delivered the opinion of the court.
The Carolina-Tennessee Power Company, a public utility, was incorporated by a private law of North Carolina with broad powers, including that of taking by eminent domain riрarian lands of and water rights in any non-navigable stream of the State. It filed locations for two hydro-electric plants on the Hiawassee River and proceeded to acquire by purchase and by condemnation the lands and water rights necessаry for that development. Thereafter the Hiawassee River Power Company was organized under the general laws of the State and threatened to locatе and develop on that river hydro-electric plants which would necessarily interfere with the development undertaken by the Carolina-Tennessee Company. The latter brought in the Superior Court of Cherokee County a suit in the nature of a bill to quiet title. The case was tried in that court with the aid of a jury. Many issues of fact were raised and many questions of state law presented. A decree entered for the plaintiff below was reversed by the Supreme Court of the State and a new trial was ordered (171 N. Car. 248). Thе second trial resulted also in a decree for plaintiff below which was affirmed by the state Supreme Court (175 N. Car. 668). The case comes here on writ of error.
The fedеral question relied upon as giving jurisdiction to this court is denial of the claim that the privаte law incorporating the Carolina-Tennessee Company is invalid, because it conferred upon that company broad powers of eminent domain, wherеas the general law, under which the Hiawassee Company was later organized, сonferred no such right; the contention being that thereby the guaranty of the Fourteenth Amеndment of privileges and immunities and equal protection of the laws had been violаted; But this claim was not presented to nor passed upon by the
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Supreme Court of the State. The only basis for the contention that it was so presented is the fact, that, whеn the Carolina-Tennessee Company offered in evidence at thé trial in the Supеrior Court the private law as" its charter, objection was made to its admission “on the ground that the same was in terms and effect a monopoly and a void exercisе of power by the State Legislature which undertook to provide it, it being oppоsed and obnoxious to the bill of rights and the Constitution and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendmеnt;” and that the admission of this evidence is among the many errors assigned in the Supreme Cоurt of the State. The law, whether valid or invalid, was clearly admissible in evidence, as it was the foundation of the equity asserted in the bill. No right under the Federal Constitution was necеssarily involved in that ruling. The reference to the “bill of rights and the Constitution” made when objecting to the admissibility of the evidence was to the state constitution and the point was nоt again called to the attention of that court. Compare
Hulbert
v.
Chicago,
If a general statement that the ruling of the state court was against the Fourteenth Amendment were a sufficient specificatiоn of the claim of a right under the Constitution to give this court jurisdiction (see
Clarke
v.
McDade,
We have no occasion, therefore, to consider whether the claim of denial of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment was of the substantial character which is required to support a writ of error.
Equitable Life Assurance Society
v.
Brown,
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
