
In November 2024, the Debtor and the West Association entered into a shared services agreement, pursuant to which the West Association agreed to provide spa and laundry services to the East Property for a yearly fee, while also agreeing to transfer to the Debtor 70 timeshare
In February and March 2025, the Debtor solicited consent from the co-owners of the East Property to terminate the timeshare structure and sell the property. The Debtor obtained the consent of the owners of more than 700 intervals, representing approximately 99% of responding owners, but the amount was insufficient to satisfy the voting requirements in the property Declarations.2
Unable to obtain the required owner consent to sell outside bankruptcy, the Debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2025.
With approval from the Court, the Debtor has retained Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXI“) and HREC Investment Advisors (“HREC“) to market and sell the Properties. The two companies have different expertise and responsibilities in the sale process and prior experience working together. CREXI has a commercial real estate auction platform, and HREC is the largest hospitality-only commercial real estate brokerage in the country. They have already begun a broad marketing campaign.
In November 2025, the Debtor filed a motion for approval of bidding procedures, auction, and sale of the Properties (the “Sale Motion“). (Case. No. 25-01916, Doc. 110.) The Court set the Sale Motion for hearing along with pretrial conferences in these adversary proceedings on January 20, 2026. The Court approved the bid procedures and allowed the Debtor to proceed with the sale process, subject to further objection by March 9, 2026, and a determination of the
Adversary Proceedings and Motions for Summary Judgment
The Debtor commenced the two adversary proceedings contemporaneously with its Chapter 11 filing in May 2025. While the Debtor is pursuing approval pursuant to
In support of its motions for summary judgment, the Debtor primarily relies on declarations submitted by two witnesses: Alexander Krakovsky, the CEO of Lemonjuice; and Paul Sexton, a Managing Director with the Debtor’s commercial real estate broker, HREC. Mr. Krakovsky provided the following three declarations, with substantially similar versions filed in each of the adversary proceedings: Declaration (mislabeled “Affidavit“) of Alexander Krakovsky filed on January 19, 2026 (“First Krakovsky Declaration“; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. 42; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052, Doc. 43); Unsworn Declaration of Alexander Krakovsky dated March 19, 2026 (“Second Krakovsky Declaration“; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. 50, pp. 14-15); Unsworn Declaration of Alexander Krakovsky dated April 6, 2026 (“Third Krakovsky Declaration“; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. 55; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052, Doc. 51). The Debtor also submitted an Unsworn Declaration of Paul Sexton. (“Sexton Declaration“; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. 50, pp. 22-24.)
Linda Simmons, a co-owner in the East Property and a defendant in the Abernathy proceeding, objected to summary judgment in both proceedings and objected to most of the
The West Association filed a written statement in support of the sale of the West Property and Debtor’s motions for summary judgment. No other party responded to the motions.
On March 31, 2026, the Court conducted a hearing and heard arguments from the Debtor’s counsel and Ms. Simmons. The Court accepted supplemental record evidence after the hearing and allowed a further opportunity for any response to that supplemental proof.
DISCUSSION
The Debtor requests a determination on summary judgment that it may sell the Properties, including co-owners’ shares, free and clear of co-owners’ interests pursuant to
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issues of material fact exist. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once a summary judgment movant has met his burden, the “opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must cite to appropriate materials in the record,
“When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, th[e] [c]ourt views the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Petsche v. Hruby, No. 25-3323, ___ F. 4th ___, 2026 WL 915045, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2026) (citation omitted).
II. Ms. Simmons’ Objections
In a case such as this, when individual timeshare interests have little, if any, value, the Court would not expect significant involvement from the defendant co-owners. There is simply not enough at stake for any single timeshare owner to participate in a meaningful way. In fact, of the more than 4,000 defendants in the adversary proceedings, only one defendant filed an answer to either complaint for declaratory judgment on the
The Court has conducted numerous pretrial and status conferences and allowed defendants to join remotely. Approximately a dozen co-owners or their family members appeared at some of these conferences to monitor the sale process and obtain information. Several expressed their support for the sale. None expressed opposition. Those that have participated have generally not been concerned about the sale but rather were most interested in being sure that they would no longer have responsibility for timeshare fees.
