25 N.J. Eq. 24 | New York Court of Chancery | 1874
The bill is filed for an injunction to restrain the defendant from prosecuting two suits at law, brought by hitn in the Supreme Court of this state. One of them is against the complainant and Augustus B. Smith and Jacob L. Martin, upon a promissory note for $250, dated December 10th, 1869, made by Smith and Martin, as partners, to the order of the complainant, and by him endorsed to the defendant, and two bank checks drawn by Smith and Martin, as partners, on the Union National Bank of Rahway, payable to the order of the complainant, and by him endorsed to the
The view I take of the case renders it unnecessary to con.siderthe question raised on the argument, as to the nature of the business relation of the parties toward each other, whether they were partners inter sese or not. They agree as to the ■character of the transactions, that they were jointly interested in them, and as to the extent of their respective interests. It is also undisputed that no final settlement has been made between them. Nor is any question made as to the defendant’s right to recover from the complainant the amount of the checks and note in suit, but for the allowances claimed in re_ .spect to the mortgage and remittances before referred to. As to the former it is enough to say that the answer denies that it has been assigned for value, but alleges that it was assigned to a creditor of the defendant as collateral security for a precedent debt, and that by reason of the large amount of prior ■ encumbrances on the mortgaged premises it is of no value. But if the allegation of the bill were true that it has been .assigned by the defendant for its full value, the complainant might avail himself of the fact in the suits at law. It would be a payment pro tanto.
The remaining equity depends on a claim of equitable off.set. Beyond the general statement, that with a view to the payment of the claims now in suit, the complainant remitted to the defendant, out of the proceeds of the business, “ large .sums, amounting in the aggregate to many thousands of dollars, and greatly exceeding the proportion to which the defendant was entitled for his share of the profits,” there is nothing in the bill on which this claim of equitable offset is based, and even this meagre and indefinite statement is not verified except by the complainant’s general affidavit to the truth of his acts set forth in the bill. To maintain an equitable offset, the party seeking the benefit of it must show some equitable ground for being protected against his adversary's demand. The mere existence of a counter demand is
I And nothing in this bill to warrant me in restraining the defendant from proceeding to recover his claims at law. The complainant does not even state his belief that on the accounting for which he prays, there will be a balance found in his favor. And if he had not only so stated, but had sworn to it also, this would not, of itself, have been sufficient ground on which to hold the injunction, for it would still have been but the simple assertion of a counter demand, as to the probable merits of which the court is entirely in the dark. No account is given, no statement made, nor any facts alleged from which the court could even judge whether the complainant would probably be able to establish his claim. The .statements of the bill in this connection are, except as to the amount alleged to have been received on the transfer of the mortgage, (and this is wholly denied by the answer,) a mere assertion of the existence of a counter demand, without particulars, and without statement or even conjecture as to the amount.
On the other hand, the defendant denies that anything would be found to be due from him to the complainant on an accounting, but alleges, that on the contrary, the balance would be largely in his favor.
The injunction must be dissolved with costs.