Since participation by the affected defendants has been so limited, the Court appreciates that one defendant has been active, as her concerns could align with some of the other co-owners who were not inclined to get involved. Ms. Simmons has been both an active and a persistent participant in the bankruptcy case and these proceedings. Because she is the only co-owner to become an active participant and has handled the matter without a lawyer, the Court has been extremely lenient in allowing her voice to be heard and taken seriously.
At times Ms. Simmons has filed “no objection” responses that she indicates are intended only to inform the Court of what she perceives to be flaws in the Debtor’s filings, not to oppose the relief requested. (See, e.g., Notice Regarding Scope of Issue Not Adjudicated in Connection with Debtor’s [Sale Motion], Case No. 25-01916, Doc. 110.) Ms. Simmons’ objections to the Debtor’s motions for summary judgment are additional examples of Ms. Simmons objecting to form, but not substance.
Ms. Simmons filed objections to the motions in both proceedings, though she is only party to one. While she requests the Court deny both motions for summary judgment due to what she perceives to be deficiencies in the motions and proof, she has indicated multiple times that she does not oppose sale of the Properties. In fact, the deadline to object to the Debtor’s Sale Motion
Further, at the March 31 hearing, Ms. Simmons reiterated that she does not oppose the sale of the Properties or the sale of her interest. When asked by the Court if she wanted a trial if summary judgment were denied, she stated she did not. Although she denies that her intent is to drive up the Debtor’s costs or delay the sale, that would be the effect of denial of summary judgment simply to augment the record with numerous documents about facts that are not disputed.
Ms. Simmons’ objections to summary judgment resulted in the Court requiring the Debtor to submit some additional evidence to support some aspects of its requests. Ms. Simmons was given an opportunity to respond to this additional proof, but she filed nothing to dispute the supplemental information, and her deadline for a response has now passed.
The Court has considered Ms. Simmons’ objections and finds them to lack merit, except where they mirrored the Court’s own concerns with the adequacy of the Debtor’s proof on particular
A. Objection in Carrara, Adv. Pro. No. 25-90052
Ms. Simmons owns a timeshare interest in the East Property, and she is a defendant in the Abernathy proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051. She claims no ownership in the West Property, and she is not a party to the Carrara proceeding, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052. However, she filed a limited objection in that proceeding based on the Debtor’s failure to name the West Association as a defendant.
Ms. Simmons provided no support or argument for her having standing as a non-party with no ownership interest in the West Property that would be affected in the Carrara proceeding, and
The West Association owns timeshare interests in the West Property, so it is one of the co-owners affected by the Debtor’s proposed sale. It also has an interest in the proposed sale as the homeowners’ association for the West Property. The West Association has long supported the Debtor’s efforts to sell the West Property through its bankruptcy case. The Court takes judicial notice of the docket in the main bankruptcy case and multiple sale-related hearings, as well as the pretrial conferences in these adversary proceedings. Counsel for the West Association entered an appearance in the bankruptcy case on September 4, 2025. Thereafter, he appeared at multiple sale-related hearings and pretrial conferences and expressed the West Association’s general support for the sale. Furthermore, the West Association filed a written statement in support of the Debtor’s motion for summary judgment and proposed sale. (Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052, Doc. No. 48.)
While the West Association perhaps could have been named as a defendant in the Carrara proceeding, the Debtor obtained the West Association’s consent and support for the sale free and clear of its interests. The Debtor is effectively relying on
B. Objections in Abernathy, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051
In the Abernathy proceeding, Ms. Simmons disputes most of the Debtor’s statements of material facts. (See Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. No. 49.) To contest the Debtor’s facts and evidence and present a genuine dispute, Ms. Simmons must (i) cite to “particular parts of materials in the record,” (ii) show that the materials cited by the Debtor “do not establish the absence … of a genuine dispute,” or (iii) show that the Debtor “cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
With rare exceptions addressed herein, Ms. Simmons does not cite to record materials to dispute the Debtor’s facts. Instead, she either argues that the Debtor “has not produced admissible evidence” of facts, or that she has been prevented from presenting facts and evidence to dispute the Debtor’s facts.
1. Inadequate Documentation
Ms. Simmons disputes most, if not all, statements by Mr. Krakovsky that might be based on the Debtor’s books and records. In her responses to many of the Debtor’s statements of material facts, she argues that the “Debtor has not produced admissible evidence supporting” the facts. She does not argue that any of the Debtor’s declaration evidence is inadmissible. Instead, she appears to argue that a fact is not supported unless the Debtor includes in the record all documents that relate in any way to the factual assertion.
Ms. Simmons presents no legal authority for her argument that a statement based on personal knowledge of a company’s books and records is inadequate proof in the absence of actually filing every possible document that could be relevant to the factual assertion. In fact, such
2. Facts Unavailable
Ms. Simmons also argued that she cannot present evidence to dispute the Debtor’s facts because the Debtor has not produced documents. Summary judgment may be delayed when an opposing party “shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition[.]”
Ms. Simmons filed an affidavit in support of her Rule 56(d) request, in which she says she needs additional time for discovery concerning the Debtor’s governance authority, ownership interests in the two Properties, and vaguely, “related transactions.” (Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. No. 48-1, ¶¶ 3, 6.) She says she served requests for production of documents to the Debtor on January 30 and February 2, 2026, and the Debtor has not yet produced responsive documents.
The Court does not find Ms. Simmons’ request for additional time for discovery to be justified. Since Ms. Simmons expressly does not oppose the sale of the Properties, including her
A critical flaw in Ms. Simmons’ argument about unavailability of factual information is that she declined to take advantage of the access to documents she and all other timeshare owners were given. From very early in the bankruptcy case and these proceedings, the Court has insisted on transparency and has pressed the Debtor to provide easy access to documents relevant to the sale and
As of at least September 23, 2025, the Data Room was populated and accessible. (See Order Regarding the Status of Debtor’s Disclosure of Information and Implementation of Use of Data Rooms, Case No. 25-01916, Doc. 93.). The Court did not mandate what should be included in the Data Room. However, by order entered on September 25, the Court stated it would promptly address any issues regarding sufficiency of information or accessibility upon the filing of an appropriate motion. (Id.) The Debtor specifically provided Ms. Simmons with instructions for accessing the Data Room by email on September 8, 2025, and told her whom to contact if she had any difficulty. (See Reply, Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. 50, Ex. A.)
Ms. Simmons has had six months to access the Data Room, but, by her own admission at the hearing on March 31, she has not done so. She stated she does not want to sign the agreement required for accessing the Data Room, which places restrictions on use and sharing of the documents. She has never moved the Court for relief from that agreement or argued that it is any
Apparently, Ms. Simmons seeks to circumvent the Protective Order and Data Room restrictions by serving document production requests on the Debtor without first investigating what documents have already been provided to her in the Data Room. She cannot end-run the Protective Order and Data Room by serving discovery requests, because the Protective Order expressly applies to discovery, and it states that the Debtor may produce discovery through the Data Room. (Id.) Ms. Simmons has not sought relief from the Protective Order.
As the party requesting additional time under Rule 56(d), Ms. Simmons has the burden of showing that specific information material to summary judgment is unavailable to her and that she has not had a reasonable opportunity to obtain it. Without having even looked to see what is available to her, she cannot say what is unavailable.3 Ms. Simmons has not acted diligently to obtain discovery, and her request for additional time to do so is denied.
3. Objections Relating to the Debtor’s Authority
Ms. Simmons objects that, as a threshold matter, the Debtor has not shown it had the authority to initiate the adversary proceeding and “execute the transactions on which its claims depend,” which the Court takes to mean, filing the bankruptcy and moving to sell the Properties. The Debtor’s petition included the normal declaration under penalty of perjury, signed by the Debtor’s President, and stating that he was authorized to sign the petition on behalf of the Debtor. The Debtor points to that declaration and the written consent of the board, attached thereto, which
In objecting to summary judgment, Ms. Simmons does not argue that the Debtor lacked authority or point to any record evidence that demonstrates a lack of authority. Without any contrary evidence, she has not shown a genuine dispute.
4. Objections Relating to the Debtor’s Ownership
Ms. Simmons objects that the Debtor has not presented sufficient proof of its ownership interests in the East Property and the West Property.
With respect to the East Property, Mr. Krakovsky stated in his initial Declarations that the Debtor owned 1,764 timeshare weeks. Ms. Simmons argues generally that the Krakovsky Declaration is inadequate because it does not attach all of the underlying documentary proof of ownership. As explained earlier, the Debtor need not include in the summary judgment record all of the books and records upon which sworn statements by persons familiar with those records are based.
Ms. Simmons also argues that the 1,764 number appears to be inaccurate based on various records. The Court finds these arguments to be irrelevant. While the Debtor’s ownership of some units in the East Property is material to
To the extent the Debtor’s allegedly inaccurate ownership records resulted in a co-owner not being named as a defendant or personally served, as opposed to being served through publication, any argument as to insufficiency of service or lack of notice is for the affected co-owner to raise, not Ms. Simmons. See In re Dark Rhiino Sec., Inc., 2026 WL 1020585, at *7. The
With respect to the West Property, Ms. Simmons argues that the Debtor has not demonstrated the legitimacy of the transfer of 70 timeshare weeks from West Association to the Debtor. First, proof of this transfer is only materially relevant to the Carrara adversary proceeding to which Ms. Simmons is not a party. Second, the Debtor presented adequate proof of ownership, and Ms. Simmons has not demonstrated a genuine dispute. Mr. Krakovsky stated in his initial declarations that the Debtor “holds” the 70 units. (Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90051, Doc. No. 42, ¶ 5; Adv. Pro. No. 2:25-ap-90052, Doc. No. 43, ¶ 5.) Ms. Simmons herself filed a copy of a Quitclaim Deed evidencing the transfer of the 70 units from the West Association to the Debtor. (Simmons Obj., Ex. 2.) Yet she complains of a lack of further background evidence such as proof that the person signing the Deed on behalf of West Association had authority to do so, and that the Debtor had authority to acquire the units. If she believes there is a lack of authority, it is her burden to produce evidence of it. Instead, the Quitclaim Deed bolsters the Debtor’s statement of ownership, instead of disputing it. The only flaws she points out appear to be typographical or clerical errors in the
Ms. Simmons has clearly dug deep to find something to challenge about a sale that she does not oppose. Her overall efforts in these proceedings have resulted in more openness and clarity about the Debtor’s actions, but her objections to summary judgment on this point lack merit or support, and the Court finds it to be without genuine dispute that the Debtor owns 70 units in the West Property.
5. Objections Relating to § 363(h) Factors
In addition to her general evidentiary objections, Ms. Simmons also argued that conclusory statements in the Debtor’s declarations are insufficient to satisfy factors (2) and (3) of
On April 6, 2026, the Debtor filed a third Declaration of Alexander Krakovsky in each of the proceedings. Ms. Simmons did not file a response indicating any further dispute. With the addition of this Declaration, the Court finds that the Debtor has satisfied its burden on summary judgment.
While the Court has concluded that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, it must still determine that the Debtor is entitled to the relief sought as a matter of law based on those undisputed facts. The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor-in-possession to sell both the estate’s interest in property as well as any co-owners’ interest in that property when the debtor has an undivided interest as tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, if certain conditions are satisfied.
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-owners is impracticable;
(2) sale of the estate’s undivided interest in such property would realize significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners;
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; and
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power.
Id.
The fourth condition is clearly satisfied in this case, as the Properties are used as vacation timeshare condominiums. The Court will discuss the other three conditions in order.
A. Partition in Kind is Impracticable
“Partition in kind means to split or physically divide real property among two or more co-owners who each receive a proportionate share of the real property.” Weinman v. Feshaye (In re Sbahtu), No. 22-14103 TBM, 2024 WL 206342, at *17 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 18, 2024); see also 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partition § 3 (Feb. 2026) (“In a partition in kind, the property is physically divided, and the individual interests of each joint owner are severed so that, after partition, each has the right to enjoy an estate, or dispose of the estate, without hindrance from the other.“). The
There are 47 condominium units for the East Property and 70 units for the West Property. Ownership of those units is divided into weekly timeshare interests, with more than a thousand co-owners per Property. It is fairly obvious that there is no further physical partition of these Properties among the thousands of co-owners that would be practicable.5 Incidentally, none of the co-owners has shown any desire for partition in kind.
B. Comparative Sale Values
Section 363(h) requires the Court to consider whether the “sale of the estate’s undivided interest in such property would realize significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the interests of such co-owners.”
The Debtor’s evidence regarding the comparative values comes from its commercial real estate broker and Mr. Krakovsky. Mr. Krakovsky has 11 years of experience in the timeshare industry, including service on resort boards of directors and direct involvement in the evaluation, repositioning, and sale of timeshare properties. He has overseen the sale of numerous whole-property timeshare resorts, both in and outside bankruptcy proceedings. He is familiar with the challenges of marketing timeshare properties as individual intervals and as whole properties, and he is aware of the market conditions for the proposed sale in this case.
The Debtor’s real estate broker, HREC, estimates the combined sale value for the Properties to be $5,000,000, with $2,000,000 attributable to the East Property and $3,000,000 allocated to the West Property. Of these amounts, Mr. Krakovsky estimates that the Debtor will receive approximately $1,000,000 from the sale proceeds for its ownership interests.
In contrast, the condition of the Properties and the declining interest in timeshare ownership are such that Mr. Krakovsky believes the Debtor’s timeshare intervals to have negative value. His opinion is supported by numerous facts, as well as photos of the Properties showing disrepair.
In Mr. Krakovsky’s experience, the timeshare industry as a whole has been trending down, with little to no market for the purchase and sale of timeshare interests. The downward trend is exhibited with the Properties at issue here.
Recently, the developer (a professional timeshare sales organization) gave the Debtor 2,005 timeshare intervals in the East Property that it had been unable to sell for years. Similarly, the developer gave the Hiawatha West Association all of its intervals in the West Property. The developer handed the shares over to the Debtor for no cost, after several years of not paying its share of the maintenance fees.
Many owners have also deeded back their intervals to the Debtor and the West Association – 316 for East and 700 for West. Others have sold their intervals to timeshare relief companies. Both of these options for divesting themselves of their timeshare intervals would have cost the owners hundreds of dollars, and in some instances, thousands.
The Properties are in poor condition, which would make them unattractive to individual buyers. Nine of the units in the East Property are shuttered due to structural damage. And more than half of the units in the West Property are closed due to life safety or structural issues.
The Debtor has provided ample proof that sale of the whole Properties will realize significantly more for the estate than the unsaleable timeshare interests.
C. Benefit to Estate vs. Detriment to Co-Owners
The Debtor has also shown that “the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners.”
After payment of creditors, with there being no equity holders, excess proceeds from the Debtor’s share will be added to the distributions to be paid to co-owners for their ownership interests. The Debtor estimates that owners in the East Property may be entitled to receive approximately $622 per timeshare interval, and owners in the West Property could receive approximately $1,868 per timeshare interval. Therefore, individual co-owners should directly benefit financially from the sale of the Properties.6 The Debtor has stated repeatedly, and most recently in the Third Krakovsky Declaration, that the Debtor will not pursue timeshare owners for collection of delinquent maintenance fees upon consummation of a sale.
On the other hand, continued ownership by the existing owners would likely be detrimental. The physical condition of the Properties is declining to the extent of units becoming uninhabitable. With no prospect for increased ownership and maintenance fee payments, there is no likelihood of the Debtor or the West Association improving the condition of the Properties and
Both the estate and the individual co-owners should benefit from the proposed sale.
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed material facts, the Court concludes that the Debtor’s proposed sale of the East Property and the West Property as whole properties, including co-owner interests, benefits both the estate and the co-owners and satisfies all conditions of
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